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 Human Rights in Business 
 The capacity to abuse, or in general affect the enjoyment of human, labour and 
environmental rights has risen with the increased social and economic power 
that multinational companies wield in the global economy. At the same time, 
it appears that it is diffi cult to regulate the activities of multinational companies 
in such a way that they conform to international human, labour and environ-
mental rights standards. This has partially to do with the organization of com-
panies into groups of separate legal persons, incorporated in different states, as 
well as with the complexity of the corporate supply chain. Absent a business 
and human rights treaty, a more coherent legal and policy approach is required. 
 Faced with the challenge of how to effectively access the right to remedy in 
the European Union for human rights abuses committed by EU companies in 
non-EU states, a diverse research consortium of academic and legal institutions 
was formed. The consortium, coordinated by the Globernance Institute for 
Democratic Governance, became the recipient of a 2013 Civil Justice Action 
Grant from the European Commission Directorate General for Justice. A man-
date was thus issued for research, training and dissemination so as to bring 
visibility to the challenge posed and moreover, to provide some solutions for 
the removal of barriers to judicial and non-judicial remedy for victims of business-
related human rights abuses in non-EU states. The project commenced in 
September 2014 and over the course of two years the consortium conducted 
research along four specifi c lines in parallel with various training sessions across 
EU Member States. 
 The research conducted focused primarily on judicial remedies, both jurisdic-
tional barriers and applicable law barriers; non-judicial remedies, both to company-
based grievance. The results of this research endeavour make up the content of 
this report whose aim is to provide a scholarly foundation for policy proposals 
by identifying specifi c challenges relevant to access to justice in the European 
Union and to provide recommendations on how to remove legal and practical 
barriers so as to provide access to remedy for victims of business-related human 
rights abuses in non-EU states. 
 Juan José Álvarez Rubio is Professor of Private International Law at the Uni-
versity of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Spain and Secretary of the Glober-
nance Institute for Democratic Governance. 
 Katerina Yiannibas is an Assistant Professor of Public and Private International 
Law at Deusto University, Spain and a researcher at the Globernance Institute 
for Democratic Governance. 
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 On 24 April 2013, a factory collapsed in the Savar subdistrict of Bangladesh, 
killing more than 1,100 people and injuring more than 3,000. Three years later, 
the name of that factory is synonymous with irresponsible business practices: 
Rana Plaza. Following the disaster, many reports came out about the working 
conditions in the factory, overcrowding and the substandard construction of 
the factory itself. The criticism was not just confi ned to the Rana Plaza factory, 
but was directed at the whole of the Bangladeshi clothing industry and its buy-
ers, many of which are company brands based in the European Union (EU). 
Garments from Rana Plaza were allegedly made for Spanish clothing giant Zara, 
Italian fashion house Benetton, and Irish retailer Primark. 
 However, it is not just European clothing companies that are accused of 
irresponsible behaviour. 1 Other examples include European resource extraction 
companies whose activities were connected to environmental damage in local 
communities, or that have worked together with authoritarian regimes to sup-
press protests against those environmental impacts. Yet other European com-
panies have been accused of maintaining unsafe and unhealthy working 
environments in production facilities operated by their subsidiaries, or violating 
other labour rights. 2 
 The capacity to abuse, or in general affect the enjoyment of human, labour 
and environmental rights, has risen with the increased social and economic 
power that multinational companies (MNCs) wield in the global economy. At 
the same time, it appears that it is diffi cult to regulate the activities of MNCs 
1  The term ‘company’ is used here to denominate non-governmental, for-profi t entities with 
legal personality that conduct commercial transactions. The word ‘companies’ appears to be 
more common in the European context, whereas American and Canadian authors tend to 
refer more to these entities as ‘corporations’. As this report concerns the European Union, 
the authors have opted for the former, noting that for the purposes of this work the two 
terms can be regarded as synonyms. 
2  See for a (non-exhaustive) list of judicial complaints on these issues against European com-
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in such a way that they conform to international human, labour and environ-
mental rights standards. This has partially to do with the organization of com-
panies into groups of separate legal persons, incorporated in different states, as 
well as with the complexity of the corporate supply chain. 3 Absent a business 
and human rights treaty, a more coherent legal and policy approach is required. 
 The debate regarding this policy approach is currently governed by the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘UN Guiding 
Principles’ or UNGPs). 4 Unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights 
Council as an operationalization of the 2008 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework, the UN Guiding Principles have sought to clarify the respective 
roles and responsibilities of states, businesses and those affected by business-
related human rights abuses. The 2008 Framework and the Guiding Principles 
do so through a three-pillar structure: the state duty to protect against third-
party human rights abuses, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
of those affected by their operations, and the right of victims to an effective 
remedy if human rights abuses do occur. 
 The UN Guiding Principles are but the start of the debate, laying down 
issues to be addressed and providing the terminology with which the debate 
can be conducted. The actual legal and policy developments have to come from 
states themselves, in pursuance of their obligations and responsibilities under 
human rights law. Nowhere is this emphasized more than under the First Pillar 
and General Principle 1, putting on states the obligation to ‘protect against 
human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, 
including business enterprises.’ States are thus still the primary actors in securing 
an optimum respect for human rights in business activities. 
 The state duty to protect is complemented by the right of victims to an 
effective remedy. No matter how clear expectations are for companies to conduct 
their activities responsibly, no matter how well developed the legal regime 
governing those activities is, there will always be the need for a remedy for 
victims, when business operations adversely affect their human rights. Neverthe-
less, in the fi rst fi ve years after the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles, the 
third pillar and the right to remedy have received scarce attention. While some 
of the national action plans that have currently been published do acknowledge 
the relevance of the Third Pillar and the right to remedy, the attention paid to 
the Third Pillar in relation to the fi rst two pillars is limited and very few concrete 
recommendations can yet be found. 5 
3  R. Mares, Limits of Supply Chain Responsibility: A Critical Analysis of Corporate Respon-
sibility Instruments (2010)  Nordic Journal of International Law , 79, No 2. 
4  UN HRC, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. 
5  See for a general overview of the National Action Plans drafted thus far, UN OCHCR, 
State National Action Plans, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/
Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx. Note that of those NAPs already written and published, 
all but Colombia and Norway are EU Member States, the latter of course having strong 
ties with the EU. 
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 The right to remedy comprises a large spectrum of interrelated mechanisms, 
some explicitly addressed in the UN Guiding Principles, some more implicitly 
present. At the core are state-based, judicial remedies as recognized in General 
Principle 26, but non-judicial and non-state based mechanisms also play an 
additional part. Regarding judicial mechanisms, states have an obligation to 
remove ‘legal, practical and other relevant barriers’ to effective remedies. Such 
barriers may include lack of jurisdiction by the courts of a particular state, ques-
tions of which law is to be applied, absence of duties of care on the parent 
company, availability of legal funding and representation, and many others. 
Overcoming these barriers requires of states that they develop a clear view of 
which barriers are problematic in their own legal systems, and develop coherent 
policies as to how they will address those barriers. 
 The relevance of this question does not emanate solely from the UN Guiding 
Principles. Victims of business-related human rights abuses have increasingly been 
seeking remedies in the domestic legal systems of the parent companies related 
to a particular rights abuse. This movement has for a time mostly been present 
in the US, where the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 6 has made it possible for plaintiffs 
coming from third states to fi le tort claims over violations of international human 
rights law by US as well as foreign companies in US federal courts. However, 
the US Supreme Court’s recent decisions in  Kiobel v Royal Dutch Shell (133 
S.Ct. 1659 (2013)) regarding the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, and  Daimler 
AG v Bauman (134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)) on the limits of personal jurisdiction in 
US courts, have made US courts less attractive for such claims. Already, more 
and more litigants fi nd their way into European courts concerning human rights 
abuses connected to European companies, either through civil litigation, or as 
injured parties in criminal cases. With the ATS now less accessible to plaintiffs 
litigating against non-US companies, this can only be expected to increase. 
 These are the developments with which the EU is now confronted. As one 
of the early supporters of the UNGP project, the EU plays a ‘leading role in 
the interrelation between business and human rights’, recognizing the UNGPs 
as the ‘authoritative policy framework’. 7 That policy framework permeates the 
EU’s competences in several ways, as the business and human rights debate is 
present in many legal and policy areas. In the area of access to justice, however, 
the EU shares part of those competences with the Member States. Some are 
fully harmonized, such as the applicable law question under the Rome II Regu-
lation; some are partially harmonized, such as civil jurisdiction under the Brussels I 
bis Regulation; and yet others are not harmonized at all, such as non-judicial 
remedies or the availability of legal aid. Any discussion on how the EU should 
6  28 United States Code §1350. 
7  Commission Staff Working Document on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights – State of Play, Brussels, 15 July 2015, SWD (2015) 144 fi nal. 
See also Council of the European Union Conclusions on Business and Human Rights, 
20 June 2016, 10254/16. 
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deal with remedies for business-related human rights abuses must also take into 
account the diversity of competences and policy powers between the EU and 
the Member States on any particular issue. 
 The authors of this report acknowledge the work of several authors that have 
contributed to this discussion with analyses and recommendations, to which 
this report hopes to build upon in the specifi c context of the EU. Key to the 
debate on the right to remedy has been the ‘Third Pillar: Access to Judicial 
Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business’ report by 
Professor Gwynne Skinner, Professor Robert McCorquodale, Professor Olivier 
De Schutter, and Andie Lambe for the International Corporate Accountability 
Roundtable (ICAR), CORE, and the European Coalition for Corporate Justice 
(ECCJ). Also key in the area of right to remedy has been the Report of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on ‘Improving account-
ability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse’, 
A/HRC/32/19. 
 As regards recent work on business and human rights in the European con-
text, two documents have been of specifi c relevance. First, the European Com-
mission Staff Working Document on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights – State of Play’, an internal document describing 
the measures currently taken by the EU and possible gaps in implementing the 
UNGPs. Secondly, the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on human rights and business (CDDH-CORP (2015) R4, 
appendix II) drafted by the Council of Europe’s drafting group on Human 
Rights and Business. While not specifi cally on the right to remedy, both of these 
documents have been informative with regards to the work that has already 
been done in the area of business and human rights responsibilities in Europe. 
 Discussing the right to remedy in the area of business and human rights is 
not just relevant for policy-makers and academics, but also for practitioners 
involved with business and human rights litigation. While plaintiffs have increas-
ingly found their way into EU domestic courts to pursue their claims, indeed 
only a handful of these claims have led to a fi nal verdict, as most have been 
settled at an early stage or dismissed before being argued on the merits. 8 Many 
issues are still left unclear for courts and litigants alike. Even taking into account 
the partial harmonization of European private international law, there is con-
siderable diversity amongst EU Member States as to the rules pertaining to civil 
litigants in business and human rights cases. Familiarity with cases from one 
jurisdiction may not necessarily help claimants fi nd their way in another. Thus, 
a more comprehensive guide for litigants on the obstacles they may face in 
8  R. Meeran, ‘Access to remedy: The United Kingdom experience of MNC tort litigation for 
human rights violations’ in S. Deva and D. Bilchitz (eds.), Human Rights Obligations of 
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
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bringing and arguing their case in various European courts is of great practical 
use. 
 Faced with the challenge of how to effectively access the right to remedy in 
the EU for human rights abuses committed by EU companies in non-EU states, 
a diverse research consortium of academic and legal institutions was formed. 9 
The consortium, coordinated by the Globernance Institute for Democratic 
Governance, became the recipient of a 2013 Civil Justice Action Grant from 
the European Commission Directorate General for Justice. A mandate was thus 
issued for research, training and dissemination so as to bring visibility to the 
challenge posed and, moreover, to provide some solutions for the removal of 
barriers to judicial and non-judicial remedy for victims of business-related human 
rights abuses in non-EU states. The project commenced in September 2014 
and over the course of two years the consortium conducted research along four 
specifi c lines in parallel with various training sessions across EU Member States. 
The research conducted focused primarily on judicial remedies, both jurisdictional 
barriers and applicable law barriers; non-judicial remedies, both company-based 
grievance mechanisms and international arbitration; and substantive law barriers 
concerning the corporate responsibility to respect human rights vis-à-vis a legal 
duty of care, with the goal of providing feasible legal recommendations for the 
EU and Member States. 10 At various research stages, external input was requested 
to engage stakeholders by way of questionnaires or peer review. 
 The results of this research endeavour make up the content of this report, 
the aim of which is to provide a scholarly foundation for policy proposals by 
identifying specifi c challenges relevant to access to justice in the EU, and to 
provide recommendations on how to remove legal and practical barriers so as 
to provide access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses 
in non-EU states. 
 Chapters I and II analyse issues related to access to judicial remedies. Chap-
ter I addresses the jurisdictional challenges that victims of human rights 
abuses committed by EU-based MNCs abroad face in seeking redress in EU 
Member State courts. The role of international human rights law in private 
litigation for human rights abuses by MNCs is analysed. The allocation of 
jurisdiction in transnational tort litigations against MNCs in the EU is discussed 
and compared with the US. Moreover, residual jurisdiction is addressed – the 
 9  The research consortium is composed of the University of Navarra, Frank Bold Society, 
University of Castilla-La Mancha, University of Jaume I, Rovira I Virgili University, Cees 
van Dam Consultancy Ltd., Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, Tilburg Uni-
versity, Utrecht University, Leiden University, Public University of Navarra, Cuatrecasas 
Gonçalves Pereira SLP, University of Rijeka, and coordinated by the Globernance Institute 
for Democratic Governance. 
10 The research focused mainly on civil rather than criminal liability. The choice to focus on 
civil litigation was taken in light of the fact that criminal laws cannot always be applied 
against corporations in many European jurisdictions. 
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rules of jurisdiction governing third-state defendants. In conclusion, Chapter I 
offers some recommendations on how jurisdictional challenges can be addressed. 
 Chapter II addresses the issues concerning applicable law. It thus deals with 
the question of under what circumstances the national rules of tort law of the 
EU Member States would be applied in foreign direct liability cases brought 
before EU Member State courts against EU-based internationally operating 
companies in relation to the harmful impacts of their activities – or those of 
their subsidiaries or business partners – on people and the environment in non-
EU host countries. In addition, Chapter II also addresses some of the main 
practical and procedural barriers that host country victims of corporate human 
rights or environmental abuse may encounter when seeking to get access to 
remedy before EU Member State courts. 
 Chapter III addresses the effectiveness of non-judicial remedies, in particular, 
company-based grievance mechanisms and international arbitration. Analysis is 
presented through detailed case studies on the company-based grievance mecha-
nisms of Siemens and Statoil, as well as a case study on the potential of the 
arbitration mechanism conducted under the auspices of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA). The effectiveness of each mechanism is evaluated based 
on criteria established by the UN Guiding Principles: legitimacy, accessibility, 
predictability, equitability, transparency, rights-compatibility, a source of continu-
ous learning, and engagement and dialogue. 
 Chapter IV deals with the intersection of corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights and European tort law in the context of complex corporate struc-
tures and business relationships. More specifi cally, it considers the relationship 
between a company’s duty of care and the same company’s responsibility to 
address adverse human rights impacts linked to its operations, products or 
services by its business relationships. Chapter IV describes three options for 
legal reform to facilitate corporate responsibility to respect human rights: a 
disclosure obligation in civil law procedure with respect to the defendant-
company’s control over its business partner, a shift of the burden of proof to 
the defendant-company to prove that it did not exercise such control when 
available evidence show control prima facie, and a statutory duty for a company 
to identify, prevent and take action to cease human rights abuses by its business 
partners, analogous to the human rights due diligence outlined in the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, connected with 
liability for the consequential damage. 
 Each chapter, each set of issues, is accompanied by a set of recommenda-
tions. It is our hope that the academic content of these pages translates 
into acts. 
 1  Judicial remedies 
 The issue of jurisdiction 
 Daniel Augenstein and Nicola Jägers 
 1.1 Overview 
 This chapter addresses jurisdictional challenges that third-country victims of 
human rights abuses committed by EU-based ‘multinational’ companies (MNCs) 
face in seeking redress in EU Member State courts. In general terms, private 
international law allocates jurisdiction to courts on the basis of a nexus to the 
forum state. In the EU, this general rule fi nds an expression in the requirement 
that the defendant of a civil action must be domiciled in one of the EU Member 
States. This creates diffi culties in cases of private litigation for human rights 
abuses committed by MNCs where parts of these companies are domiciled 
outside the EU. While from an economic point of view, MNCs operate as 
globally integrated entities, they appear in law as a multitude of separate legal 
companies with different ‘nationalities’. An important consequence of this legal 
sequestration is that victims of human rights abuses committed by EU-based 
MNCs outside the EU face signifi cant obstacles in seeking redress in EU Member 
State courts, should they fi nd no effective remedy in their home state. On the 
one hand, while EU Member State courts generally have jurisdiction over (par-
ent) companies domiciled in the EU, it proves diffi cult to establish the liability 
of these companies in substantive law for human rights abuses committed by 
their subsidiaries and contractors in third countries. On the other hand, while 
third-country victims of human rights abuses often encounter diffi culties in 
obtaining effective redress in their home countries, Member State courts will 
as a general rule decline jurisdiction in cases directly brought against these 
foreign subsidiaries and contractors in the EU. 
 In the second section, these challenges are addressed by way of examining 
the impact of the human right to access to justice and effective remedies on the 
allocation of jurisdiction in private international law. Against this background, 
the third section compares the allocation of jurisdiction under private interna-
tional law in the European Union (Brussels I Regulation) and the United States. 
Particular reference is made to the US Alien Tort Claims Statute, until recently 
a preferred forum for victims seeking civil redress for human rights abuses com-
mitted by MNCs. The fi nal section of the chapter analyses three avenues for 
establishing jurisdiction of EU Member State courts over human rights abuses 
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committed by foreign companies in cases not covered by the Brussels I Regula-
tion (‘residual jurisdiction’). 
 1.2 Impact of international human rights law 
on jurisdiction in private international law 
 1.2.1 Introduction 
 International human rights law can play an important role in private litigation 
for human rights abuses by MNCs. International human rights treaties impose 
obligations on states to prevent and redress corporate human rights abuses 
within their (human rights) jurisdiction. As public institutions of the state, civil 
courts adjudicating disputes between private parties are directly bound by these 
human rights obligations. This includes obligations to ensure victims’ access to 
justice and to effective civil remedies. The important role of the state in ensur-
ing effective civil remedies for victims of corporate human rights abuses has 
been recognized in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs): 
 States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic 
judicial mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, 
including considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant 
barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy. 1 
 In particular, states should ‘ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent 
legitimate cases from being brought before the courts in situations where judicial 
recourse is an essential part of accessing remedy or alternative sources of remedy 
are unavailable’. This also applies to transnational or cross-border litigations 
where ‘claimants face a denial of justice in a host State and cannot access home 
State courts regardless of the merits of the claim’. 2 
 Against this background, the present section focuses on two issues: the obli-
gations of EU Member States to protect human rights in private litigations 
against MNCs and the impact of these obligations on the allocation of jurisdic-
tion in private international law. Substantively, the primary focus is on the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). All Member States of the 
EU are also contracting parties to the ECHR. While, until accession, the EU 
is not directly bound by the ECHR, the latter plays an important role in the 
interpretation of EU law including the EU’s own human rights instrument, the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
1  UN HRC,  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework , A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), 26. 
2  Ibid . 
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 1.2.2 Human rights in private litigation 
 The relationship between human rights and private litigation can be approached 
from two different perspectives. The fi rst perspective, germane to private lawyers, 
asks whether and to what extent civil litigation can be used to vindicate values and 
interests protected by human rights, such as physical integrity, privacy, or individual 
property. Here, the relationship between corporate perpetrators and victims of 
human rights abuses is regulated by private law, and the principal aim of litigation 
is the award of pecuniary damages. The second perspective, germane to public 
lawyers, asks what obligations international human rights law imposes on states to 
protect human rights in the relationship between private actors. Here, the emphasis 
is on state duties to prevent and redress corporate human rights abuses through 
domestic legislation, adjudication, and the proper administration of justice. 
 It is widely accepted that international human rights treaties impose (positive) 
obligations on states to protect human rights in the relationship between private 
actors, including obligations to ensure access to justice and effective civil remedies 
for human rights abuses committed by (‘multinational’) corporations. According 
to the UN Human Rights Committee, for example, a state’s human rights obli-
gations ‘will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the state, 
not just against abuses of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts 
committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of 
Covenant rights’. Inversely, a state may violate its international human rights 
obligations if it fails ‘to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence 
to prevent, punish or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons 
or entities’. 3 The ECHR imposes some obligations on EU Member States to 
secure in their domestic law the individual’s legal status, rights, and privileges 
necessary for an effective enjoyment of their human rights. These obligations 
also require states to ensure human rights protection in the relationship between 
companies and individuals, for example, in the employment context. 
 In  Wilson , the applicants petitioned the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) on grounds of violations of Article 10 (freedom of expression) and 
Article 11 (freedom of assembly) because their employer companies had offered 
them fi nancial incentives to renounce their rights to collective bargaining. The 
House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court) did not fi nd the actions of the 
companies in violation of domestic law. The ECtHR, by contrast, ruled that 
the state must uphold the rights of workers to use trade unions to represent 
them in negotiations with employers: 
 The Court observes at the outset that although the essential object of 
Article 11 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities with the exercise of the rights protected, there may in addition 
3  HRC, General Comment No. 31,  Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant , CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004) para. 8. 
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be positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of these rights. In 
the present case, the matters about which the applicants complain . . . did 
not involve direct intervention by the State. The responsibility of the United 
Kingdom would, however, be engaged if these matters resulted from a 
failure on its part to secure to the applicants under domestic law the rights 
set forth in Article 11 of the Convention . . . [The Court] considers that, 
by permitting employers to use fi nancial incentives to induce employees to 
surrender important union rights, the respondent State has failed in its 
positive obligation to secure the enjoyment of the rights under Article 11 
of the Convention. This failure amounted to a violation of Article 11, as 
regards both the applicant trade unions and the individual applicants. 4 
 The ECHR also imposes obligations on EU Member States concerning the 
judicial process, law enforcement, and the proper administration of justice. The 
court’s case law suggests that states are duty-bound to investigate, punish and 
redress corporate human rights abuses when they occur. Where the legislative 
framework itself is defi cient, states can be obliged to introduce new, or amend 
existing, legislation. Domestic courts are under an obligation to ensure access 
to justice and effective remedies when adjudicating private disputes between 
corporate perpetrators and victims of human rights abuses. The right to an 
effective remedy has both a procedural and a substantive dimension. A victim 
must have practical and meaningful access to a procedure that is capable of 
ending and repairing the effects of the violation. Once the violation is estab-
lished, the victim must receive a relief suffi cient to repair the harm. 
 In  Steel and Morris , the ECtHR had to consider fair trial rights under Article 6 
ECHR in defamation proceedings brought by an MNC against NGO campaign-
ers in the UK. In its judgment, the court recalled that 
 [t]he Convention is intended to guarantee practical and effective rights. This 
is particularly so of the right of access to a court in view of the prominent 
place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial. It is central to 
the concept of fair trial, in civil as in criminal proceedings, that a litigant is not 
denied the opportunity to present his or her case effectively before the court 
and that he or she is able to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side. 5 
 Applying these principles to the case at hand, the ECtHR concluded that the 
applicants were denied the possibility to effective legal representation before the 
domestic court: 
 The disparity between the respective levels of legal assistance enjoyed by 
the applicants and [the company] was of such a degree that it could not 
4  ECtHR  Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v The United Kingdom (Judgment 
of 02 July 2002) paras 41, 48. 
5  ECtHR  Steel and Morris v The United Kingdom (Judgment of 15 February 2005) para. 59. 
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have failed, in this exceptionally demanding case, to have given rise to 
unfairness . . . The lack of procedural fairness and equality therefore gave 
rise to a breach of Article 10 in the present case. 6 
 1.2.3 International human rights law and jurisdiction 
in private international law 
 There are several ways in which private international law can accommodate 
concerns for human rights protection, including through the recognition of 
special grounds of jurisdiction such as  forum necessitatis . The latter, which is 
discussed in more detail in section 1.4, raises a more general question as con-
cerns the relationship between jurisdiction in private international law and the 
state’s human rights obligations in public international law. To the extent that 
international human rights treaties apply extraterritorially, states are duty-bound 
to ensure access to justice and effective civil remedies for third-country victims 
of corporate human rights abuses. To be able to enjoy the protection of their 
human rights in transnational tort litigations against MNCs, victims of corporate 
human rights abuses need to come within the human rights jurisdiction of the 
state concerned. 
 Jurisdiction in private international law determines the competence of state 
courts to hear private disputes involving a foreign element. In most general 
terms, the determining factor is whether there exists a suffi ciently close nexus 
between the facts of the case and the forum state. In EU law, this nexus is 
established through the domicile of the defendant in an EU Member State. 
The allocation of jurisdiction in private international law serves a number of 
different purposes, such as protecting the legitimate interest of private parties 
in cross-border disputes, ensuring an economical judicial process, and avoiding 
confl icting judgments in different states. Yet it is also an expression of the 
delimitation of jurisdiction in public international law that protects the state’s 
sovereign authority over its territory and people therein against undue external 
interference by other states. Jurisdiction in public international law regulates 
states’ legal competence to assert authority in matters not exclusively of domestic 
concern, in accordance with a recognized legal basis and subject to a standard 
of reasonableness. It is commonly divided into prescriptive jurisdiction (the 
state’s authority to prescribe legal rules), enforcement jurisdiction (the state’s 
authority to enforce legal rules), and adjudicative jurisdiction (the authority of 
state courts to adjudicate disputes referred to them). 7 This entails, as Crawford 
notes, that ‘the starting point in this part of the law is the presumption that 
jurisdiction (in all its forms) is territorial, and may not be exercised 
6  Ibid. , paras 69, 95. 
7  The latter category is sometimes subsumed under the state’s prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction, see V. Lowe, ‘Jurisdiction’ in M. Evans (ed.),  International Law (2003) 329, 
333. 
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extra-territorially without some specifi c basis in international law’. 8 Moreover, 
it suggests that the competence of state courts in private international law to 
hear disputes involving extraterritorial corporate human rights abuses is con-
strained by the state’s jurisdiction under public international law. 9 
 The way in which public international law constrains states’ jurisdictional 
competences to assert legal authority outside their borders has also informed 
debates about the extraterritorial application of international human rights trea-
ties. The text of Article 1 ECHR does not suggest that human rights jurisdiction 
should be delimited by state territory but simply provides that ‘the High Con-
tracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defi ned in . . . this Convention’. Nevertheless, according to the 
ECtHR, ‘jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the 
State’s territory’ and ‘acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing 
effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within 
the meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional circumstances’. 10 Whether acts 
performed, or producing effects, outside the state’s territory bring an individual 
under that state’s human rights jurisdiction for the purpose of triggering cor-
responding extraterritorial human rights obligations depends on the establish-
ment of a qualifi ed relationship of power and control between the state and the 
individual victim. Importantly, whether a state asserts power and control over 
an individual outside its borders is established independently of whether that 
state was legally competent in public international law to exercise jurisdiction 
on the territory of another state. 11 According to the ECtHR, the decisive factor 
for establishing a ‘jurisdictional link’ between the applicants and the respondent 
state is not the (il)legality of state action but the state’s exercise of power and 
control, whether directly or indirectly, over foreign territory and people therein. 12 
Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee considers that ‘a state party must 
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the [International Covenant on Civil 
 8  J. Crawford,  Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (2012, 8th ed.) 456. 
 9  Although it should be noted that the risk of civil courts unduly interfering with the sov-
ereignty of other states by assuming jurisdiction over extraterritorial corporate human rights 
violations is mitigated in those cases that are decided according to the substantive law of 
the third state, see O. de Schutter, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a tool for improving the 
Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations’ (2006). Accessible at http://
business-humanrights.org/en/pdf-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-as-a-tool-for-improving-the-human-
rights-accountability-of-transnational-corporations. 
10  ECtHR (Grand Chamber),  Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (Judgment of 7 July 
2011) para. 131. 
11  The implications of this difference between establishing jurisdiction in general public 
international law and international human rights law are further elaborated in D. Augenstein 
and D. Kinley, ‘Beyond the 100 Acre Wood: in which international human rights law fi nds 
new ways to tame global corporate power’, 19(6)  The International Journal of Human 
Rights (2015) 828–848. 
12  Al Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (Judgment of 7 July 2011) paras 136–138. 
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and Political Rights] to anyone within [its] power or effective control . . . even 
if not situated within the territory of the state party . . . and regardless of the 
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained’. 13 Accord-
ingly, as per the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, ‘the inquiry 
turns not on the presumed victim’s nationality or presence within a particular 
geographic area, but on whether, under the specifi c circumstances, the state 
observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control’. 14 
 Foreign victims of corporate human rights abuses also come under the ‘author-
ity and control’ and therewith the human rights jurisdiction of an EU Member 
State by bringing legal proceedings in the domestic courts of that Member 
State. In  White v Sweden , for example, the applicant living in Mozambique 
complained that two publications in Swedish newspapers associating him with 
various crimes (including the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme) violated 
his right to private and family life as protected by Article 8 ECHR. 15 Before 
turning to the Strasbourg court, Mr White had brought a private prosecution 
for defamation against the newspapers in Sweden. The responsible editors were 
acquitted by a Swedish District Court, a judgment that was upheld on appeal. 
Without further ado, the ECtHR considered the applicant to be within Sweden’s 
jurisdiction for the purpose of Article 1 ECHR and simply noted that ‘this 
complaint is not manifestly ill-founded . . . [nor] inadmissible on any other 
grounds. 16 
 The ECHR does not directly provide for a right of foreign victims to bring 
civil proceedings against MNCs in a European Member State. However, when 
victims of corporate human rights abuses attempt to bring such proceedings, 
EU Member State courts deciding on their jurisdiction under private interna-
tional law must have due regard to their human rights obligations to ensure 
access to justice under Article 6 ECHR. This was confi rmed by the ECtHR 
Grand Chamber judgment in  Markovic – a case that concerned the attempt of 
applicants from Serbia and Montenegro to bring civil proceedings in Italy for 
human rights abuses committed during a NATO airstrike in Belgrade in 1999. 17 
The Italian courts declined jurisdiction because the claimants were not entitled 
under Italian law to seek reparation from the Italian state for civil damages 
incurred as a result of a violation of public international law. The ECtHR, by 
contrast, unanimously held that the claimants came under the Italy’s human 
13  HRC  General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant , CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, 10. 
14  IACHR,  Coard et al v The United States (Judgment of 29 September 1999) para. 37. 
15  ECtHR,  White v Sweden (Judgment of 19 December 2006). 
16  Ibid ., para. 16. 
17  ECtHR (Grand Chamber),  Markovic and Others v Italy (Judgment of 14 December 2006). 
The case concerned the same facts as the ECtHR’s previous admissibility decision in 
 Banković (see ECtHR,  Banković & Others v Belgium & Others (Admissibility Decision of 
12 December 2001). 
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rights jurisdiction and could therefore benefi t from the state’s obligation to 
ensure access to justice (Article 6 ECHR): 
 If the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right 
claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by 
Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic 
proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any 
other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extrater-
ritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an action 
may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the fi nal outcome 
of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction 
 ratione loci and  ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings 
are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of 
the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights pro-
tected by Article 6. The Court considers that, once a person brings a civil 
action in the courts or tribunals of a State, there indisputably exists, without 
prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings, a ‘jurisdictional link’ for the 
purpose of Article 1. 18 
 At the merits stage, the court gave some further indication as to what is required 
by the European Convention in such cases. On the one hand, Article 6 ECHR 
extends only to disputes over civil rights and obligations ‘which can be said, at 
least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law; it does not 
itself guarantee any particular content for (civil) rights and obligations in the 
substantive law of the Contracting States’. 19 Yet on the other hand, 
 [it] would not be consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society 
or with the basic principle underlying Article 6 § 1 – namely that civil 
claims must be capable of being submitted to a judge for adjudication – if, 
for example, a State could, without restraint or control by the Convention 
enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole 
range of civil claims or immunities or confer immunities from civil liability 
on large groups or categories of persons. 20 
 Moreover, while Article 6 ECHR does not oblige EU Member States to create 
any particular remedy, ‘it can be relied upon by anyone who considers that an 
interference with the exercise of one of his (civil) rights is unlawful and com-
plains that he has not had the possibility of submitting that claim to a tribunal 
meeting the requirements of Article 6 § 1’. 21 
18  Ibid. , paras 53, 54. 
19  Ibid. , para. 93. 
20  Ibid. , para. 97. 
21  Ibid., para. 98. 
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 Various comments and concluding observations of the UN Treaty Bodies 
also suggest that states have obligations under international human rights law 
to prevent and redress abuses committed by MNCs on the territory of another 
state. 22 In its well known General Comment No. 14 on the Right to Health, 
for instance, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
called upon states ‘to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other 
countries, and to prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, 
if they are able to infl uence these third parties by way of legal or political means, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable interna-
tional law’. 23 The Committee’s General Comment on social security provides 
that ‘state parties should extraterritorially protect the right to social security by 
preventing their own citizens and national entities from violating this right in 
other countries’. 24 In 2011, CESCR adopted a ‘Statement of the obligations of 
states parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural 
rights’ in which it called upon states to ‘take steps to prevent human rights 
contraventions abroad by companies which have their main seat under their 
jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations 
of the host states under the Covenant’. 25 Similarly, the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child considers that home states ‘have obligations . . . to respect, protect 
and fulfi l children’s rights in the context of businesses’ extraterritorial activities 
and operations, provided that there is a reasonable link between the state and 
the conduct concerned’. 26 
 Once again, these obligations encompass the prevention and redress of extra-
territorial corporate human rights abuses. In its Concluding Observations on 
Germany, for example, the Human Rights Committee showed itself concerned 
that measures taken by the state to provide remedies against German companies 
violating human rights abroad ‘may not be suffi cient in all cases’. Accordingly, 
the Committee encouraged Germany ‘to take appropriate measures to strengthen 
the remedies provided to protect people who have been victims of activities of 
such business enterprises operating abroad’. 27 Similarly, in its Concluding Obser-
vations on the UK, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
22  For an overview and discussion of the relevant case law and treaty body commentary, see 
the ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011), published with extensive annotations in 34  Human 
Rights Quarterly (2012) 1084–1169. 
23  CESCR,  General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health , 
E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) para. 39. 
24  CESCR,  General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security , E/C.12/GC/19 (4 February 
2008) 54. 
25  CESCR,  Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector and 
economic, social and cultural rights , E/C.12/2011/1 (12 July 2011) para. 5. 
26  CRC,  General Comment 16 on State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector 
on children’s rights , CRC/C/CG/16 (17 April 2013) 43. 
27  HRC,  Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Germany, adopted by the Com-
mittee at its 106th session , 15 October to 2 November (2012) para. 16. 
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(CERD) recommended that ‘the state party should ensure that no obstacles are 
introduced in the law that prevent the holding of transnational companies 
accountable in the state party’s courts when such abuses are committed outside 
the state party’. 28 CERD has also called on the US and Canada to explore ways 
to hold business entities incorporated in their jurisdiction accountable for extra-
territorial violations of the Covenant. 29 
 To conclude, the ECHR imposes obligations on EU Member States to ensure 
access to justice and effective remedies in civil proceedings brought by victims 
of human rights abuses committed by MNCs within their human rights jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, whenever third-country victims of corporate human rights abuses 
attempt to bring civil proceedings in an EU Member State court, they come 
within that Member State’s human rights jurisdiction with the consequence that 
the court has to interpret private international law in the light of the state’s 
human rights obligations under Article 6 ECHR. 
 1.3 Jurisdiction in private international law in Europe 
and the US 
 1.3.1 Introduction 
 This section outlines the EU regulation of jurisdiction in private international 
law and compares it with the approach of the US. In the EU, the allocation of 
civil jurisdiction to Member State courts has been harmonized by the Brussels 
I Regulation. This section outlines the general functioning of, and the rationale 
behind, the Brussels I Regulation. To get a better understanding of Member 
States’ views of human rights issues involved and how they should be addressed, 
the policy debate leading up to the reform of Brussels I (recast) will be discussed, 
with particular reference to questions of jurisdiction in the business and human 
rights context. 30 This is followed by a comparative discussion of the US approach 
to jurisdiction in private international law, including the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
This brief discussion of the developments in the US is promoted by the fact 
that until recently most business and human rights litigation took place before 
US domestic courts. 
28  CERD,  Concluding observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , 
CRD/C/GBR/CO/18–20 (14 September 2011) para. 29. 
29  CERD,  Concluding Observations: United States , CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 May 2008) 
para. 30; CERD,  Concluding Observations: Canada , CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (25 May 
2007) para. 17. 
30  The focus of analysis is on non-contractual (tort) disputes as the most pertinent type of 
cases in the business and human rights domain. Accordingly, specifi c rules pertaining to 
contractual disputes such as choice of court clauses and consumer protection shall not be 
discussed. 
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 1.3.2 The European approach: the Brussels I Regulation 
 In the EU, rules on jurisdiction in civil cases are partially harmonized through 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ 2012 L 351/1, 
also known as the Brussels-I or Brussels-I bis Regulation. 31 Together with the 
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters of 30 October 2007, 32 this Regula-
tion forms the so-called Brussels regime on jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcements of judgments in the EU. This regime contains some of the most 
important rules for establishing jurisdiction in tort cases for corporate human 
rights abuses. 
 1.3.2.1 Scope of application 
 According to Article 1(1), the Regulation applies  ratione materiae to all civil 
and commercial disputes regardless of the court or tribunal, bar matters of 
revenue, customs or administrative disputes, or acts of states in exercise of 
their authority. Article 1(2) further exempts several other procedures, includ-
ing family law, 33 social security, and bankruptcy. According to Article 4(1), 
the Regulation applies  ratione personae to all procedures against persons 
domiciled in one of the EU Member States; conversely, in procedures against 
persons not domiciled in an EU Member State, in principle, the national rules 
on jurisdiction of the state where the cases is brought apply. 34 Whether a 
defendant is domiciled in a Member State is determined by that member 
state’s law on residence whereas, pursuant to Article 63, companies are con-
sidered to be domiciled in the place where they have their statutory seat, 
central administration, or principal place of business. This is particularly relevant 
for the business and human rights context, considering the Regulation only 
applies against those entities in the corporate network that are domiciled in 
the EU. For the rest, it will be up to the law of the Member State whose 
courts are seized for the claim. 
31  This regulation displaced Regulation No. 44/2001 (Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) OJ [2001] L 12/1 on 10 January 2015, which 
in turn superseded the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and 
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
32  Extending the rules of the Brussels I Regulation to Denmark, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland. 
33  Covered by Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of 
parental responsibility (Brussels II Bis). 
34  See further below, section four. 
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 1.3.2.2 Rules on jurisdiction 
 The Regulation’s main purposes are the promotion of free circulation of judg-
ments within the Union, 35 and in pursuance of that goal, creating the highest 
possible degree of legal certainty. 36 The cornerstone of the Brussels I Regulation 
is Article 4(1) which determines both applicability of the Regulation and the 
main ground for jurisdiction, holding that persons domiciled in a Member State 
shall be sued in the courts of that Member State. For legal persons, domicile 
is determined by Article 63(1), where domicile is defi ned as the state where a 
company or other legal person has its statutory seat, 37 central administration or 
principal place of business. As the Brussels I Regulation is a closed system that 
harmonizes Member States’ rules on jurisdiction within its scope of application, 
Member State courts are barred from considering grounds of jurisdiction other 
than those contained within Brussels I. Courts are equally prevented from 
dismissing cases on grounds other than those contained in the Regulation, as 
was clarifi ed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with regard to the non-
applicability of  forum non conveniens in  Owusu v Jackson . 38 Consequently, in 
cases against corporate entities, even when the acts occurred extraterritorially, 
the courts of a Member State will in principle have jurisdiction over the entity 
that is incorporated on that Member State’s territory. 
 Brussels I contains some additions and exceptions to that basic rule, described 
in sections 2–7 of the Regulation. Most relevant for the business and human 
rights context is the additional ground under Article 7(2), giving concurrent 
jurisdiction in cases of tort, delict or quasi-delict to the courts of the Member 
State where the tort was committed, and the state where the harm occurred. 
Additionally, Article 7(3) grants concurrent jurisdiction to the courts of the 
Member State where the same act has already given rise to criminal proceedings. 
Other exceptions are less relevant to tort cases in the business and human rights 
area, such as jurisdiction of the courts of the place of performance of a con-
tractual obligation, jurisdiction in disputes over immovable property, or specifi c 
rules in situations where parties have mutually agreed to a specifi c forum. Such 
agreements will, however, not occur, or only rarely, in cases related to business 
and human rights. 
 As the Regulation only applies to companies domiciled in the EU, it generally 
does not apply in tort cases against subsidiaries, save for two possibilities. First, 
35  P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968.  Offi cial Journal 
C 59, 5 March 1979. 
36  ECJ 17 June 1992 – C-26/91,  Handte v TMCS [1992] ECR I 3967. 
37  As indicated by Art. 63(2), not all EU Member States have a concept of statutory seat, 
in which case the registered offi ce, place, or law of incorporation of the company works. 
38  ECJ 1 March 2005 – C-281/02  Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-01383, holding that a 
court cannot decline jurisdiction on the basis of  forum non conveniens in cases that fall 
within the ambit of Brussels I. 
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some states apply the same tests when determining residual jurisdiction in their 
domestic law as the ECJ applies with comparable provisions of the Regulation, 
of their own volition. Such was the case in the Dutch  Akpan v Shell case, 39 
where foreseeability of the joining of claims against the parent and subsidiary 
was assessed according to the ECJ’s criteria in  Painer . 40 Regulation standards 
may thus be relevant beyond its formal scope of application. In this case, the 
ECJ ruled that joining defendants when there are different legal bases for the 
claims against them is possible under Art. 6(1) (old) of the Regulation, provided 
it was foreseeable by the defendants that they might be sued in a Member State 
where at least one of them is domiciled. 41 This test only applies when a case 
falls within the scope of the Regulation, but as in  Akpan , Member State courts 
have applied similar tests to cases not decided under the Regulation, to avoid 
creating a gap between Regulation and non-Regulation standards. 
 Second, the Regulation may apply directly to a third state-incorporated 
subsidiary when a plaintiff can prove that a subsidiary’s central administration 
lies with its parent company, rather than in its state of incorporation. Such 
was argued in  Vava and others v AASA , 42 in the absence of ECJ decisions on 
the subject. The argument was rejected in that specifi c case, but could hypo-
thetically be raised in a subsequent case. If accepted, the Regulation would 
apply and the court of the state of incorporation of the parent may have 
jurisdiction. This is, however, hard to argue as it requires extensive knowledge 
of the corporate group’s decision-making process and internal organization, 
and the concept of central administration has thus far been scarcely defi ned 
absent an ECJ ruling on the matter. This problem is tackled in recommenda-
tion no. 5. 
 1.3.2.3 Policy debate regarding the reform of the Brussels I Regulation 
 As mentioned, the current Regulation is a recast version of the previous Regula-
tion 44/2001. While the core principles have not changed signifi cantly, the 
Commission’s initial proposal for a new Regulation was much more ambitious. 43 
While the most far-reaching proposals were dropped following negotiations with 
the Member States and Parliament amendments, that rejection is informative 
in other aspects for the business and human rights debate. It is worth noting 
that the recasting process was, amongst other concerns, also prompted by a 
39  Akpan v Shell , ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BY9854 (30 January 2013). 
40  ECJ 1 December 2011 – C-145/10,  Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and 
Others [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:798. 
41  Ibid ., para. 81. 
42  Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd (No 2) [2013] EWHC 2131 (QB). 
43  Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Brussels, 
21.4.2009, COM(2009) 174 fi nal. Accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0175:FIN:EN:PDF. 
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discussion of how the Brussels I regime functions in the international legal order 
and relates to third states. 44 
 Because the regime only extends to defendants domiciled in an EU Member 
State, EU citizens can experience unequal access to justice depending on whether 
their claim is against an EU-based defendant or a defendant domiciled in a third 
state, over which the forum state courts may or may not have jurisdiction under 
national law. Such a situation could also occur in business and human rights 
cases, where a national court may have jurisdiction over a parent company 
incorporated on its territory, but not over a subsidiary incorporated in a third 
state where the harm also occurred. As a possible remedy for this inequality, 
the Commission initially suggested extending its rules to non-EU defendants, 
fully harmonizing the Member States’ rules on jurisdiction in civil and com-
mercial disputes. This would have brought Brussels I in line with the Rome I 
and II Regulations on applicable law that claim universal application in their 
respective areas. 45 It would have also barred the application of national rules on 
residual jurisdiction currently in force in the Member States. To compensate, 
the Regulation would have included two additional grounds of jurisdiction, 
 forum necessitatis/ forum of necessity (Article 26) and asset-based jurisdiction 
(Article 25). The former would have provided for jurisdiction where it is impos-
sible or unreasonable for the claimant to bring a case in another state. 46 The 
latter concerns jurisdiction in cases where the defendant owns property in 
the forum state, provided the value of that property is not disproportionate 
to the claim – as currently present in German and Austrian civil law. 47 
 Both grounds for jurisdiction would have facilitated tort litigations for extra-
territorial corporate human rights abuses in EU Member State courts:  forum 
necessitatis jurisdiction because it aims at preventing a denial of justice, asset-
based jurisdiction because it facilitates litigation in states where a company does 
signifi cant business without having its statutory seat or head offi ce there. These 
proposals were not, however, included in the fi nal proposal to the European 
Parliament; in fact, universal application was dropped entirely. The European 
44  See Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Brussels, 21.4.2009, COM(2009) 174 fi nal. Accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0175:FIN:EN:PDF; Green Paper on the Brussels I Regula-
tion, House of Lords European Union Committee, 21st Report, Session 2008–2009. 
Accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/fi les/090630/ms_
parliaments/united_kingdom_house_of_lords_en.pdf. 
45  See Rome I, Art. 2; Rome II, Art. 3. 
46  See further below, section four. 
47  See Code of Civil Procedure as promulgated on 5 December 2005 (Bundesgesetzblatt 
(BGBl., Federal Law Gazette) I page 3202; 2006 I page 431; 2007 I page 1781), last 
amended by Article 1 of the Act dated 10 October 2013 (Federal Law Gazette I page 3786), 
s. 23; Julian Feichtinger and Karin Lehner,  Comparative Study of Residual Jurisdiction in 
Civil and Commercial Disputes in the EU, National Report for Austria . Accessible at http://
ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_austria_en.pdf. 
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Parliament expressed concern that the Commission had overstepped its mandate 
by proposing to extend the scope of the Regulation and thereby signifi cantly 
changing its meaning and effect. The Parliament felt that a much wider range 
of consultations and debate should have taken place before taking that step. 
Moreover, it considered that a unilateral move on the part of the EU would 
‘not necessarily improve’ the EU’s positions in future negotiations regarding a 
worldwide jurisdiction and judgments convention. 48 
 While few states publicly expressed their opinion on the Commission’s pro-
posal, one can fi nd some explanation for the rejection of the proposal in the 
Dutch response, which was quite comprehensive. The arguments underlying 
this response can be found in an advisory opinion from the joint Dutch advisory 
committees on Private International Law and Civil Law, which was followed by 
the Minister of Justice and both parliamentary chambers. 49 These committees 
advised that full harmonization of jurisdiction rules with respect to defendants 
from third states was not desirable, for two reasons. First, as the issue would 
also affect non-EU legal orders, the committees felt that the EU should leave 
it to the Hague Conference for Private International Law rather than unilaterally 
extend its jurisdiction rules to affect cases from third states. 
 Second, in the Commissions’ view, the Brussels I regime is distributive rather 
than attributive in nature. In other words, Brussels I was not meant to create 
new grounds for jurisdiction, but ‘merely’ to create a practical division of 
jurisdictional powers between the Member States – a road map for civil litigants. 
The rationale behind this regime is the EU principle of mutual trust in other 
Member States’ legal systems, a principle that does not apply to third states. 
Consequently, there would be no guarantee that third state courts will assume 
jurisdiction where an EU State cannot; nor would an EU Member States’ 
assumption of jurisdiction on the basis of the revised Brussels I regime under 
draft Articles 25 and 26 guarantee recognition and enforcement by the courts 
in the third states concerned. Thus, the committees concluded, the closed 
nature of the Brussels I regime does not lend itself to extension to disputes 
involving third state defendants. 50 While no other reasoned rebuttals were 
publicly submitted to the Commission’s proposal, the fact that Articles 25 and 
26 were omitted (and only specifi c protection for consumers and employees 
of third state defendants remained in the recast Regulation) suggests that the 
above arguments also resonated with other Member States in the closed nego-
tiations. The UK Green Paper cited above suggested some changes to the 
original Regulation to accommodate differences in legal protection, yet most 
48  Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast), PE467.046v01–00 [28 June 2011] (EP Draft Report). 
49  Advies ontwerp-Verordening Brussel I (document COM (2010) 748 d.d. 14 december 
2010), No. 5689654/11/6. Accessible at https://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/publicatie/
20110909/advies_ontwerp_verordening_brussel/document. 
50  Ibid . 
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Member States resisted transferring more national competences on jurisdiction 
to the EU. 
 Two conclusions can be drawn from the recent recasting process of the 
Brussels I Regulation that bear relevance for the question of whether, in the 
view of the EU Member States, further modifi cations to the regime are needed 
to accommodate business and human rights concerns. First, the long and 
tedious process itself makes it highly unlikely that substantial modifi cations 
will be added in the near future. Moreover, the driving concern behind review-
ing Brussels I was the removal of unequal legal protection of Community 
residents, rather than that of third-country nationals. Second, adding specifi c 
grounds for jurisdiction to facilitate transnational tort litigation for extrater-
ritorial corporate human rights abuses would entail extending the scope of 
Brussels I scope to all civil cases, not just those involving EU-domiciled 
defendants – a proposal that has been categorically rejected by the Member 
States in the recasting process. Accordingly, and for the foreseeable future, 
the rules of jurisdiction governing third state defendants in cases for corporate 
human rights abuses will be those of the EU Member States. This may not 
be a bad thing. While the proposed Articles 25 and 26 in Brussels I Recast 
would have offered some possibility for recourse, they would also displace 
national rules of residual jurisdiction that may provide better opportunities in 
business and human rights cases. 
 1.3.3 The US approach to jurisdiction 
 Over the last two decades many victims of alleged corporate human rights abuses 
around the world have brought their cases before US domestic courts. As will 
be discussed, recent developments in the US have brought the US approach to 
jurisdiction more in line with the approach under the Brussels I regime. Most 
of the plaintiffs bringing their cases before US domestic courts have relied on 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). 51 In 2013, the US Supreme Court in  Kiobel v 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 52 restricted but did not eliminate federal jurisdiction 
over abuses of certain well-established rules of international law. A likely con-
sequence is that litigants will increasingly rely on US general private international 
law and litigate their cases in US state courts under domestic tort law. The 
cause of action under the ATS (violations of the law of nations) will in many 
cases also constitute a violation of the law of the US forum. 
 The following sections will discuss several doctrines that have been developed 
in US case law, which courts consider in order to determine their competence. 
In practice, consideration of these doctrines has limited the access to US courts 
for plaintiffs in transnational cases. In the fi nal section, the EU and US approach 
to jurisdiction is compared. 
51  Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
52  Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. , 133 SCt 1659 (2013). 
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 1.3.3.1 Doctrines that may limit access to US courts 
in transnational cases 
 In this section the following doctrines, which are relevant for the issue of juris-
diction, are addressed: the requirements of personal jurisdiction, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality,  forum non conveniens, and comity. The doctrines address 
different aspects of a court’s power to hear a case:  forum non conveniens and 
comity provide courts with a discretionary basis for declining to exercise juris-
diction; personal jurisdiction considers a court’s adjudicative power over the 
defendant; and the presumption of extraterritoriality goes to the scope of a 
statutory cause of action (prescriptive jurisdiction). A case may be dismissed on 
other grounds, such aspolitical question and immunity, inter alia, but these will 
not be considered here. 
 Unlike the statutory approach in the EU, the US approach to jurisdiction 
has evolved through interpretation of statutes and the US Constitution (especially 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) by the US Supreme 
Court. Courts are required to make a factual determination each time in deter-
mining whether jurisdiction is in accordance with the requirements of due 
process. In US case law several doctrines have been developed that US courts 
will apply to determine their competence and may constitute a barrier for plain-
tiffs bringing a transnational human rights case. These doctrines address both 
questions of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. Over the last two decades, 
the US courts have become increasingly responsive to these doctrines, which 
all speak to the nexus between the US, the parties, and a given suit. The under-
lying rationale of these doctrines is the balancing of interests pro-defendant, 
international comity, and considerations of judicial effi ciency and fairness. 
 1.3.3.2 The Alien Tort Statute: presumption against extraterritoriality 
and personal jurisdiction 
 The possibility of using the ATS in tort litigations for extraterritorial corporate 
human rights abuses has been limited by the recent US Supreme Court deci-
sions in  Kiobel and  Daimler AG v Baumann 53 based on the doctrine presumption 
against extraterritoriality and the limitation of personal jurisdiction respectively 
and will thus be discussed in that context. The unique character of the ATS 
must be pointed out; no other state has any statute that is comparable in its 
scope and effects. 
 As stated above, most transnational human rights litigation has been brought 
before the US domestic courts under the ATS, the provision in the 1789 Judi-
ciary Act that provides federal courts with jurisdiction over civil actions for ‘a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States’. Until recently, US courts have accepted that a minimal connection to 
53  Daimler AG v Bauman No. 11–965, 571 US (2014). 
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the US forum was suffi cient to establish jurisdiction under the ATS. The result 
was hundreds of transnational human rights civil suits being brought before the 
US courts seeking monetary compensation for a broad range of human rights 
violations. 
 The question decided by the US Supreme Court in  Kiobel was whether a 
claim brought under the ATS ‘may reach conduct occurring in the territory of 
a foreign sovereign’, even assuming that the conduct was performed by an 
individual or entity that subsequently came within the personal jurisdiction of 
a US court. 54 The  Kiobel majority, by applying the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality to the judicial creation of a cause of action under the ATS, curbed 
the remedial reach of this jurisdictional statute. According to the US Supreme 
Court, the presumption can only be overcome if the claim ‘touches and con-
cerns’ the Unites States ‘with suffi cient force’. 55 Whether this allows judges to 
create causes of action for conduct occurring exclusively in the territory of a 
foreign sovereign remains contested. 56 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer rec-
ognized three scenarios in which the exercise of US jurisdiction would be 
appropriate under the ATS, the fi rst based on the principle of territoriality (if 
the tort occurred on American soil); the second based on the principle of 
nationality (if the defendant is an American national); and the third based on 
US national interest, including ‘a distinct interest in preventing the United 
States from becoming a safe harbour (free of civil as well as criminal liability) 
for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.’ 57 However, this concur-
rence only has limited persuasive power. 
 Whether a case touches and concerns the US with suffi cient force is for the 
lower courts to decide. In decisions post- Kiobel , lower courts have mainly fol-
lowed the idea that cases against foreign companies for conduct abroad should 
be dismissed. 58 In July 2015, the District Court for the District of Colombia 
in the case  Doe I v Exxon Mobile decided that the plaintiffs succeeded in show-
ing that the case suffi ciently ‘touched and concerned’ the US. 59 In this case the 
plaintiffs alleged that Exxon Mobile should be held liable for aiding and abetting 
human rights abuses committed by members of the Indonesian military. The 
military was providing security for the company in Indonesia in 2000 and 2001. 
The jurisdictional hook was found in US-based decision-making by executives 
of the company. 
54  Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. , 133 SCt 1659 (2013) 1664. 
55  Ibid., 1669. 
56  Maria Chiara Marullo and Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot,  Transnational Human Rights 
Litigations. Kiobel’s Touch and Concern : A Test Under Construction , April 2016. Accessible 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2765068. 
57  Ibid ., 1671. 
58  Maria Chiara Marullo and Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot,  Transnational Human Rights 
Litigations. Kiobel’s Touch and Concern:  A Test Under Construction , April 2016. Accessible 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2765068. 
59  Doe v ExxonMobil Corp . (DDC July 6, 2015). 
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 To ascertain personal jurisdiction, US courts will consider whether defendants’ 
contacts with the forum are suffi ciently ‘continuous and systematic’ to render 
it subject to the forum jurisdiction. The courts will address the question whether 
jurisdiction is ‘reasonable’. 60 This contacts-based analysis of jurisdiction resulted 
in a broad approach where multinational companies with offi ces in many coun-
tries could be sued in the US for conduct anywhere in the world. In January 
2014, in  Daimler AG v Bauman the US Supreme Court asserted that ATS liti-
gation should satisfy a stricter general jurisdiction requirement. 61 In this case, 
the plaintiffs, twenty-three Argentine citizens, sought to establish personal 
jurisdiction in a Californian federal court against the German parent company 
Daimler AG based upon the presence in California of two Mercedes Benz 
marketing offi ces. They alleged that the Argentine military, which had ruled the 
country from 1976 to 1983, brutalized, tortured, or murdered them or their 
close relatives. They further alleged that Mercedes Benz Argentina had aided 
and abetted the military in these human rights violations.   The Supreme Court 
in  Daimler said that a defendant is subject to ‘general jurisdiction’ only if its 
extensive contacts with the forum render it ‘at home’ there. 62 To satisfy this 
requirement, the courts will consider the places where a company is incorporated 
and where it maintains its principal place of business. It did not ‘foreclose the 
possibility’ that there might exist an ‘exceptional case’ in which a company’s 
contacts with a third state were ‘so substantial and of such a nature as to render 
the company at home in the State’. 63 The ‘at home’ standard will probably 
exclude from US courts most cases concerning conduct abroad by foreign 
defendants that are not incorporated in the US (foreign cubed cases). Specifi c 
jurisdiction, i.e. where a forum is alleged to have jurisdiction over a defendant 
because the defendant’s activities in that forum gave rise to the claim itself, is 
still available against foreign defendants. 
 1.3.3.3 Further doctrines that may limit access to US courts 
in transnational cases 
 In addition to the previously discussed presumption against extraterritorial 
application and the requirements of personal jurisdiction, the doctrines of  forum 
non conveniens and comity are of particular relevance. Both  forum non conveniens 
and comity provide courts with a discretionary basis for declining to exercise 
jurisdiction. A case may also be dismissed on other grounds such as political 
question and immunity but these will not be considered here. The  forum non 
60  For a discussion of the requirement of reasonablesness see Kate Bonacorssi, ‘Not at home with 
“at home” jurisdiction’, 37(6)  Fordham International Law Journal , (2014) 1828–1830. 
61  For an analysis of this case see F.J. Zamora Cabot,  Decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the Daimler AG v Bauman et al  case: closing the golden door , April 2014. 
Accessible at: http://www.tiempodelosderechos.es/docs/wp-2–2014-englishversion.pdf. 
62  Daimler AG v Bauman 134 SCt 751. 
63  Ibid., 761. 
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conveniens doctrine may preclude a case from coming to federal court when 
there is an alternative forum that is more appropriate as it is more closely linked 
with the case due to the location of parties, witnesses, evidence, and so on. 
 Forum non convenience (like comity) is a discretionary, non-statutory doctrine 
developed mostly by trial courts. Courts in their  forum non conveniens analysis 
are guided by private interests (focus on burden for defendant) and by public 
interests (especially judicial resources). It has been noted that courts have 
increasingly been granting  forum non conveniens motions in cases involving 
foreign plaintiffs. 64 Comity plays an important role in transnational cases before 
US courts. According to the US Supreme Court comity concerns ‘the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty 
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who 
are under the protection of its laws.’ 65 Comity considerations may prompt a 
court not to adjudicate a case that has, is or will be heard in a foreign court 
out of deference to the sovereignty of the other state. 66 
 1.3.3.4 Litigating torts in state courts and/or under state law 
 In light of the procedural and substantive hurdles plaintiffs face since the  Kiobel 
and  Daimler decisions, an alternative for victims of corporate related human 
rights abuse may be to litigate in state courts and/or to apply state tort law. 
The cause of action under the ATS, violations of the law of nations will mostly 
also constitute a violation of the law of the forum state (wrongful death, assault, 
battery etc.). Alternatively, such claims may be for transitory torts applying the 
law of the host state depending on the choice of law analysis applied by the state 
court. A benefi t of bringing a case before state courts is that some of the pro-
cedural doctrines discussed above are only applicable in federal courts. State courts 
do not have to recognize these doctrines. For example, many state courts do 
not recognize in the same manner the doctrine of  forum non conveniens. 67 
However, some of the federal procedural doctrines discussed above do not only 
apply in federal courts but also in state courts, or equivalent limiting doctrines 
are applied. As the personal jurisdiction requirements emanate from a constitu-
tional rule derived from the Due Process Clause, these requirements govern all 
US courts. Moreover, the limits on the extraterritorial application of state statutes 
64  See for example, Donald Earl Childress III, ‘ Forum Non Conveniens : the search for a 
convenient forum in transnational cases’ 32(1)  Virginia Journal of International Law 
(2012) 157. 
65  Hilton v Guyot , 159 US 113, 143 (1895). 
66  For more on the doctrine of comity see Beth Stephens  et al. (eds.)  International Human 
Rights Litigation in US Courts (2008, 2nd revised edn.) 354 ff. 
67  Donald Earl Childress III, ‘The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism and the next wave of 
transnational litigation’, 100  Georgetown Law Journal (2012)709; see pp. 741–751 for an 
analysis of potential obstacles for plaintiffs to overcome at the state level. 
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and state common law are unsettled. 68 Thus, also at the state level, plaintiffs 
face signifi cant procedural hurdles when bringing transnational cases. 
 1.3.4 Comparing the EU and US approach to jurisdiction 
in private international law 
 When comparing the US and the EU approach to jurisdiction in civil litigation 
there are marked differences in the sources of the rules and the rationale under-
lying their creation. It has been argued that the US approach to jurisdiction is 
more pro-defendant and thus more restrictive for plaintiffs than the European 
jurisdiction. 69 However, it should be noted that the Brussels I regime is expressly 
designed with a presumption against plaintiffs, and centralizes the defendant’s 
domicile as its main ground for jurisdiction. An important difference lies in the 
more fl exible approach under the Due Process Clause by US courts, whereas 
the EU favours a ‘one-size-fi ts-all’ approach dictated by legal certainty pursuant 
to the Brussels I Regulation. The US courts have been a magnet for transnational 
human rights litigation due to the fl exible approach that the courts have taken 
to the issue of jurisdiction. However, a relatively recent development can be 
witnessed whereby the US approach to jurisdiction in transnational cases shows 
a resurgence of territorially-based reasoning, increasingly pushing out transna-
tional cases as evidenced in the two decisions discussed above : Kiobel and 
 Daimler . The  Kiobel decision limited subject matter jurisdiction in transnational 
human rights cases under the ATS. Since the  Daimler decision the ability of 
courts to assert personal general jurisdiction over foreign companies in trans-
national cases has been restricted, bringing these more in line with internationally 
accepted standards of domicile. The retreat to reasoning based on territoriality 
to an extent brings the US approach closer to the criteria applied in the EU 
context to determine whether jurisdiction may be ascertained. 
 1.4 Residual jurisdiction in Europe 
 1.4.1 Introduction 
 The Brussels I Regulation (recast) only applies if the defendant is domiciled in 
a Member State (Article 4). A company is considered to be domiciled in a 
Member State if it has its statutory seat, its central administration, or its principal 
place of business there (Article 63). If none of these conditions is fulfi lled (as 
will often be the case with subsidiaries and contractors of EU-based MNCs), 
the private international law of the Member States determines the jurisdiction 
of national courts (so-called residual jurisdiction). In this vein, Article 6 of the 
68  Ibid. 
69  See, for example, Kate Bonacorssi, ‘Not at home with “at home jurisdiction”’ 37(6) 
 Fordham International Law Journal (2014) 1844. 
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Brussels I Regulation provides that ‘if the defendant is not domiciled in a 
Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall . . . 
be determined by the law of that Member State’. The following considerations 
discuss and illustrate three jurisdictional instruments in Member States’ private 
international law that can facilitate tort litigations for human rights abuses com-
mitted by Europe-based MNCs:  forum necessitatis , the joining of defendants, 
and the pursuit of civil remedies through criminal jurisdiction. 
 1.4.2  Forum necessitatis 
 The doctrine of  forum necessitatis allows a court to accept jurisdiction in cases 
where there is no other forum available in which the plaintiff could pursue his/
her claims. In the course of the 2009 review of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
European Commission proposed the inclusion of a  forum necessitatis rule. 70 New 
Article 26 of the recast Brussels I Regulation would have provided that 
 [w]here no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under the Regulation, 
the courts of a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case 
if the right to a fair trial or the right to access to justice so requires, in 
particular: (a) if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted 
or would be impossible in a third State with which the dispute is closely 
connected; or (b) if a judgment given on the claim in a third State would 
not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in the Member State of 
the court seized under the law of that State and such recognition and 
enforcement is necessary to ensure that the rights of the claimant are satis-
fi ed; and the dispute has a suffi cient connection with the Member State of 
the Court seized. 
 The proposal was rendered obsolete because the proposed universal scope of 
the Regulation, for which this article functioned as a counterbalance, was rejected 
as described in paragraph 1.3.2.3. Nevertheless,  forum necessitatis is still a rec-
ognized ground of jurisdiction in many EU Member States, either based in statute 
or developed through case law. 71 The conditions for  forum necessitatis vary from 
Member State to Member State, yet it always constitutes an exceptional ground 
of jurisdiction. Claimants have to demonstrate that it is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unac-
ceptable’ to bring proceedings abroad. This may be due to legal obstacles (e.g. 
no guarantee of a fair trial in the third country) or practical obstacles, such as 
70  Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Juris-
diction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
COM (2009) 175 fi nal (21 April 2009);  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Regulation and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters , COM (2010) 748 fi nal (14 December 2010). 
71  For an overview see A. Nuyts,  Study on Residual Jurisdiction – General Report (Brussels: 
2007) 66. 
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that the claimant would in fact be deprived of an effective remedy. A further 
condition is usually that the claim has a suffi cient connection with the Member 
State concerned. 
 Forum necessitatis jurisdiction is often considered to fl ow from, or even to 
be mandated by, Member States’ human rights obligations under Article 6 
ECHR. The 2009 Commission proposal to include  forum necessitatis in the 
Brussels I Regulation made explicit reference to the ‘right to a fair trial or the 
right to access to justice’. That jurisdiction ‘of necessity’ is based on or required 
by Article 6 ECHR was also considered in the course of parliamentary debates 
in a number of Member States, including Belgium and the Netherlands. 72 In 
other Member States,  forum necessitatis is (in addition) linked to the prohibition 
of a denial of justice as a requirement of national constitutional law and a 
principle of public international law. Even in Member State jurisdictions such 
as England that do not explicitly recognize a forum of necessity, courts have 
considered that under exceptional circumstances a denial of the right to sue to 
foreign claimants could amount to a violation of Article 6 ECHR. 73 The fol-
lowing examples illustrate the importance of  forum necessitatis jurisdiction in 
providing access to justice for victims of corporate-related human rights abuses 
committed outside the European Union. 
 Forum necessitatis jurisdiction has a statutory basis in Article 9 of the Dutch 
Code of Civil Procedure. Article 9 contains two different versions of the  forum 
necessitatis rule, only one of which requires a connection to the Dutch forum. 
Dutch civil courts have accepted  forum necessitatis jurisdiction in a case brought 
by Iraqi pilots residing in the Netherlands that concerned a labour dispute with 
the Kuwait Airlines Corporation. 74 Even though the labour contract established 
the competence of the Kuwaiti courts, the Dutch court accepted jurisdiction 
because the pilots, as former Iraqi nationals, could not expect a fair trial in 
Kuwait. 75 In the Palestinian Doctor case, the District Court of The Hague heard 
the claim of a Palestinian doctor for damages suffered from being unlawfully 
imprisoned in Libya because he had allegedly infected children with HIV/
AIDS. 76  Forum necessitatis jurisdiction was justifi ed having regard to the general 
political situation in Libya during that time, and irrespective of the fact that the 
claimant did not reside in the Netherlands. 
72  Ibid., 64. 
73  Mark v Mark [2004] EWCA Civ 168, [2005] Fam 267. 
74  Abood/Kuwait Airways Corp. , Amsterdam Sub-District Court (5 January 1996), 1996 
Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 145, 222 (Kuwait Airways case I). 
75  In a similar case brought a few years later, the Dutch courts declined  forum necessitatis 
jurisdiction due to an insuffi cient connection to the Dutch forum because the claimants 
did not reside in the Netherlands; see  Saloum/Kuwait Airways Corp. , Amsterdam Sub-
District Court (27 April 2000), 2000 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 315, 472 
(Kuwait Airways case II). 
76  El-Hojouj/Unnamed Libyan Offi cials , The Hague District Court (21 March 2012) LJN: 
BV9748. 
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 There are cases in which French and Spanish courts have recognised  forum 
necessitatis jurisdiction in the light of Article 6 ECHR and the prohibition of 
a denial of justice. 77 Spain has recently amended its private international law to 
include a statutory basis for  forum necessitatis , which requires that the case has 
a suffi cient link to the Spanish forum and that other courts connected with the 
dispute have declined jurisdiction. 78 In the COMILOG case, denial of justice 
was used to gain access to French courts. 79 In 1991, the Gabonese mining 
company COMILOG, operating on the territory of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, laid off 955 workers without due notice or compensation. In 1992, 
the workers attempted to challenge their dismissal before a Congolese court 
that, however, failed to deliver a judgment. In 2003, COMILOG reached an 
agreement with the governments of Congo and Gabon according to which the 
company would compensate the workers who, in turn, were to renounce their 
right to a judicial remedy in relation to their unfair dismissal. 80 The workers 
claimed that they were not consulted about this agreement and did not receive 
the promised compensation. Meanwhile, the French company ERAMET had 
become the majority owner of COMILOG. In 2007, former COMILOG work-
ers brought a complaint before a French employment tribunal, alleging unfair 
dismissal and requesting 65 million euros in compensation. While the employment 
tribunal dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, the Paris Court of Appeal 
held that French courts were competent to hear the case against COMILOG 
France and COMILOG International. 81 French jurisdiction was justifi ed having 
regard to the necessity of avoiding a denial of justice to the Congolese workers. 
Moreover, that ERAMET was a French company was considered to establish a 
suffi ciently close link to the French forum. In January 2015, the  Cour de Cas-
sation confi rmed the jurisdiction of the French courts. 82 In September 2015, 
77  See, respectively,  Vid. Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal (31 May 1923), JDI 1924, 204; 
 Vid. Paris Court of Appeal (10 November 1960), JDI 1961, 426; and  Murcia Court of 
Appeals (decision of 12 May 2003);  Madrid Commercial Court N. 1 (order of 5 July 
2013). 
78  Art. 22 octies 3. Art. 22.3 Organic Law 7/2015, of 21 July, whereby the Organic Law 
6/1985, on the Judiciary Power (LOPJ) is modifi ed. 
79  On the background of the case see Sherpa, ‘Affaire COMILOG: Victoire pour les 857 
travailleurs victims d’un déni de justice’, September 2015. Accessible at http://www.
asso-sherpa.org/affaire-comilog-victoire-pour-les-857-travailleurs-victimes-dun-deni-de-
justice#.Vjtg227zkhw. 
80  See further ILO,  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation made by the 
International Organization of Energy and Mines (OIEM) under article 24 of the ILO Con-
stitution alleging non-observance by Congo of the Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95) . 
Accessible at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50012:0::NO::P50012_LANG_
CODE:en:NO. 
81  Cour d’appel de Paris (Pôle 6 – Chambre 2), du 20 juin 2013. 
82  Cour de Cassation, civile, Chambre Sociale, 28 janvier 2015, 13–22.994 13–22.995 
13–23.003 13–23.004 13–23.005 13–23.006. 
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the Paris Court of Appeal ordered COMILOG to compensate the workers for 
their unfair dismissal in Congo in 1992. 83 
 1.4.3 Joining of defendants 
 One of the problems faced by litigants in tort litigations for corporate human 
rights abuses committed outside the European Union is that, while the parent 
company will often be domiciled in an EU Member State and thus fall under 
the Brussels I Regulation, the same is not true of the subsidiary or contractor 
that has committed the tortuous act. One way to overcome jurisdictional hurdles 
in relation to the subsidiary/contractor domiciled outside the EU is to join the 
proceedings against the parent and the subsidiary/contractor in a Member State 
court. Article 8(1) Brussels I Regulation permits the joining of defendants under 
the condition that ‘the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to 
hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments 
resulting from separate proceedings’. The ECJ has made the joining of defen-
dants under Article 8 subject to two conditions: the parent company cannot be 
sued with the exclusive aim of bringing the foreign subsidiary/contractor within 
the European jurisdiction; and a prior relation must exist between the defendants 
to be joined – a condition that will always be fulfi lled when suing a corporate 
group. 84 Article 8 Brussels I Regulation only applies to defendants domiciled 
in an EU Member State, which relegates the question of whether proceedings 
against non-EU defendants can be joined to the residual jurisdiction of the 
Member States. In a number of Member States it is possible to join proceedings 
against EU and non-EU domiciled defendants, which facilitates tort litigation 
in the EU for human rights abuses committed by foreign subsidiaries or con-
tractors of Europe-based MNCs. 
 A recent amendment of the Spanish private international law permits Spanish 
courts to join proceedings against foreign defendants provided at least one of 
the defendants is domiciled in Spain and the claims against the different defen-
dants are suffi ciently connected. 85 The following case, which is hypothetical 
though inspired by real events, 86 illustrates some of the reasons that may compel 
a Spanish court to join defendants in litigation for human rights abuses 
83  Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arrêt du 10 Septembre 2015, S11/05955 S11/05956 S/1105957 
S11/05958 S11/05959 S11/05960. 
84  STJUE C-145/10 and C-616/10. See Virgós Soriano / Garcimartín Alférez, Derecho 
Procesal Civil Internacional. Litigación Internacional, Civitas, Madrid, 2007, pp. 214–215. 
85  The amendment of the LOPJ provides that ‘ En caso de pluralidad de demandados, serán 
competentes los Tribunales españoles cuando al menos uno de ellos tenga su domicilio en España, 
siempre que se ejercite una sola acción o varias entre las que exista un nexo por razón del 
título o causa de pedir que aconsejen su acumulación’. See Art. 22 ter 3. of the Organic 
Law 7/2015, of 21 july, whereby the Organic Law 6/1985, on the Judiciary Power (LOPJ) 
is modifi ed. 
86  See further ECCHR,  Holding Companies Accountable: Lessons from Transnational Human 
Rights Litigation (2014). 
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committed by foreign subsidiaries of parent companies domiciled in Spain. GES.CO 
is the Colombian subsidiary of GEC, a Spanish energy company that pro-
duces electricity and distributes it to end consumers. In summer 2012, a short 
circuit in an electricity grid in a poor neighbourhood of Bogota maintained by 
GES.CO caused a fi re that killed a number of inhabitants and destroyed their 
properties. The short circuit was allegedly the result of poor maintenance work 
by GES.CO. The Spanish parent company was implicated in the ensuing human 
rights abuses because it was under a legal obligation in Spanish law to ensure 
minimum quality standards in the provision of maintenance services by its sub-
sidiary. Moreover, when incorporating in Colombia, GES.CO had made a 
commitment to meet the safety standards set by Colombian domestic law. Finally, 
not only did part of the capital of the subsidiary come from Spain but also its 
directors and members of the technical staff were delegated from the Spanish 
parent company. These various linkages between the companies, their alleged 
joined legal liability for the human rights abuses committed in Colombia, as 
well as the legitimate interest of the claimants to obtain an enforceable judg-
ment against a solvent defendant (i.e. the parent company) warranted the joining 
of defendants in the Spanish courts. 
 Croatian private international law provides the option of suing two or more 
defendants in the capacity of ‘co-litigants under substantive law’ (Croatian 
 materijalni suparničari , which corresponds to the German notion of  materielle 
Streitgenossenschaft ). The Croatian courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the case 
against all defendants, provided one of those defendants has domicile or seat 
in Croatia. The notion of  materijalni suparničari includes the situation in which 
their rights or obligations derive from the same factual and legal basis –  idem 
factum, idem ius (the same contract or tortious act provides the basis for the 
claim and is subject to the same law). 87 This is essentially an assessment based 
on substantive law, in which the Croatian company law rules on piercing the 
corporate veil may play an important role. 88 It is possible not only to join a 
company and its director as co-defendants (because they are considered  materi-
jalni suparničari ) before the same court, 89 but also a company and its share-
holders. 90 Probably the most frequent case is where a company shareholder is 
held liable for the non-paid wages to the company employees. 91 
87  This term is defi ned in Art. 196(1)(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, Offi cial Gazette of the 
Republic of Croatia 53/1991, 91/1992, 112/1999, 129/2000, 88/2001, 117/2003, 
88/2005, 2/2007, 96/2008, 84/2008, 123/2008, 57/2011, 25/2013 and 89/2014. 
88  The case law related to domestic situations is likewise applicable in cross-border ones, as 
the legal concepts on which jurisdiction is based ( materijalni suparničari ) is the same .
89  See, e.g., High Commercial Court of the Republic of Croatia, Pž-2775/03, 10.12.2002. 
Accessible at www.iusinfo.hr. 
90  See, e.g., Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, Pž-6369/03, 17.2.2004. Accessible 
at www.vsrh.hr. 
91  See, e.g., Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, Rev-58/00, 14.02.2001. Accessible 
at www.vsrh.hr; High Commercial Court of the Republic of Croatia, Pž-9140/03, 
17.1.2006,  Informator , Nos. 5572–5573, 1.8.2007. 
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 The most publicized case involving the joining of a foreign subsidiary in liti-
gation against an EU-domiciled parent company is currently pending in the 
Netherlands. According to Dutch private international law, a Dutch court may 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary when the claims against parent 
and subsidiary are so closely connected as to justify the joining of defendants 
for reasons of process effi ciency. 92 In a 2010 interlocutory judgment, the District 
Court of The Hague accepted jurisdiction over Royal Dutch Shell Plc (domiciled 
in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and its Nigerian subsidiary, the 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC) in a tort litiga-
tion for human rights abuses caused by oil spills in the Nigerian Bodo com-
munity. Not only were the claims against both companies intertwined and had 
the same legal basis (tort of negligence under Nigerian law), but, moreover, it 
was foreseeable for SPDC that it might be summoned in the Netherlands in 
connection with its alleged liability for the oil spills. In January 2013, the Dis-
trict Court dismissed the claims against Royal Dutch Shell Plc and all but one 
claim against SPDC. 93 However, the court maintained that the mere possibility 
that the Dutch parent company could be held liable was suffi cient to attract a 
foreign subsidiary to the Dutch jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court’s jurisdic-
tion over the foreign subsidiary is sustained even if the claims against the parent 
company eventually proved unfounded. Both Shell and the Nigerian plaintiffs 
appealed the judgment. In December 2015, the Court of Appeal reinstated all 
claims against the Dutch parent company and SPCD, and ordered Shell to 
disclose documents concerning the maintenance of its oil pipelines. 94 It is inter-
esting to note that the Court of Appeal applied the  Painer test in assessing 
whether the joining was unforeseeable for the defendant. It rejected Shell’s 
arguments on the matter on the grounds that, amongst other reasons, the recent 
increase in litigation against parent companies made it foreseeable for Royal 
Dutch Shell that it would be named as a defendant in a case like this. 95 
 Under English common law, courts can accept jurisdiction over non-EU 
defendants for a claim in tort, provided that jurisdiction has been established 
over another defendant under the Brussels I Regulation or the common law, 
and that the non-EU defendant can be considered a necessary or proper party 
92  See Art. 7(1) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. 
93  District Court The Hague,  Oguru-Efanga v Shell , ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BY9850 (30 Jan-
uary 2013);  Dooh v Shell , ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BY9854 (30 January 2013);  Akpan v 
Shell , ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BY9854 (30 January 2013). 
94  Court of Appeal The Hague,  Oguru-Efanga v Shell , ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3588 
(17 December 2015);  Dooh v Shell , ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586 (17 December 2015); 
 Akpan v Shell , ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3587 (17 December 2015). The question of 
Shell’s liability for the oil spills has not been answered on appeal but will be subject to 
further litigation; see Gerechtshof Den Haag, ‘Dutch courts have jurisdiction in case against 
Shell Nigeria oil spills’ (18 December 2015). Accessible at https://www.rechtspraak.nl/
Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Gerechtshoven/Gerechtshof-Den-Haag/Nieuws/
Paginas/Dutch-Courts-have-jurisdiction-in-case-against-Shell-Nigeria-oil-spills.aspx. 
95  Akpan v Shell , ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3587 (17 December 2015) para. 3.6. 
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to the claim. 96 As the rationale for assuming jurisdiction in such cases is that it 
is more convenient and economical to litigate a dispute against connected par-
ties in one court, no further connection between the non-EU defendant and 
the English forum is required. In a recent litigation with the same subject matter 
as the Dutch Shell case involving 15,000 claimants from Nigeria’s Bodo com-
munity, the proceedings were originally issued against the Anglo-Dutch parent 
company Royal Dutch Shell Plc and its Nigerian subsidiary SPDC. 97 Later on, 
SPDC submitted to the jurisdiction of the English court on the condition that 
the claimants stayed proceedings against the parent company. The court decided 
that SPDC could in principle be held liable for oil spills resulting from a failure 
to take all reasonable steps to protect its oil infrastructure in Nigeria. 98 In Janu-
ary 2015 a settlement was reached according to which Shell is to pay £55 mil-
lion compensation and to clean up the affected areas. 99 
 1.4.4 Pursuing civil remedies through criminal jurisdiction 
 The ECHR (as international human rights law more generally) imposes obliga-
tions on EU Member States to ensure effective civil as well as criminal remedies 
for corporate human rights abuses committed within their human rights juris-
diction. If human rights abuses committed by foreign subsidiaries or contractors 
of EU-based companies also constitute an (international) crime, it can be 
benefi cial for claimants to attract the case to the jurisdiction of an EU Member 
State by initiating criminal proceedings there. Criminal jurisdiction is not regu-
lated by EU law and therefore falls within the responsibility of the Member 
States. Using criminal cases to pursue civil remedies can be of advantage where 
a Member State’s rules on criminal jurisdiction encompass cases of extraterrito-
rial corporate human rights abuses that would not otherwise fall within the 
competence of national courts under that state’s private international law. 
However, this opportunity is rarely used at present and can incur signifi cant 
costs for the victims, especially if the legal support for the victims of crime does 
not extend to the civil proceedings. 
 In Spain, as in a number of other Member States, criminal courts are com-
petent to adjudicate civil claims arising out of a criminal offence. 100 This enables 
the application of Spain’s traditionally far-reaching rules on universal criminal 
jurisdiction to civil cases involving human rights abuses by ‘multinational’ com-
panies, provided that the tort also constitutes an international crime. Statutory 
reforms in 2009 and 2014 have restricted the scope of universal criminal 
 96  Civil Procedure Rules (1998) SI 1998/3132, r. 6.37. 
 97  High Court (QU),  Bodo Community v Shell , Claim No. HQ 11X01280. 
 98  The Bodo Community and Others v The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Limited [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC). 
 99  See further https://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2015/January-2015/Shell-agrees-55m-
compensation-deal-for-Nigeria-Del. 
100  See Arts 109ff. of the Spanish Criminal Code. 
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jurisdiction, yet Spanish courts are still competent to hear claims relating to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. While there are a number 
of well-publicized universal criminal jurisdiction cases in Spain, victims of human 
rights abuses have not yet made use of the possibility of pursuing civil remedies 
before Spanish criminal courts. 
 Croatia’s rules on universal criminal jurisdiction are suffi ciently broad to 
permit a criminal prosecution of companies committing a crime anywhere, 
without the need to show a strong connection to the Croatian forum. A condi-
tion is that the crime is either punishable under both Croatian law and the law 
of the foreign jurisdiction, or that Croatia must prosecute that crime pursuant 
to its obligations in international law. Croatian criminal courts may entertain 
civil disputes in the so-called adhesion proceedings. In a 2008 Amendment to 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 101 the scope of claims was broadened to include 
any claim available under civil law. It is not entirely clear whether this rule may 
be relied upon in all cross-border disputes even beyond the specifi c rules of 
universal jurisdiction, but there seems to be room for such an interpretation. 
This is of considerable importance given that Croatian criminal courts have used 
the Croatian Legal Persons Responsibility for Criminal Offences Act 102 to convict 
not only companies but also their shareholders of economic crimes, without 
reference to the company law institute of ‘piercing’ the corporate veil. 103 Thus 
far, criminal judges have been rather unwilling to decide about civil damages 
in criminal proceedings. This is partly due to the fact that judges are under 
constant pressure to reduce the length of proceedings, and that their perfor-
mance is evaluated irrespective of whether they accept to adhere to a civil claim 
to the criminal case. 104 
 In France, victims of human rights abuses that also constitute a crime can 
become a  partie civile in criminal proceedings against the responsible companies. 
This enables victims to obtain civil remedies for damages directly related to the 
commission of the crime. In August 2011, it transpired that the French company 
 Amesys (a subsidiary of the French  Groupe Bull ) had provided the Libyan gov-
ernment with a computer program (‘Eagle’) used for surveillance and mass 
interception of internet communications. In October 2011, the Human Rights 
101  Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 91/2012, 
143/2012, 56/2013, 145/2013 and 152/2014. 
102  Offi cial Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 151/2003, 110/2007, 45/2011 and 
143/2012. 
103  See, e.g., Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, I Kž 724/01–7, 3.8.2005; Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Croatia, I Kž 818/12–9, 27.11.2013; Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Croatia, I Kž 626/14–6, 201.1.2015; all accessible at www.iusinfo.hr. 
104  See Metodologija izrade ocjene sudaca [Methodology for Evaluation of Judges]. Accessible 
at: http://www.dsv.pravosudje.hr/index.php/dsv/propisi/metodologija_izrade_ocjene_
sudaca; and Okvirna mjerila za rad sudaca [Framework Criteria for the Performance of 
Judges]. Accessible at https://pravosudje.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/dokumenti/Pravo%20
na%20pristup%20informacijama/Zakoni%20i%20ostali%20propisi/Okvirna%20mjerila%20
za%20rad%20sudaca.pdf. 
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League and the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) fi led a 
criminal complaint against  Amesys before the Paris Court of First Instance, 
alleging that its software had enabled the Libyan government to commit serious 
human rights abuses including torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. 105 
The Public Prosecutor initially declined to initiate criminal proceedings. The 
judge nevertheless ordered an investigation into the alleged complicity of  Amesys 
in the human rights abuses committed by the Gaddafi  regime. An appeal by 
the Offi ce of the Public Prosecutor was unsuccessful. In January 2013, the Paris 
Court of Appeal directed the case to a judicial unit specializing in war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide. 106 In May 2013, fi ve victims who had 
been arrested and tortured in Libya were admitted as ‘ parties civiles ’ to the 
lawsuit, following which the judges ordered an assessment of the civil damages 
they had suffered. 107 The case is still pending. 
 1.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
 • When deciding on their jurisdiction in private litigation for human rights 
abuses by multinational companies, state courts of EU Member States must 
have due regard to their human rights obligations to ensure effective civil 
remedies under the ECHR and international human rights law. 
 • EU Member States should consider allowing their domestic courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction over civil claims concerning business-related human rights 
abuses against subsidiaries, wherever they are based, of companies domiciled 
within their jurisdiction if such claims are closely connected with civil claims 
against the latter companies. 
 • EU Member States’ courts should reverse the foreseeability test applied in 
the ECJ’s  Painer case for joining actions on different legal bases, in cases 
where parents and subsidiaries are joined together. This would put the 
burden on the defendant company to prove that it was unforeseeable that 
the parent may be held jointly liable with the subsidiary, rather than the 
plaintiffs having to argue that it was foreseeable. 
 • Where companies are not domiciled within their jurisdiction, EU Member 
States should consider, or not retreat from, the possibility of allowing their 
domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil claims concerning business-
related human rights abuses against such a business enterprise, if no other 
105  P. Sonne and M. Coker, ‘Firms Aided Libyan Spies: First Look Inside Security Unit Shows 
How Citizens Were Tracked’,  Wall Street Journal (30 August 2011). Accessible at http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904199404576538721260166388. 
106  See FIDH,  Amesys case: The investigation chamber green lights the investigative proceedings 
on the sale of surveillance equipment by Amesys to the Gaddafi  regime (15 January 2013). 
Accessible at https://www.fi dh.org/en/north-africa-middle-east/libya/Amesys-Case-The-
Investigation-12752. 
107  See FIDH, The Amesys case (20 September 2015). Accessible at https://www.fi dh.org/
IMG/pdf/report_amesys_case_eng.pdf. 
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effective forum guaranteeing a fair trial is available ( forum necessitatis ), and 
there is a suffi ciently close connection to the Member State concerned. 
 • EU Member States should consider introducing a rebuttable presumption 
of control in determining a subsidiary’s central administration; a wholly 
owned or majority-owned subsidiary is presumed to have its central admin-
istration with the parent company, unless the parent can prove that the 
subsidiary makes relevant business decisions independently from the parent 
and has no ties with the parent’s place of incorporation. 
 2  Judicial remedies 
 The issue of applicable law 
 L.F.H. (Liesbeth) Enneking 
 2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter addresses the issue of applicable law, thus dealing with the ques-
tion of under what circumstances the national rules of tort law of the EU 
Member States would be applied in cases brought before EU Member State 
courts against EU-based internationally operating business enterprises in rela-
tion to the harmful impacts of their activities – or those of their subsidiaries 
or business partners – on people and the planet in non-EU host countries. In 
addition, it also addresses some of the main practical and procedural barriers 
that host country victims of corporate human rights and environmental abuse 
may encounter when seeking to get access to remedy before EU Member 
State courts. 
 This chapter will start out with a general overview in section 2 of the legal 
context within which the issue of applicable law is set. The issue of applicable 
law is largely determined by EU law in the form of the Rome II Regulation, 
which will be discussed in section 3. The issue of practical and procedural 
circumstances is largely determined by the national rules of civil procedure 
of the country in which a particular case is brought. Although a full com-
parative study of relevant procedural rules in the different EU Member States 
falls outside of the scope of this report, section 4 will provide an indication 
of the main thresholds. At the end of each section, the fi ndings will be dis-
cussed and put into the context of relevant provisions of the UN Guiding 
Principles (UNGPs). This chapter will close up with an overall conclusion in 
section 5. 
 2.2 Legal context 
 With an increasing number of liability cases being brought before EU Member 
State courts against EU-based companies in relation to the harmful impacts of 
their activities on people and the planet in non-EU host countries, the issue of 
access to justice  before EU Member State courts in a business & human rights 
context has gained signifi cance. 
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 2.2.1 Foreign direct liability and beyond 1 
 Over the past two decades, Western societies around the world have witnessed 
a growing trend towards transnational civil liability claims against internationally 
operating business enterprises in relation to harm caused to people and the 
planet in the course of their operations – or those of their subsidiaries or supply 
chain partners – in developing host countries. These so-called foreign direct 
liability cases are typically initiated by host country citizens who, often with the 
help of home country based NGOs, turn to courts in the Western society home 
countries of the internationally operating business enterprises involved in search 
of an adequate level of protection of their human rights, their health and safety, 
and their local environment. 
 In many of these cases, plaintiffs seek to hold accountable the Western society 
based parent companies of multinational corporations, often together with any 
local (sub-)subsidiaries that were in charge of carrying out the harmful opera-
tions in question. In more recent cases, claims have also been directed at, for 
instance, Western society based retailers in relation to the harmful consequences 
of the operations of foreign (sub-)contractors in their supply chains. Another 
key feature of these cases is that the claims put forward are generally not only 
aimed at securing fi nancial compensation for harm suffered by past activities, 
like more garden-variety tort cases. Instead, they are often also, and some-
times especially, aimed at: fi rst, trying to get the internationally operating busi-
ness enterprises involved to exercise a higher level of care for the local inhabitants 
and local environment in their future operations in the host countries involved 
and to persuade their subsidiaries or supply chain partners into doing the same; 
second, trying to create transparency and debate in the Western society home 
countries of the internationally operating business enterprises involved with 
respect to the detrimental impacts that the operations of ‘their’ companies may 
have on people and the planet in developing host countries. 
 Up until now, the vast majority of these foreign direct liability cases have 
been brought before US federal courts on the basis of the Alien Tort Statute 
1  This section is largely based on: Liesbeth F. H. Enneking et al., Zorgplichten van Nederlandse 
Ondernemingen inzake Internationaal Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen, Report 
of a study commissioned by the Dutch Ministries of Security & Justice and Foreign Affairs, 
The Hague, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2016, report (in Dutch) and executive summary 
(in English) accessible at https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/2531-maatschappelijk-
verantwoord-ondernemen-in-het-buitenland.aspx; Liesbeth F. H. Enneking, ‘The Future of 
Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria 
Case’ 1 Utrecht Law Review (2014) 44–54; Liesbeth F. H. Enneking, Foreign Direct Liability 
and Beyond – Exploring the Role of Tort Law in Promoting International Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Accountability (2012) Eleven International Publishing: The Hague. 
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(ATS). 2 This ancient US federal statute, which was ‘rediscovered’ in the 1980s 
by human rights activists, turned out to provide a legal basis for civil claims 
before US federal courts in relation to violations of public international law 
norms perpetrated around the world. It has been hailed by human rights activ-
ists as a much-needed accountability mechanism for human rights violations 
perpetrated in developing societies where victims’ chances of obtaining (enforce-
able) remedies may be compromised by poorly functioning legal systems, cor-
ruption and/or favouritism. 3 
 Initially, the ATS was mainly used as a basis for civil claims against individual 
perpetrators of international human rights violations or international crimes, 
like Karadzic and Marcos. From the mid-1990s onwards, however, it has also 
become a popular basis for civil liability claims against corporate actors in rela-
tion to their alleged involvement in human rights violations perpetrated in host 
countries. 4 The result of this development so far is that over 150 ATS-based 
foreign direct liability claims have been brought before the US federal courts 
against a wide range of multinationals with a basis or at least a presence in the 
US, for their alleged involvement in international human rights abuses perpe-
trated in countries such as Burma, South Africa, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Sudan. 5 
High-profi le examples include claims against a large group of multinationals 
including General Motors, IBM and DaimlerChrysler for their alleged involve-
ment in the human rights violations perpetrated by the South African Apartheid 
regime, and the claims against oil multinational Shell for its alleged involvement 
in the human rights violations perpetrated by the Nigerian military regime 
against environmental activists in the Ogoniland region of the Niger Delta in 
the mid-1990s. 6 
 But foreign direct liability cases have also, and increasingly so, been brought 
before US state courts and before courts in other Western societies like 
Canada, the UK, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands. In the absence of an 
ATS equivalent outside the US (federal) legal system, these claims are often 
based on general principles of tort law and the tort of negligence in particular. 
As a consequence, the claims in these non-ATS-based foreign direct liability 
2  28 United States Code §1350. This statute, which has famously been referred to as a ‘legal 
Lohengrin’, since ‘no one seems to know whence it came’ ( IIT v Vencap, Ltd ., 519 F.2d 
1001 (2nd Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., at 1015)) – or, more particularly: what exactly the 1789 
framers had in mind when they enacted it – provides: ‘The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States’. 
3  See in more detail, for example, Enneking 2012,  op. cit. , pp. 77–87, 277–278. 
4  Ibid. , pp. 77–83. 
5  See, for instance, Jonathan C. Drimmer and Sarah R. Lamoree, ‘Think Globally, Sue Locally: 
Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transitional Tort Actions’, 2  Berkeley Journal of Inter-
national Law (2011) 456–527, 465. 
6  See in more detail and with further references: business-humanrights.org/en/apartheid-
reparations-lawsuits-re-so-africa and https://business-humanrights.org/en/shell-lawsuit-re-
nigeria-kiobel-wiwa, respectively. 
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cases tend to revolve not primarily around alleged violations of international 
(human rights) norms, but more often around alleged violations of non-
written norms pertaining to proper societal conduct and due care with respect 
to health and safety, labour standards and the environment. In countries such 
as Belgium, France and Switzerland, similar cases have presented themselves 
in the form of criminal proceedings initiated at the instigation of victims and 
NGOs. 7 
 A 2015 comparative study on the duties of care of Dutch companies in 
the field of international corporate social responsibility revealed that, since 
the early 1990s, at least 35 foreign direct liability cases have been pursued 
before courts in the six countries investigated (Belgium, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, the UK, and Switzerland). 8 Similar cases have been reported 
in a number of other countries that fell outside the scope of this study 
including, for instance Sweden, 9 which means that the number of these 
cases pursued so far before EU Member State courts is likely to be around 
40 in total. 
 Well known examples include the civil claims that were brought before the 
High Court of Justice in London by a large group of Ivorian citizens following 
the Probo Koala toxic waste dumping incident, 10 and the claims against Shell 
by Nigerian farmers and the Dutch NGO Milieudefensie in relation to damage 
caused by oil spills in the Ogoniland region of the Niger Delta that are currently 
pending before the Hague Court of Appeals. 11 It should be noted that of these 
35 cases, only three have resulted in a fi nal judicial decision on the merits in 
which the defendant companies were held liable. Many of the other cases have 
either been dismissed at an early stage of the proceedings, often due to lack of 
jurisdiction or lack of suffi cient evidence substantiating the claims, or settled 
out of court (see  Figure 2.1 ). 
 These foreign direct liability cases play a crucial role in exploring the hard 
law edges of international soft law instruments like the UN Policy Framework 
on Business and Human Rights and the accompanying UNGPs. 12 
 Their signifi cance fl ows from the fact that we are living in a globalizing world 
in which the production processes of corporate actors are increasingly becoming 
transnational affairs, but where adequate regulatory mechanisms to deal with 
 7  See in more detail, for example: Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit . pp. 23–29  et seq. ; Enneking 
2012,  op. cit. pp. 87–91. 
 8  Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 35–44, 163–164, 190–193, 224–231, 265–275, 315–316, 
439–442. 
 9  See, in more detail on the Swedish case: Rasmus Klocker Larsen, ‘Foreign direct liability 
claims in Sweden: Learning from “Arica Victims KB” v “Boliden Mineral AB”?’, 4  Nordic 
Journal of International Law (2014) 404–438. 
10  See in more detail and with further references: https://business-humanrights.org/en/
trafi gura-lawsuits-re-côte-d’ivoire. 
11  See in more detail and with further references: https://business-humanrights.org/en/
shell-lawsuit-re-oil-pollution-in-nigeria. 









Belgium 0 0  n/a 1 •  1 dismissed 1
Germany 0 3 •  1 out-of-court 
settlement
•  2 ongoing
2 •  1 status unclear




France 0 2 •  1 compensation 
granted
•  1 dismissed
8 •  1 status unclear
•  1 prosecutor 
ends 
investigation





•  3 ongoing
•  2 ongoing with 
joint civil claim
10
UK 0 13 •  6 out-of-court 
settlements
•  1 partly settled, 
partly ongoing
•  2 dismissed
•  4 ongoing
0  n/a 13




Netherlands 0 2 •  1 compensation 
granted (partly)
•  1 partly 
dismissed, 
partly ongoing
2 •  1 conviction
•  1 dropped
4
Totals 0 20 15 35
 Figure 2.1 Overview of relevant cases 1 
 1 Derived from: Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. p. 440. 
these internationally operating business enterprises and the impacts of their 
worldwide activities are lacking. In a world with an international legal order 
that is still premised on the traditional idea of sovereign nation states, domestic 
public law regulations in principle remain territorially confi ned. At the same 
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time, international treaties are few and far between and are usually either con-
fi ned to a very specifi c subject matter, or broad but vague. And although soft 
law instruments and self-regulatory mechanisms such as corporate codes of 
conduct may strike a chord with corporate leaders in the fi eld of international 
corporate social responsibility, they are less well suited to deal with corporate 
laggards in this context due to the lack of a mandatory nature and/or adequate 
enforcement. 
 This leaves the fi eld of private law, and that of tort law in particular, as an 
important mechanism to ensure that internationally operating business enterprises 
take seriously their responsibility to minimize the risk that the activities they 
undertake in the pursuit of profi ts will detrimentally affect people and planet 
elsewhere. One of the big advantages of relying on private law mechanisms in 
this context is that potential concerns by the states involved over extraterritorial 
infringements of one another’s sovereignty are dealt with through the fi eld of 
private international law. However, the role that national systems of tort law 
may play in promoting socially responsible behaviour by internationally operat-
ing business enterprises and business respect for human rights is, in the end, 
strongly dependent on the feasibility for the victims of irresponsible business 
practices of successfully pursuing foreign direct liability claims. 13 
 An analysis of the claims pursued so far shows that the feasibility of these 
cases is determined by four main factors: 1) whether the home country court 
seized of the matter has jurisdiction to hear the claim; 2) which national system 
of tort law the court will apply in determining the validity of the claim; 3) what 
the conditions for liability are that are connected to the legal basis on which 
the claim is brought; 4) to what extent the procedural rules and practical cir-
cumstances in the forum country are conducive to the pursuit of this type of 
litigation. 14 This report will address the issue of applicable law as well as that 
of practical and procedural circumstances in the forum country. In doing so, 
its focus is on foreign direct liability cases pursued on the basis of tort law. A 
further discussion of the feasibility, applicable law, and practical and procedural 
circumstances in cases pursued on the basis of the criminal law falls outside the 
scope of this report – and of this project. 
 2.2.2 Private international law and extraterritoriality 15 
 As has been mentioned, the point of departure in today’s international legal 
order of sovereign nation states remains that each state, in principle, has the 
supreme authority to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations with respect 
to actors and activities within its territory. However, as a result of growing 
global interconnectedness, actors and activities are increasingly situated in 
13  See in more detail: Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 443–521. 
14  Ibid. , pp. 129–203. 
15  This section is derived from: Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 137–140. 
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transnational rather than domestic contexts and are thus potentially subject to 
the authority of more than one state. The resulting competing claims to regula-
tory authority by different states with respect to those actors and activities raise 
questions of international jurisdiction. These questions may be subdivided into 
questions of: adjudicative jurisdiction (referring to a state’s authority to have 
its courts adjudicate on disputes and render judgments in an international con-
text); prescriptive jurisdiction (referring to a state’s authority to apply its laws 
in an international context); and enforcement jurisdiction (referring to a state’s 
authority to enforce compliance with its laws in an international context). 16 
 In line with the idea that the contemporary international legal order is made 
up of different sovereign nation states each with exclusive authority over actors 
and activities within their territories, the jurisdiction of states to exercise any of 
these types of international jurisdiction over actors and activities outside their 
territory (extraterritorially) is limited. In theory, these limitations are defi ned 
either by the fi eld of public international law where public law rights and obli-
gations are concerned, or by the fi eld of private international law where private 
law rights and obligations are concerned. These two fi elds of law are of a very 
different nature. Whereas the former justifi es international jurisdiction in spatial 
terms with a strong focus on territoriality and state sovereignty, the latter focuses 
on connecting factors between the private actors and activities in question and 
the different states involved. 
 Furthermore, the fi eld of public international law revolves around state interests 
and as such tends to be highly politicized, while the traditional and still popular 
basic assumption in the fi eld of private international law, in Europe at least, is that 
this fi eld of law is apolitical, due also to the fact that the domestic systems of 
private law that it is concerned with are assumed to be relatively free of state 
intervention and insulated from public interests. According to Michaels, this tra-
ditional view can be traced back to Von Savigny’s conception that private law is 
apolitical and should as such be sharply distinguished from the fi eld of public law. 
He argues that this traditional conception of private international law as an essen-
tially value-neutral, apolitical fi eld of law as originally developed by Von Savigny 
cannot adequately deal with the contemporary challenges of globalization. 17 
 In practice, the two fi elds are also closely interconnected. The more blurred 
the boundary between public law and private law becomes, for instance where 
16  See in more detail, for instance: Jennifer A. Zerk,  Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for 
the Business and Human Rights Sphere from Six Regulatory Areas , A report for the Harvard 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative to help inform the mandate of the UNSG’s Special 
Representative on Business and Human Rights, 2009, accessible at https://www.hks.harvard.
edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_59_zerk.pdf; Gary P. Born and Peter B. 
Rutledge  International Civil Litigation in United States Courts , (2007) Wolters Kluwer 
Law & Business: Austin, TX, (4th ed.) 1–217. 
17  R. Michaels,  Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the 
Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization , Duke Law School Faculty Scholarship 
Series, no. 15, 2005. Accessible at http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228. 
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private law and civil disputes are given a more ‘public’ character because they 
are applied by the government and/or by private actors themselves to enforce 
public laws, promote public policies, protect public interests or facilitate societal 
change more generally, the more principles of public and private international 
law come together. 18 Thus, the question may be raised of whether (the issues 
sought to be resolved through) the fi eld of private international law may not 
under certain circumstances be rather ‘public’ in both character and conse-
quences. Symeonides argues in this respect that 
 the word ‘private’, which echoes the private-public law distinction prevalent 
in Europe, assumes that the cases that fall within the scope of this subject 
are garden-variety private-law disputes that implicate only the interests of 
the litigants and not the interests of the states having contacts with the 
case. If this were true, these cases would not differ from intra-state cases 
which are always governed by forum law. Precisely because of their multistate 
dimension, confl icts cases implicate the laws of more than one state, which 
may embody different objectives, values, or policies. Although these states 
are not the actual disputants as they would be in a public international law 
dispute, it is unrealistic to assume that they are wholly indifferent to the 
way these confl icts cases are resolved. 19 
 In fact, the idea of the fi eld of private international law as an apolitical, neutral 
fi eld of law that does not involve state interests has long been abandoned in 
the US, in favour of an approach that recognizes that the confl icting interests 
involved in this fi eld go far beyond the interests of the parties directly involved 
in a transnational private law dispute and concern also societal, public and 
ultimately state interests. 20 Meanwhile, also in Europe there is a growing aware-
ness of and sensitivity to the broader, more public implications of the role of 
private international law in transnational private law disputes, even though the 
consideration of these implications remains much less overt than in the US. 21 
 With respect to the future role of public interests in the fi eld of private 
international law, Symeonides predicts: 
 As we proceed down the path of the twenty-fi rst century, we can expect 
that states will, even more boldly, assert their interest in multistate private-
law disputes. 22 
18  Similarly, J. A. Zerk,  Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (2006), Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 104–142. 
19  S. C. Symeonides, ‘The American Revolution and the European Evolution in Choice of Law: 
Reciprocal Lessons’, 5  Tulane Law Review (2008) 1741–1799 (hereinafter: Symeonides 2008a). 
20  See, in more detail: Symeonides 2008a,  op. cit. pp. 1784–1794. 
21  Ibid . 
22  Ibid ., p. 1794. 
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 The resulting confl uence of public and private international law may result in 
complex issues that challenge existing paradigms in both fi elds of law. 23 An 
example is the growing reliance on civil procedures before domestic courts to 
address international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, torture, slavery, and terrorism. This tendency has the potential of caus-
ing confl ict with (the harmonization of) domestic civil procedural rules, and 
raises questions with respect to the lawful exercise of universal (civil) jurisdiction 
where the domestic legal order in which the claim is brought has little or no 
connections to the actors or activities in question. 24 
Dubinsky argues in this respect: 
 In attempting to adjudicate claims arising out of severe and systematic 
human rights abuses, domestic courts are trying to fi ll an enforcement gap, 
a task for which they were not designed. 25 
 He suggests that in order to tackle these issues, a set of common principles of 
procedural law (including private international law) should be developed that 
would be applicable to the adjudication of civil claims pertaining to grave human 
rights violations, no matter where those claims would be brought. 26 
 Foreign direct liability cases, due to their transnationality and distinct public 
interest nature, are a clear example of cases that lie at the plane of intersection 
between both areas of law. Accordingly, despite the fact that these cases are 
essentially concerned with private law disputes over the private interrelationships 
between the host country plaintiffs and the defendant companies, they also tend 
to raise issues of international adjudicatory and prescriptive jurisdiction and 
extraterritoriality. After all, home country courts are typically asked in these 
cases to exercise authority over actors and activities that predominantly lie outside 
the territorial ambit of those home countries, by exercising jurisdiction over 
foreign direct liability claims and by, where possible, determining them on the 
basis of home country tort standards. This may be controversial where this is 
perceived by the host countries involved as an ‘interference in their sovereign 
rights to regulate corporations within their own borders, and to pursue their 
own economic, social and cultural interests’. 27 
23  For a more detailed discussion, see A. Mills,  The Confl uence of Public and Private Inter-
national Law (2009) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
24  For a more detailed discussion, see P. R. Dubinsky, ‘Human Rights Law Meets Private 
Law Harmonization: The Coming Confl ict’, 1  Yale Journal of International Law (2005) 
211–318. 
25  Ibid. , p. 302. 
26  Ibid. , pp. 312–317. 
27  D. Augenstein (2010)  Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment 
Applicable to European Enterprises Operating outside the European Union , Report of a study 
prepared for the European Commission by the University of Edinburgh. Accessible at 
http://en.frankbold.org/sites/default/fi les/tema/101025_ec_study_fi nal_report_en_0.
pdf. In fact, issues of extraterritoriality have been raised in various foreign direct liability 
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 This means that even though the exercise of jurisdiction by home country 
courts over foreign direct liability claims or the adjudication of those claims on 
the basis of home country tort principles may be fi rmly based on applicable 
rules of private international law, issues of extraterritoriality may remain. Zerk 
has noted in this context that 
 [s]uperfi cially, a court may only be deciding a dispute between private par-
ties. In reality, though, judicial approaches to problems posed by multina-
tionals in the private law sphere will refl ect a set of principles and assumptions, 
conscious or unconscious, about the appropriate distribution of risk, reward 
and responsibilities between the different actors involved. But, as well as 
having a regulatory context, case law on matters of private international 
law also has regulatory consequences to the extent that it affects the balance 
of risks and rewards against which the investment decisions of multinationals 
are subsequently made. In this sense, even the act of deferring to the courts 
of another state, for whatever reason, is a ‘regulatory’ act. 28 
 Accordingly, underlying issues of sovereignty and extraterritoriality play a promi-
nent role in providing the socio-political context of foreign direct liability cases 
and the background to private international law-related issues such as the 
determination of the applicable law in these cases. 
 2.2.3 Discussion 
 One of the main focal points of the debates in the EU Member States on access 
to judicial remedy for victims of corporate human rights abuses is the contem-
porary trend towards foreign direct liability cases: transnational (civil) liability 
claims against internationally operating business enterprises in relation to harm 
caused to people and the planet in the course of their operations – or those of 
their subsidiaries or supply chain partners – in developing host countries. Over 
the past two decades, the prevalence of this type of litigation before EU Member 
State courts has strongly increased, from a mere handful of cases in the 1990s 
to a total of around 40 cases pursued in various EU Member States up until 
now – and counting. 
 The signifi cance of these cases lies in the role they may play in promoting 
international corporate social responsibility and in fostering corporate respect 
for human rights, as set out in the UNGPs, while at the same time providing 
a potential redress mechanism for victims of corporate environmental or human 
cases, including for instance the Bhopal litigation ( In re Union Carbide gas plant disaster 
at Bhopal, India in December 1984 , 634 F.Supp. 842 (SDNY 1986), p. 862–867) and the 
Apartheid litigation ( In re South African Apartheid Litigation , 617 F.Supp.2d 228 (SDNY 
2009), p. 276–286). 
28  Zerk 2006,  op. cit. p. 114. 
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rights abuse. They typically originate in developing host countries where legal 
standards relating to the protection of human rights, the environment, health 
and safety, and labour circumstances are not very strict or not very strictly 
enforced. These cases make it possible for individuals and communities who 
have suffered harm as a result of the activities of internationally operating 
business enterprises in these host countries to turn to courts in the Western 
society home countries of those business enterprises in order to obtain a 
more adequate level of protection of their people and planet related 
interests. 29 
 What plays an important role in these cases is that legal procedures before 
local host country courts are often problematic, regardless of the merits of the 
claims involved. Reasons for this may be for instance that the local judiciary is 
not independent, that there is a fear of persecution, that the individuals or 
communities involved face discrimination, that the host country legal system is 
not equipped to effectively deal with complex legal claims, that it would be 
diffi cult to locally enforce a court verdict, etc. This means that getting access 
to judicial remedies before home country courts is often crucial for the victims’ 
chances of addressing and obtaining redress for infringements of their environ-
mental and human rights interests as a result of activities carried out by or for 
EU-based internationally operating business enterprises in the host countries 
involved. 30 
 Whether these foreign direct liability cases can play a role in providing 
victims of corporate human rights and environmental abuse with access to 
judicial remedies before EU Member State courts is dependent on a number 
of factors that determine the feasibility of these cases. These include, inter 
alia, what law is to be applied in determining the validity of the claims, and 
whether there are barriers inherent in the procedural rules and practical 
circumstances in the EU Member States that may prevent these cases from 
being pursued, regardless of their merits. 31 This report focuses on the second 
and the fourth of these factors; the first is dealt with in the report on 
jurisdiction, while the third is (partly) dealt with in the report on standards 
of care. 
 2.3 Applicable law 32 
 Once it has been established that the court before which a foreign direct liability 
claim has been brought has jurisdiction to hear the matter, the question arises 
29  Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 27–28; Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 107–117. 
30  Ibid . 
31  Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 27–28; Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 132–137. 
32  This section is largely derived from: Enneking 2012. See also L.F.H. Enneking,’ The 
Common Denominator of the Trafi gura Case, Foreign Direct Liability Cases and the Rome II 
Regulation’, 2  European Review of Private Law (2008) 283–311. 
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on the basis of which legal norms the transboundary civil claim should be 
adjudicated. After all, transnational litigation inevitably presents questions of 
applicable law (or confl ict-of-law) where two or more states are able to prescribe 
substantive rules of conduct regulating the private actors and activities in dispute. 
Accordingly, courts dealing with transnational civil disputes need to select, on 
the basis of the domestic rules of private international law that apply in the 
forum country, which of the legal systems of the states connected to the trans-
national civil dispute should govern the claims. Rules of private international 
law may also fl ow from non-domestic sources of law, such as the EU’s many 
regulations on the law applicable to civil disputes in various subject matter areas. 
 In principle, different confl ict-of-law regimes may apply depending on the 
characterization of the transnational claims in dispute as tort claims, contractual 
claims, or otherwise. In this report, the focus will be on applicable law issues in 
foreign direct liability cases pursued on the basis of tort law. Due to these cases’ 
strong connections to the host country (since they typically pertain to harm caused 
to people and planet in the host country as a result of activities carried out there), 
it is not at all a given that the home country courts adjudicating foreign direct 
liability claims will be able to do so on the basis of home country substantive 
norms on tort law. In fact, in many of these cases the home country courts 
involved will have to formulate their judgment with respect to the alleged wrong-
fulness of the corporate conduct in question – as well as with respect to its legal 
consequences – on the basis of foreign (often host country) rules of tort law. 
 2.3.1 Rome II Regulation: general rule 
 In foreign direct liability cases brought before courts of the EU Member States, 
the issue of applicable law is largely determined by EU law in the form of the 
Rome II Regulation. 33 This regulation provides a mandatory and exhaustive 
regime of unifi ed rules on applicable law in cases of non-contractual liability 
(hereinafter, tort) involving events giving rise to damage that have occurred on 
or after 11 January 2009. 34 Pursuant to its principal aim of realizing uniformity 
33  Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II),  OJEU L199/40 
(31 July 2007). Note that the Regulation covers torts occurring within and outside the 
EU alike and may as such also lead to the application of the law of a non-EU Member 
State; it’s geographical scope is universal (Art. 3 Rome II Regulation). 
34  Tort claims brought before EU Member State courts after 11 January 2009, but pertaining 
to events giving rise to damage that occurred before 11 January 2009, fall outside the 
temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation and are governed by the domestic rules on 
applicable law in tort cases of the forum country; the same is true for tort claims that have 
been initiated before 11 January 2009. See ECJ Case C-412/10, 6 September 2011, 
[2011] ECR I-11603 ( Homawoo v GMF  ). A further discussion of domestic rules on 
applicable law in tort cases in the various EU Member States falls outside the scope of this 
report. See, for a brief discussion of relevant Dutch rules, for instance, Enneking 2012, 
 op. cit. pp. 223–224. 
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in the choice of law decisions by the courts of the EU Member States, 35 the 
Regulation provides a relatively neutral ‘system of tightly written black-letter 
rules with relatively few escapes and little room for judicial discretion’ that is 
focused on jurisdiction-selection (confl icts justice) rather than content-oriented 
law selection (material justice). 36 
 The Rome II Regulation takes as its point of departure the applicability of 
the  lex loci damni , a specifi cation of the traditional  lex loci delicti rule. Conse-
quently, it is the law of the country in which the damage occurs that in principle 
applies under the Regulation, ‘irrespective of the country in which the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries 
in which the indirect consequences of that event occur’. 37 On the basis of this 
general rule, it is the tort law of the host country that will in principle be 
applicable in foreign direct liability cases that are brought before EU Member 
State courts. This rule in principle also applies if the tort in question is a trans-
boundary tort, in the sense that the act (or omission) giving rise to the damage 
is located in one country (the  Handlungsort ) whereas the harm resulting from 
that act (or omission) is located in another country (the  Erfolgsort ). 38 
 There are a number of matters that in particular fall within the scope of the 
law that is applicable on the basis the Rome II Regulation’s rules. These include: 
 a) the basis and the extent of liability, including the determination of persons 
who may be held liable for acts performed by them; b) the grounds for 
exemption from liability, any limitation of liability and any division of liability; 
35  See recital 6 Rome II Regulation: ‘The proper functioning of the internal market creates 
a need, in order to improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to 
the law applicable and the free movement of judgments, for the confl ict-of-law rules in 
the Member States to designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the 
court in which an action is brought’. 
36  See, for a critical appraisal S. C. Symeonides, ‘Rome II and Tort Confl icts: A Missed 
Opportunity’, 1  American Journal of Comparative Law (2008) 173–222, 178–186) (Syme-
onides 2008b). 
37  Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Com-
mission’s proposal for the Rome II Regulation, this choice for the  lex loci damni as the 
Regulation’s starting point is justifi ed by the concern for certainty in the law, as well as 
by the consideration that ‘the modern concept of the law of civil liability [. . .] is no longer 
[. . .] oriented towards punishing for fault-based conduct: nowadays, it is the compensation 
function that dominates’ (COM(2003) 427, p. 12). It is further asserted that this rule 
‘strikes a fair balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and the 
person sustaining the damage, and also refl ects the modern approach to civil liability and 
the development of systems of strict liability’ (Recital 16 Rome II Regulation). See, criti-
cally, Symeonides 2008b,  op. cit. pp. 186–192, and (with a focus on foreign direct liability 
cases) Enneking 2008,  op. cit. pp. 309–310. 
38  Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation. The classic example of a transboundary tort case is the 
Mines de Potasse case, which concerned the pollution of the river Rhine by chlorides from 
French potassium miners, causing environmental harm to Dutch farmers located downstream 
from their operations. ECJ Case C-21/76, 30 November 1976, [1976] ECR 01735 ( Bier/
Mines de Potasse d’Alsace ). 
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c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy 
claimed; d) within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its pro-
cedural law, the measures which a court may take to prevent or terminate 
injury or damage or to ensure the provision of compensation; e) the ques-
tion whether a right to claim damages or a remedy may be transferred, 
including by inheritance; f) persons entitled to compensation for damage 
sustained personally; g) liability for the acts of another person; h) the man-
ner in which an obligation may be extinguished and rules of prescription 
and limitation, including rules relating to the commencement, interruption 
and suspension of a period of prescription or limitation. 39 
 In addition, where the law that is applicable to a claim under the Rome II 
Regulation ‘contains rules which raise presumptions of law or determine the 
burden of proof’, those will also be applicable. 40 
 There are two general escape clauses that accompany the Rome II Regula-
tion’s general rule of applicability of the  lex loci damni . 
 The fi rst pertains to the situation that the person claimed to be liable and 
the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same 
country at the time when the damage occurs. 41 In such a situation, the law of 
the country of the joint habitual residence shall be applied to the case. However, 
this situation is unlikely to arise in foreign direct liability claims that are brought 
by host country victims against Western society-based internationally operating 
business enterprises. 42 It may in theory play a role in claims that would be 
brought by these victims before EU Member State courts against (only) host 
country-based companies, but in such cases, leaving aside the question whether 
the court would have jurisdiction to hear the claim, 43 this rule would not lead 
to a different outcome (i.e. applicability of host country tort law). 
 The second pertains to the situation that ‘it is clear from all the circumstances 
of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected’ with a 
country other than the one in which the damage has arisen and other than the 
one in which (if relevant) the parties have their joint habitual residence. 44 In 
such a situation, the law of this other country shall be applied to the case. 
Whether it would be possible in foreign direct liability cases to successfully argue 
that such a closer connection to another country – notably the EU Member 
State that is the home country of the corporate defendant involved – exists is 
unclear, however. The example of such a ‘manifestly closer relationship’ that is 
provided by the Regulation itself, ‘a pre-existing relationship between the parties, 
39  Art. 15 Rome II Regulation. 
40  Art. 20(1) Rome II Regulation. 
41  Art. 4(2) Rome II Regulation. 
42  Similarly, G. Van Calster,  European Private International Law (2013) Hart Publishing: 
Oxford, 439. 
43  See in more detail on this matter the report on Jurisdiction. 
44  Art. 4(3) Rome II Regulation. 
52 Liesbeth Enneking
such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question’, 45 
is unlikely to play a role in foreign direct liability cases. 46 Especially considering 
the fact that, in line with the Regulation’s general aim of providing for certainty 
as to the applicable law and predictability concerning the outcome of litigation, 
this provision will have to be interpreted and applied restrictively. 47 
 In addition, the Rome II Regulation leaves open the possibility that the par-
ties to a foreign direct liability case that is brought before an EU Member State 
court jointly designate the law that is to be applied to the claims on the basis 
of an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred. 48 
In reality, the chances that parties to a foreign direct liability case will agree on 
the law that is to be applied to the case seem slim, especially in those cases 
where circumstances such as the level of protection of the victims and the level 
of damages will vary widely according to the law that is applied to the case, as 
will often be the case in this context. At the same time, to the corporate defen-
dants involved the application of foreign (host country) tort law by these courts 
may carry with it the additional benefi t that any judgment on the issue of liability 
in favour of the plaintiffs would not create binding and/or useful precedent 
under the tort law of the EU Member State where they are based. 
 2.3.2 Rome II Regulation: special rule on environmental damage 
 Furthermore, the Regulation contains a number of special provisions for specifi c 
types of torts that deviate from the general rule of  lex loci damni . Of these 
provisions, the special rule on environmental damages is likely to be especially 
relevant in the context of foreign direct liability cases. 49 On the basis of this rule, 
the tort victim in a transboundary tort case that arises out of environmental 
damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage, 
is presented with the option of choosing the applicability of the law of the 
 Handlungsort ( lex loci actus ) instead of that of the  Erfolgsort ( lex loci damni ). 50 
According to the Regulation, environmental damage in this sense should be 
understood as meaning 
 adverse change in a natural resource, such as water, land or air, impairment 
of a function performed by that resource for the benefi t of another natural 
45  Ibid . 
46  Similarly, Van Calster 2013,  op. cit. p. 240; Enneking 2008,  op. cit. p. 307. 
47  Similarly, but in more detail, Peter Huber (ed.),  Rome II Regulation: Pocket Commentary 
(2011) European Law Publishers: Munich, Sellier, 99–104; Enneking 2008,  op. cit. 
pp. 300–302. 
48  Art. 14 (1) (a) Rome II Regulation. 
49  This special rule is not subject to either the common domicile exception (Art. 4(2)) or to 
the closer connection exception (Art. 4(3)); it does, however, leave open the possibility of 
a choice of law on the basis of Art. 14. See Huber 2011,  op. cit. pp. 202–203, 214. 
50  Art. 7 Rome II Regulation. 
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resource or the public, or impairment of the variability among living 
organisms. 51 
 In contrast to the Rome II Regulation’s overall tendency towards policy neu-
trality, the special rule on environmental damage has been inspired by objectives 
of environmental protection policy, in combination with the concern that ‘the 
exclusive connection to the place where the damage is sustained would also 
mean that a victim in a low-protection country would not enjoy the higher 
level of protection available in neighbouring countries’. 52 In its original proposal 
for the Regulation, the Commission justifi ed the inclusion of this special rule 
on environmental damage as follows: 
 Considering the Union’s more general objectives in environmental matters, 
the point is not only to respect the victim’s legitimate interests but also to 
establish a legislative policy that contributes to raising the general level of 
environmental protection, especially as the author of the environmental 
damage, unlike other torts or delicts, generally derives an economic benefi t 
from his harmful activity. Applying exclusively the law of the place where 
the damage is sustained could give an operator an incentive to establish his 
facilities at the border so as to discharge toxic substances into a river and 
enjoy the benefi t of the neighbouring country’s laxer rules. This solution 
would be contrary to the underlying philosophy of the European substan-
tive law of the environment and the “polluter pays” principle. 53 
 This particular rule may be of signifi cance for future foreign direct liability cases, 
at least those that involve environmental damage as specifi ed in the Regulation, 
provided they can be constructed as transboundary tort claims in which the 
event giving rise to the damage in the host country has taken place in the home 
country of the corporate defendant. This may be the case for instance if a claim 
can be made that the home country-based parent company or retailer took 
decisions, made demands or implemented policies that eventually resulted in 
the environmental damage being caused in the host country, or failed to exercise 
adequate supervision over the host country activities where it could and should 
have done so. 54 It has been suggested that such an interpretation is in line with 
the notion of operator responsibility and the accompanying defi nition of opera-
tor in the EU Environmental Liability Directive. 55 
51  Recital 24 Rome II Regulation. 
52  Explanatory Memorandum,  op. cit. p. 19. 
53  Ibid. , pp. 19–20. 
54  Similarly: Enneking 2008,  op. cit. pp. 212–218, 304–307. 
55  Carmen Otera García-Castrillón, ‘International Litigation Trends in Environmental Liability: 
A European Union – United States Comparative Perspective’, 3  Journal of Private Interna-
tional Law (2011) 551–581, 571–572). See also Van Calster 2013,  op. cit. pp. 173–174. 
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 In these situations, the special rule on environmental damage would give the 
host country victims the option of choosing application of home country tort 
law, which may involve more relevant precedents, higher regulatory standards, 
stricter liabilities, more liberal rules on presumptions of law or on shifting the 
burden of proof, higher damages awards, etc. However, the question has been 
raised as to whether the environmental damage rule would indeed be applicable 
to these particular types of claims, or whether its scope is limited to more ‘clas-
sic’ cases of transboundary environmental damage such as may arise for instance 
from river pollution or an explosion at a chemical factory. 56 The real issue here 
seems to be whether this rule pertains only to situations of local conduct that 
result in transboundary environmental damage which is felt in a neighbouring 
country, or also to situations of transboundary conduct that results in local 
environmental damage in some far away (non-EU) country. Or, put in another 
way: do non-EU environmental interests also fall within the scope of Rome II’s 
environmental policies? 
 Although the Commission proposal does indeed speak of ‘neighbouring 
countries’, there is nothing in the text of the provision itself that supports this 
narrow interpretation. In fact, such a narrow interpretation does not seem to 
be in line with the Rome II Regulation’s universal application, nor with the 
environmental damage rule’s main aim, which is to raise the overall level of 
environmental protection and of making the polluter pay. 57 As is stated in the 
Regulation itself: 
 Regarding environmental damage, Article 174 of the Treaty, which provides 
that there should be a high level of protection based on the precautionary 
principle and the principle that preventive action should be taken, the 
principle of priority for corrective action at source and the principle that 
the polluter pays, fully justifi es the use of the principle of discriminating in 
favour of the person sustaining the damage. 58 
 In the end, the choice provided to environmental tort victims by Art. 7 for the 
law of the  Handlungsort rather than the  Erfolgsort is not meant to benefi t the 
victims as such, but to 
 promote the interests of the respective countries and of the Union as a 
whole in deterring pollution. Applying whichever of the two laws subjects 
56  See, for instance, A. G. Castermans and J. A. Van Der Weide,  The Legal Liability of Dutch 
Parent Companies for Subsidiaries’ Involvement in Violations of Fundamental, Internationally 
Recognised Rights’ , Report of a study prepared for the Dutch Ministries of Economic Affairs 
and Foreign Affairs, 15 December 2009. Accessible at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1626225, 
p. 53. 
57  See Arts 3 and 7 Rome II Regulation and Explanatory Memorandum,  op. cit. pp. 9–10, 
19–20. 
58  Recital 25 Rome II Regulation. 
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the polluter to a higher standard promotes this interest. Giving the victim 
a choice is simply the vehicle for ensuring this result. 59 
 Whether and how the special rule on environmental damage may play a role in 
future foreign direct liability cases is a question that may eventually have to be 
answered by the ECJ, which has yet to render a decision on the interpretation 
and the scope of application of this rule. 
 2.3.3 Rome II Regulation: relevant exceptions 
 Apart from those cases that may be brought under the special rule for environ-
mental damage, the Rome II Regulation’s general rule of  lex loci damni will in 
most cases result in the applicability of host country tort law in foreign direct 
liability cases. Nonetheless, there are a number of ways in which home country 
legal rules and standards that are relevant to the issue in dispute may fi nd 
application even in foreign direct liability cases that are decided on the basis of 
host country rules of tort law. 
 2.3.3.1 Overriding mandatory provisions 
 First of all, there is the possibility under the Rome II Regulation for the EU 
Member State court seized of a matter to apply so-called overriding mandatory 
provisions (or, public order legislation,  règles d’application immédiate ) of the 
law of the forum that are relevant to the subject matter in dispute, irrespective 
of the law that governs the claim. 60 According to the ECJ, overriding manda-
tory provisions can be defi ned as 
 national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial 
for the protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member 
State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present 
on the national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships 
within that State. 61 
 Accordingly, these provisions typically include domestic regulations of a (semi-)
public law nature that intervene in private legal relationships in order to protect 
the public interest, such as anti-trust regulations, monetary regulations, labour 
regulations (such as rules on working hours and working conditions), 
59  Symeonides 2008b,  op. cit. pp. 205–206. 
60  Art. 16 Rome II Regulation. 
61  ECJ Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, 23 November 1999, [1999] ECR I-8453 ( Arblade ). 
See also Art. 9 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). 
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environmental regulations and rules of criminal law. 62 They may also include 
rules that fl ow from non-domestic legal sources, like certain provisions of sub-
stantive EU law 63 or of public international law, potentially also including certain 
provisions on the protection of fundamental/human rights. 64 
 The extent to which such existing overriding mandatory provisions will be 
relevant in foreign direct liability cases brought before EU Member State courts 
remains to be seen. First of all, this exception may according to the text of the 
Rome II Regulation itself only be applied ‘in exceptional circumstances’. 65 At the 
same time, in line with the contemporary international legal order’s state-centred 
and territorially-based nature, mandatory public law regulation of actors and/or 
activities outside a state’s territory remains an exception. 66 Still, if an EU Member 
State were to impose, for example, statutory duties for locally based internationally 
operating business enterprises with respect to the people and planet related impacts 
of their activities in host countries, such duties could be considered to be over-
riding mandatory provisions that should fi nd application in foreign direct liability 
cases brought before the courts in those EU Member States. 
 Van Hoek states in this respect that 
 if the country in which the court sits imposes statutory duties on its cor-
porations with regard to extraterritorial compliance with human rights 
standards, such duties may override the otherwise applicable law. 67 
 She adds to this: 
 Some statutes may not stop at prescribing an extraterritorial duty of care, 
but may stipulate that violation of that duty will lead to civil liability towards 
the victims, in which case the civil law liability will be based on a manda-
tory overriding provision as well. 68 
62  See, for instance, Huber 2011,  op. cit. , pp. 354–356. See also L. Strikwerda,  Inleiding tot 
het Nederlandse Internationaal Privaatrecht , Deventer, Kluwer, 2013, pp. 69–70. 
63  Compare ECJ Case C-381/98, 9 November 2000, [2000] ECR I-9305 ( Ingmar/Eaton ). 
See also, more recently but within the scope of contractual obligations (Rome I Regula-
tion): ECJ Case 184–12, 17 October 2013 ( Unamar/Navigation Maritime Bulgare ). 
64  See, for instance, with a focus on the European Convention on Human Rights: A. A. H. 
Van Hoek, ‘Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility: Some issues with regard to the 
Liability of European Corporations for Labour Law Infringements in the Countries of 
Establishment of their Suppliers’, in: Frans Pennings  et al. (eds.),  Social responsibility in 
labour relations: European and comparative perspectives , Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, (2008) p. 147–169. Compare also, within the scope of contractual obligations 
(Rome I Regulation): Laura M. Van Bochove, ‘Overriding Mandatory Rules as a Vehicle 
for Weaker Party Protection in European Private International Law’, 3 Erasmus Law Review 
(2014) 147–156, 150. 
65  Recital 32 Rome II Regulation. 
66  Compare Augenstein 2010,  op. cit. p. 72. 
67  Van Hoek 2008,  op. cit . p. 166. 
68  Ibid. 
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 The hypothetical scenario set out by Van Hoek in 2008 may well become reality 
at some point in the near to medium-term future. In various European countries 
legislative initiatives have recently been put forward that seek to transform some 
of the soft law norms from the UNGPs into mandatory provisions on corporate 
duties of care in relation to human rights and the environment abroad. In 
France, there is fi erce debate over a legislative proposal on a legal duty of due 
care ( devoir de vigilance ) for large French business enterprises with regard to 
people and planet related risks connected with the activities of their subsidiaries, 
subcontractors and suppliers. 69 In Switzerland, a popular legislative initiative has 
been put forward requesting an amendment of the Swiss Federal Constitution 
that would introduce a legally obligatory binding ‘ responsabilité des entreprises ’ 
for Swiss business enterprises relating to the impact on people and the planet 
of their own activities and of the activities of business enterprises controlled by 
them. 70 
 The constitutional amendment proposed in the Swiss popular initiative con-
tains a specifi c provision stating that the provisions dealing with corporate 
obligations and liabilities ‘apply irrespective of the law applicable under private 
international law’. 71 This provision is meant to ensure that the Swiss legislator 
would be required to design the constitutional amendment on  responsabilité des 
entreprises as an overriding mandatory provision. 72 This is a necessary provision, 
since on the basis of the applicable Swiss confl ict-of-law regime the law applicable 
to a foreign direct liability claim brought before a Swiss court would in principle 
be the law of the host country rather than Swiss tort law. 73 Like the Rome II 
Regulation, however, the Swiss regime provides for the possibility that the court 
may apply overriding mandatory provisions that are relevant to the subject 
matter in dispute, irrespective of the law that governs the claim. 74 
 Also in Germany, there is debate on the desirability of and possibilities for 
introducing in German law a statutory duty of care for corporate actors in the 
human rights context. In a recent study commissioned by a number of German 
NGOs, a group of German legal experts have set out in detail how such a 
69  Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre , no. 708, 23 March 2016, adopted with modifi cations by the Assemblée Nationale 
in second reading. Accessible at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0708.asp. 
70  Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice,  Initiative Multinationales Responsables , 21 April 
2015. Accessible at http://konzern-initiative.ch/initiativtext/?lang=en. It is reported on 
the website that the initiative has within a year of its launch gathered the number of sig-
natures that is necessary in order for it to be submitted to the Swiss Federal Council and 
Parliament. They can either accept or reject the amendment or draft a counter-proposal. 
As long as the initiative is not retracted, it will be put to the popular vote. 
71  Ibid. , proposed Art. 101a(2)(d). 
72  Ibid. , explanation of proposed Art. 101a(2)(d). 
73  Arts 132, 133(1) and 133(2)  Loi fédérale de droit international privé . See, in more detail, 
Enneking  et al. 2016, pp. 326–327. 
74  Art. 18  Loi fédérale de droit international privé . 
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provision could take shape within the German legal system. 75 In this study, 
ample attention is paid to the fact that such a provision should be shaped as a 
mandatory overriding provision in order to ensure its applicability in tort cases 
relating to human rights related harm arising in a host country. 76 
 2.3.3.2 Rules of safety and conduct 
 A further way in which home country legal rules and standards that are relevant 
to the issue in dispute may fi nd application even in foreign direct liability cases 
that are decided on the basis of host country rules of tort law, is through the 
Rome II Regulation’s provision on rules of safety and conduct. This provision 
states that whenever the applicable law is not the law of the country in which 
the event giving rise to the damage occurred, a court should still take account 
of ‘the rules of safety and conduct which were in force at the place and time 
of the relevant event’. 77 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, this 
provision is 
 based on the fact that the perpetrator must abide by the rules of safety and 
conduct in force in the country in which he operates, irrespective of the 
law applicable to the civil consequences of his action, and that these rules 
must also be taken into consideration when ascertaining liability. 78 
 Examples include local traffi c regulations or, more relevant in the context of 
foreign direct liability cases, rules on safety and hygiene in the workplace. 79 
 The provision on rules of safety and conduct may play a role in foreign direct 
liability cases before EU Member State courts dealing with the liability of EU-
based parent companies for harm caused to human and environmental interests 
in non-EU host countries, as it allows the court to take into account home 
country behavioural standards that may be stricter than those in the host country, 
even when the law of the host country is applicable to the case. 80 Taking account 
of the rules of safety and conduct of the home country is not the same as 
applying them, however. They should be taken into account by the court as a 
matter of fact and insofar as is appropriate, ‘for example when assessing the 
seriousness of the fault or the author’s good or bad faith for the purposes of 
the measure of damages’. 81 
75  Remo Klinger  et al. ,  Verankerung menschenrechtlicher Sorgfaltspfl ichten von Unternehmen 
im deutschen Recht , March 2016. Accessible at https://germanwatch.org/de/download/
14745.pdf. 
76  Ibid. , pp. 71–76. 
77  Art. 17 Rome II Regulation. 
78  Explanatory Memorandum p. 25. 
79  Compare Van Hoek 2008,  op. cit. p. 166. 
80  Compare Symeonides 2008b,  op. cit. pp. 211–215. 
81  Ibid . 
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 Accordingly, home country rules on safety and hygiene in the workplace 
are not applied as such, but for instance used to determine an employer’s duty 
of care vis-à-vis his employees. 82 Similarly, it seems that the provision on rules 
of safety and conduct does not create an opportunity to replace the applicable 
rules on tort law of the  lex loci damni with any (stricter) liability rules appli-
cable at the place where the events giving rise to the damage occurred that 
would pertain specifi cally to the conduct in dispute. Van Hoek notes in this 
respect that 
 it seems clear that Article 17 should not be construed in such a way as to 
contain a special rules on the tortiousness of the behaviour based on the 
 lex locus actus [i.e. home country tort law]. Such  depeçage would run counter 
to Article 15 of the Regulation which provides that all major elements of 
tortious liability (the tortiousness of the act as such, liability and exceptions 
thereto, the assessment of damages etc.) are covered by the law applicable 
on the basis of Article 4 ff. 83 
 The provision on rules of safety and conduct may also cover unwritten rules 
pertaining to proper social conduct, guidelines and soft law norms. 84 This is 
important, as it opens up the possibility that EU Member State courts dealing 
with foreign direct liability claims against EU Member State-based companies 
take account of behavioural standards of safety and conduct that fl ow from 
instruments like the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. 85 In addition, the provision may potentially also be used by EU 
Member State courts dealing with foreign direct liability cases to take into 
account any domestic rules of criminal law that pertain to the extraterritorial 
violations of human or environmental interests that are at issue in the cases 
brought before them. 86 Examples of such provisions are those criminalizing the 
direct or indirect participation by companies in modern slavery at home and 
abroad as exist in Dutch law, 87 or those criminalizing the participation by private 
military and security companies (PMSCs) in human rights abuses committed in 
armed confl icts abroad as exist in Swiss law. 88 
82  Ibid . 
83  Ibid . 
84  See, in more detail, Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 220–222. 
85  Ibid .
86  Van Hoek 2008,  op. cit. p. 166. 
87  See, in more detail, A.-J. L.M. Schaap,  Chocolade met een Bittere Nasmaak – De Strafrech-
telijke Aansprakelijkheid van Nederlandse Ondernemingen voor Moderne Slavernij , blog, 
Utrecht Centre for Accountability and Liability Law, 21 June 2016. Accessible at http://
blog.ucall.nl/index.php/2016/06/chocolade-met-een-bittere-nasmaak-de-strafrechtelijke-
aansprakelijkheid-van-nederlandse-ondernemingen-voor-moderne-slavernij/; Enneking  et al. 
2016,  op. cit. pp. 146–147. 
88  See, in more detail, Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 336–337. 
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 Van Hoek notes in this respect, however, that 
 in those cases, reliance on Article 16 [on overriding mandatory provisions] 
might be preferred as that provision allows for outright application of the 
forum’s mandatory provisions. Moreover, Article 16 allows such application 
in all circumstances in which the rules of the forum claim application whereas 
Article 17 only refers to rules of the  locus actus and hence is incapable of 
covering all cases in which there is criminal jurisdiction within the forum. 89 
 2.3.3.3 Public policy 
 Finally, under the Rome II regime EU Member State courts may by way of 
exception refuse to apply a provision of host country tort law in foreign direct 
liability cases brought before them, where (the application of) the provision in 
question is manifestly incompatible with fundamental principles and values of 
the legal order ( ordre public ) of the forum. 90 This may provide an important 
minimum guarantee (or ‘emergency brake’) 91 in foreign direct liability cases that 
are brought before EU Member State courts but governed by host country 
law, especially since fundamental human rights principles, whether ensuing from 
international or domestic law, are considered to be part of the public policy of 
the forum. 92 As such, it is conceivable that, under this provision, EU Member 
State courts will for example refuse to apply provisions of host country law that 
would condone child labour or amount to serious violations of (international) 
human rights norms. 93 
 The actual extent of this role for the public policy exception in foreign direct 
liability cases brought before EU Member State courts is not unlimited, however. 
First of all, the use of the public policy exception is meant to remain exceptional; 
its application in a particular case may be subject to review by the ECJ. The 
fact that, in the eyes of the court seized of the matter, the applicable rules of 
the host country are wrong as to their substance and conclusion, is not a suf-
fi cient reason for invoking public policy, not even if the incorrectness is mani-
fest. 94 There has to be a confl ict with fundamental legal principles for the court 
seized of the matter to be allowed to refuse to apply a host country regulation 
on the basis of the public policy exception, and apply its own law instead. 95 
The ECJ, for example, found such confl ict in a case in which a defendant’s 
89  Van Hoek 2008,  op. cit. pp. 166–167. 
90  Art. 26 Rome II Regulation. 
91  Castermans & Van der Weide 2010,  op. cit. p. 54. 
92  See, in more detail for instance, Augenstein 2010,  op. cit. pp. 72–73; Van Hoek 2008,  op. cit. 
pp. 167–168. 
93  Augenstein 2010,  op. cit. p. 73; Van Hoek 2008,  op. cit. pp. 167–168. 
94  ECJ Case C-38/98, 11 May 2000, [2000] ECR I-02973 ( Renault/Maxicar ). 
95  Compare recital 32 Rome II Regulation and Explanatory Memorandum,  op. cit. p. 28. 
See also, in more detail, Enneking 2008,  op. cit. pp. 306–307. 
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right to defend himself before his court of origin, as recognized by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, had been manifestly breached. 96 
 It should be noted, however, that where it comes to the norms ensuing from 
international human rights conventions, account needs to be taken of the fact 
that international conventions in principle apply only within the territories of 
their Member States. Whether they could be applied ‘extraterritorially’ to actors 
and/or activities in non-Member States is disputable. The question may be 
raised, therefore, as to what role for instance the substantive human rights norms 
laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (as opposed 
to procedural norms like Article 6 ECHR) could play in relation to the deter-
mination of the applicable law in foreign direct liability cases brought before 
EU Member State courts that pertain to human rights violations perpetrated 
in non-European host countries. Van Hoek asserts in this respect that 
 when the application of foreign law leads to a result which is unacceptable 
if measured against the standards (rather than the rules) of the ECHR, the 
public policy exception intervenes and  lex fori is applied instead. If the 
applicable foreign law does not provide a remedy for gross violations of 
human rights taking place within the territory, this would be a violation of 
such a Convention standard. 97 
 Still, in the particular context of foreign direct liability cases, where application 
of host country law may lead to fundamentally different outcomes with respect 
to standards of care in relation to the protection of human and environmental 
interests, including fundamental human rights standards, the public policy excep-
tion may well prove instrumental. 98 
 2.3.4 Discussion 
 In foreign direct liability cases brought before EU Member State courts, the 
issue of applicable law is largely determined by EU law in the form of the 
Rome II Regulation. The EU Member States’ national rules on confl ict-of-law 
in tort cases will in principle only play a role in those foreign direct liability 
cases that fall outside the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation due to 
the fact that they pertain to events giving rise to damage that occurred before 
11 January 2009. As time progresses, however, more and more of these cases 
will fall within the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation. 
 Under the rules set out in the Rome II Regulation, foreign direct liability 
claims brought before EU Member State courts will in most cases be decided 
not on the basis of home country tort law but on the basis of the rules on 
96  ECJ Case C-7/98, 28 March 2000, [2000] ECR I-01935 ( Krombach/Bamberski ). 
97  Van Hoek 2008,  op. cit. p. 167. 
98  See also Augenstein 2010,  op. cit. p. 76. 
62 Liesbeth Enneking
non-contractual liability that apply in the host country. This is likely to be dif-
ferent only where the case pertains to environmental damage (or to damage 
sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage) and where the 
event giving rise to the damage can be said to have taken place in the home 
country of the corporate defendant (where relevant decisions have been taken, 
group policies have been imposed, supervision of host country activities should 
have taken place, human rights due diligence should have been exercised, etc). 
In that case, the victim is presented with the option of choosing the applicability 
of the law of the home country instead of that of the host country. 
 The possibility of pursuing foreign direct liability cases in the EU Member 
States on the basis of home country tort law is of fundamental importance. It 
determines whether EU Member States can deploy their national systems of 
tort law as a much needed regulatory instrument that can promote international 
corporate social responsibility and, more in particular, corporate respect for 
human rights by EU-based internationally operating business enterprises operat-
ing in developing host countries. At the same time, it also determines the pos-
sibilities for host country based individuals and communities who have suffered 
harm as a result of the activities of EU-based internationally operating business 
enterprises to ensure, through this type of litigation, that the level of protection 
of their environmental and human rights interests is adequate and not funda-
mentally different from that afforded to those living in the EU home countries 
of the business enterprises involved. 99 
 The law that is applicable to a foreign direct liability case covers issues such 
as the standard of liability, the available remedies, the calculation of damages as 
well as rules determining the burden of proof. This means that the development 
in EU Member States of statutory provisions or case law with respect to duties 
of care for internationally operating business enterprises in relation to human 
and environmental interests in non-EU host countries will only have meaning 
and effect if those provisions and precedents may fi nd application in foreign 
direct liability cases brought before EU Member State courts. It also means 
that the remedies or levels of damages or alleviations of the burden of proof 
that may be afforded to EU citizens and communities in litigation over viola-
tions of environmental and human rights norms will only be available to victims 
from non-EU host states in foreign direct liability cases if home country tort 
law is applied in foreign direct liability cases brought before EU Member State 
courts. 100 
 In the end, this is thus a matter of justice and fairness, as is also expressed 
by one of the British legal counsel of a large group of Ivorians who sought 
to hold the Anglo-Dutch Petroleum trader Trafi gura liable before an English 
 99  See, in more detail, Enneking 2012, pp. 134–135, 137–140, 152–155, 301–307, 504–521; 
Enneking 2008. 
100  Ibid . 
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court for the harm caused by the Probo Koala toxic waste dumping incident 
in 2006: 
 Although the events took place thousands of miles away, it is right that this 
British company is made to account for its actions by the British courts, 
and made to pay British levels of damages for what happened. A British 
company should act in Abidjan in exactly the same way as they would act 
in Abergavenny. 101 
 However, it is also – and increasingly so – a matter of policy, as is underlined 
by the growing willingness among European policymakers to consider the 
introduction of legal norms to promote international corporate social respon-
sibility and corporate respect for human rights in host countries by ‘their’ 
internationally operating business enterprises. 102 This is exemplifi ed by the ongo-
ing debates on the introduction of statutory human rights due diligence obliga-
tions for internationally operating business enterprises – combined with the 
possibility of civil liability for violations thereof – in France, Switzerland and – 
more recently – Germany. 103 These developments have in turn prompted the 
launch of a green card initiative by members from eight EU Member State 
Parliaments calling for the EU-wide introduction of a duty of care towards 
individuals and communities whose human rights and local environment are 
affected by the activities of EU-based companies. 104 
 At the same time, EU Member State courts are demonstrating an increasing 
willingness to consider the possibility that the parent company of a corporate group 
may owe a duty of care towards third parties (workers, neighbours, communities) 
whose environmental, human rights and/or health and safety related interests are 
negatively affected by the operations of its subsidiaries, and that it may be liable 
in case of a breach of that duty. This is evidenced by the case of  Chandler v Cape , 
a 2012 English case in which a parent company of a corporate group was held 
liable, both at fi rst instance and on appeal, for asbestos-related injuries suffered by 
101  See, with further references, Enneking 2008, pp. 284–285. 
102  See, in more detail, Enneking  et al. 2016, pp. 157–343. 
103  Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre , no. 708, 23 March 2016, adopted with modifi cations by the Assemblée Nationale 
in second reading, accessible at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0708.asp; 
Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice,  Initiative Multinationales Responsables , 21 April 
2015 accessible at http://konzern-initiative.ch/initiativtext/?lang=en; Klinger  et al. 2016, 
 op. cit . See, in more detail, Enneking  et al. 2016, pp. 236–237, 330–332. 
104  See, for instance, ECCJ,  Members of 8 European Parliaments support duty of care legisla-
tion for EU corporations , 31 May 2016, accessible at http://corporatejustice.org/
news/132-members-of-8-european-parliaments-support-duty-of-care-legislation-for-eu-
corporations; Sherpa,  Parlimentarians from all the EU commit to strengthen the social 




an employee of one of its subsidiaries as it was considered to have breached a duty 
of care owed to the employee. 105 It is also evidenced by the judgments of the 
Hague District Court and the Hague Court of Appeal in the Dutch Shell Nigeria 
case, as both courts held, in response to the corporate defendants’ assertion that 
the claims against the parent company were ‘evidently without merit’, that parent 
company liability was a possible scenario also in the case at hand. 106 
 These developments in (prospective) legislation and case law in a number of 
the EU Member States underline the importance of having the possibility of 
applying home country tort law in foreign direct liability cases brought before 
EU Member State courts. The Rome II Regulation’s special rule on environ-
mental damage may provide a basis for this. However, this basis is not only 
uncertain, due to the fact that it remains unclear for now whether it may be 
relied on in foreign direct liability cases, but also very narrow, as it would only 
be available in cases involving environmental damage or damage sustained by 
persons or property as a result thereof. 
 As a consequence, the application and enforcement through foreign direct 
liability cases of any legal norms developed in the EU Member States to promote 
international corporate social responsibility and corporate respect for human 
rights in host countries, remains dependent on the applicability of one of the 
Rome II Regulation’s other exceptions. The exceptions as regards overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the forum country and as regards the public 
policy of the forum country could potentially be relevant in this regard. Accord-
ing to the Regulation, however, these are only to be applied in exceptional 
circumstances, 107 which means that they can only play a limited role in this 
context. The same is true for the provision on rules of safety and conduct that 
are in force at the place of the event giving rise to liability, as these rules need 
only be taken into account by the court as a matter of fact and insofar as the 
court deems appropriate. 
 With respect to the two exceptions mentioned, it should be noted that the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its 2016 Recommendation 
on human rights and business has recommended: 
 Member States should apply such legislative or other appropriate measures 
as may be necessary to ensure that their domestic courts refrain from 
105  Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525. See, in more detail for instance, Siel 
Demeyere, ‘Liability of a Mother Company for its Subsidiary in French, Belgian, and 
English Law’, 3  European Review of Private Law (2015) 385–413; Enneking  et al. 2016, 
 op. cit. pp. 292–296. 
106  See, for instance: The Hague District Court, 30 December 2009, ELI:NL:RBSGR:2009:
BK8616 (oil spill near Oruma), paras. 3.2-3.3; The Hague District Court, 30 January 
2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9850 (oil spill near Oruma), para. 4.4; The Hague 
Court of Appeal, 18 December 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3588 (oil spill near 
Oruma), paras, 2.1-2.8. 
107  Recital 32 Rome II Regulation. 
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applying a law that is incompatible with their international obligations, in 
particular those stemming from the applicable international human rights 
standards. 108 
 A more structural solution may lie in an extension of the scope of the Rome 
II Regulation’s special rule on environmental damage to human rights related 
damage as well as, possibly, health and safety related damage. After all, many 
of the policy rationales prompting the introduction of the special rule on envi-
ronmental damage can be said to also exist – or even more so – with respect 
to these types of damage if they are caused by the operations of EU-based 
business enterprises. Also in these cases, the exclusive connection to the place 
where the damage is sustained would mean that a victim from a low-protection 
host country would not enjoy the higher level of protection that may be avail-
able in the EU Member State home countries of the business enterprises 
involved. 109 
 Extending the scope of the special rule on environmental damage in this way 
would be crucial to enabling EU (Member States’) policies aimed at contribut-
ing to raising the general level of protection not only with respect to environ-
mental matters but also with respect to human rights and health and safety 
related matters. In light of the fact that also in cases resulting in human rights 
related damage or health and safety related damage, the author of the damage 
(unlike other torts or delicts) generally derives an economic benefi t from his 
harmful activity, the focus of the special rule on environmental damage alone 
may even seem arbitrary. 110 A broader possibility of discriminating in favour of 
the person sustaining the damage in this broader category of cases would thus 
strongly contribute to the realization of EU (Member States’) policies on inter-
national corporate social responsibility and business respect for human rights. 
 2.4  Procedural rules and practical circumstances 111 
 A factor that tends to have a crucial impact on the feasibility of foreign direct 
liability claims is formed by the relevant procedural rules and practical circum-
stances under which these claims can be brought before Western society home 
country courts. 
 One of the features that is characteristic of foreign direct liability cases is 
that the parties to these cases are typically unevenly matched, as the corporate 
defendants are usually in a much better position than the host country plaintiffs 
with respect to both information and fi nances. The fact that there is typically 
108  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on human rights and business, no. 40. 
109  Compare Explanatory Memorandum,  op. cit. pp. 19–20. 
110  Ibid . 
111  This section is largely derived from: Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. ; Enneking 2012,  op. cit . 
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little transparency with respect to the often complex group and operational 
structures of the multinational corporations involved, and also on the way in 
which their international operations are actually coordinated, controlled, man-
aged and/or supervised, may signifi cantly hamper host country plaintiffs 
seeking to hold them accountable. At the same time, the fact that the host 
country plaintiffs usually only have very limited fi nancial means at their disposal 
from which to fi nance these often complex, expensive and drawn-out legal 
procedures, tends to put them at a signifi cant disadvantage vis-à-vis their 
corporate opponents. 112 
 Consequently, there are a number of issues that tend to be of particular 
relevance in this context. These include: 1) the fi nancial aspects of bringing 
foreign direct liability claims, also considering their typical complex and drawn-
out nature; and the availability of expert legal and practical assistance; 2) the 
possibilities for bringing collective actions; 3) circumstances relating to the col-
lection of evidence and burden of proof. 113 As matters of evidence (with the 
exception of rules which raise presumptions of law or determine the burden of 
proof) 114 and procedure fall outside the material scope of the Rome II 
Regulation, 115 these issues are largely determined by the procedural rules and 
practical circumstances of the EU Member State where the foreign direct liability 
case is brought. 
 2.4.1 General observations 
 The fact that, up until now, foreign direct liability cases have nowhere been as 
prevalent as in the US, is sometimes explained as resulting from the fact that 
the litigation cultures in other Western societies are, by comparison, less con-
ducive to this type of litigation. 116 The US legal culture of adversarial legalism 
and its tradition of public interest and impact litigation, accompanied by plaintiff-
friendly rules of civil procedure and litigation practices, are unique to the US 
and unlikely to be found elsewhere. 117 In fact, the US litigation culture is often 
depicted outside the US as being excessive and something to be avoided rather 
than welcomed. Disadvantages that are commonly perceived to be associated 
with it include: over-precaution, which may lead to high costs for potential 
112  See, in more detail, Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 114–116. 
113  Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 111–126; Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 136–137  et seq . 
114  Art. 22(1) Rome II Regulation. 
115  Art. 3 Rome II Regulation. 
116  See, for instance, Beth Stephens, ‘Translating  Filártiga : a Comparative and International 
Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations’, 1  Yale 
Journal of International Law (2002) 2–57, 17–34. 
117  Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 191–194; Ulrich Magnus, ‘Why is US tort law so different?’, 
1  Journal of European Tort Law (2010) 102–124, 119–120; Stephens 2002  op. cit. pp. 
24–27; Robert A. Kagan,  Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law , Cambridge 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2001. 
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tortfeasors, deterrence of economically valuable activities and restraints on inno-
vation; abuse of civil procedures for unmeritorious claims, which may lead to 
high societal costs and so-called ‘blackmail settlements’; insurance issues; and 
high transaction costs. 
 Generally speaking, a public interest related litigation infrastructure similar 
to the US model has failed to materialize in Europe, where public issues have 
tended to be addressed through societal dialogue and government intervention 
rather than through civil litigation. As a consequence, law fi rms specializing in 
public interest cases have remained exceptions and of the numerous European 
NGOs involved in issues of international corporate social responsibility, only a 
few are seeking to address issues of corporate wrongdoing in this respect through 
litigation rather than through dialogue with businesses and governments. Overall, 
the combination of procedural and practical features of civil litigation systems 
in the EU Member States tends to be less favourable to plaintiffs in foreign 
direct liability cases than is the case in the US. 118 
 2.4.2 The fi nancing of claims, collective redress and access to evidence 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the European civil law systems are often said to 
be converging, differences in legal culture between the different countries remain 
quite pervasive. 119 This also means that the extent to which procedural rules 
and practical circumstances in the EU Member States are as conducive to the 
pursuit of foreign direct liability claims as the US civil litigation system, varies 
from country to country. However, the general picture is that none of the EU 
Member States features a combination of procedural rules and practical circum-
stances that is as conducive to the pursuit of foreign direct liability cases as the 
US civil litigation system. 120 
 Compared to the other European systems, the UK legal system at this point 
seems most conducive for this type of litigation, which (at least partly) explains 
why up until now the far majority of (tort law based) European foreign direct 
liability claims have been pursued there. 121 Features that render English courts 
a desirable forum for plaintiffs seeking to pursue foreign direct liability 
claims include the possibility for plaintiffs to enter into contingency fee arrange-
ments with their legal representatives, the availability of collective redress 
118  See, in more detail, Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 194–197. 
119  See, for instance, C. C. Van Dam, ‘Who is Afraid of Diversity? – Cultural Diversity, 
European Co-operation and European Tort Law’, 2  King’s Law Journal (2009) 
281–308. 
120  J. Zerk,  Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses , Report prepared for the 
Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2014. Accessible at http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomestice
LawRemedies.pdf, pp. 79–87; Enneking 2012, pp. 194–202. 
121  Compare Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 439–442. 
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mechanisms such as the group litigation order and the representative action, 
and relatively liberal rules on disclosure and discovery of evidence. 122 
 In most European civil law systems, the losing party to a lawsuit must bear 
the costs of the winning party, a circumstance that may restrain prospective 
plaintiffs from initiating novel or otherwise risky civil cases. Furthermore, con-
tingency fee arrangements are not permitted in most European civil law countries; 
instead, lawyers tend to charge fi xed fees. This does bring with it the advantage, 
however, that lawyers are unlikely to refuse potential cases on the basis that 
they are unlikely to result in large damages awards. Also, as a counterbalance 
to the rule on litigation costs and the unavailability of contingency fees, many 
European civil law systems provide legal aid to poor plaintiffs who need fi nancial 
assistance in order to be able to bring their claims, at least where those claims 
have a reasonable prospect of success. In some countries, however, legal aid is 
only available to residents or nationals of the forum state, which excludes plain-
tiffs in foreign direct liability cases. 123 
 Furthermore, corollaries to the US-type class action, in which a single pro-
cedure may represent a group of claims and/or defendants (if those can be said 
to form a class and to be affected in almost the same way) in such a way as to 
allow for a reduction of costs and risks and/or to provide incentives to pursue 
even those tort cases that involve such small amounts of damages that they 
would not be pursued separately, are unavailable in most European legal systems. 
However, the possibilities for collective redress in Europe have expanded sig-
nifi cantly in recent years. Most European legal systems now provide for some 
form of collective action, in the sense that representative organizations may 
pursue civil litigation on behalf of a group of persons or certain interests and/
or in the sense that multiple claims or defendants may be bundled into one 
procedure. 124 Still, in many countries the availability of collective actions is 
restricted to particular subject matter areas that are often not relevant in foreign 
direct liability cases (like consumer law or competition law), or entail restrictions 
as to standing and available remedies. 125 
 Finally, discovery rules in most European legal systems generally do not offer 
plaintiffs the same broad possibilities for requesting information from the defen-
dants as do the rules on pre-trial discovery in the US. A general procedural 
duty to present all documents that are requested by the other party on the basis 
122  See, in more detail, Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 299–301; Zerk 2014, 
pp. 194–202. 
123  See, in more detail, Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 111–126, 179–182, 213–215, 
256–258, 299–301, 333–335; Zerk 2014, pp. 194–202; Magnus 2010,  op. cit. 
pp. 112–115. 
124  See in more detail, for example, Christopher Hodges,  The reform of class and representative 
actions in European legal systems (2008) Hart: Oxford 
125  See, in more detail: Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 111–126, 179–182, 213–215, 
256–258, 299–301, 333–335; Zerk 2014, pp. 194–202; Magnus 2010,  op. cit. 
pp. 115–116. 
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of their potential relevance to the case does not exist in most European civil 
law systems. Instead, parties may under certain conditions have a right to request 
disclosure of documents and/or courts may order such disclosure where con-
sidered necessary. However, these possibilities for document disclosure tend to 
be quite restrictive, meaning that the possibilities for plaintiffs in foreign direct 
liability cases brought before EU Member State courts to get access to relevant 
documents that are not in their own hands remain (very) limited, at least in 
the civil law systems. 126 
 2.4.3 The role of Article 6 ECHR 
 It is important to point out the role that the right to a fair trial, which is pro-
tected by Article 6 of the ECHR, may potentially play a role in foreign direct 
liability cases brought before EU Member State courts. This provision applies 
to any civil (or criminal) procedure initiated before an EU Member State court, 
regardless of whether it is a purely domestic procedure or whether the procedure 
has international aspects. It entails an obligation on the Member States to ensure 
that civil trials within their territories are accessible, fair and speedy, which 
obliges them for instance to ensure that (civil) litigants have a right of access 
to their courts that is both effective and practical. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated in this respect: 
 Article 6 §1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his 
civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way 
the Article embodies the ‘right to a court’, of which the right of access, 
that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, 
constitutes one aspect only. To this are added the guarantees laid down by 
Article 6 §1 as regards both the organisation and composition of the court, 
and the conduct of the proceedings. In sum, the whole makes up the right 
to a fair hearing. 127 
 Article 6 may act as a minimum threshold when it comes to the length (dura-
tion) of civil proceedings and when it comes to the costs involved. It has for 
instance been interpreted by the ECtHR to encompass an obligation, under 
certain circumstances, to enable plaintiffs in civil cases to acquire legal aid. 128 
126  See, in more detail, Enneking  et al. 2016,  op. cit. pp. 111–126, 179–182, 213–215, 
256–258, 299–301, 333–335; Zerk 2014, pp. 194–202; Magnus 2010,  op. cit. p. 116–117. 
See also, with a focus on impediments to transparency in Dutch foreign direct liability 
cases: Enneking 2013,  op. cit . 
127  European Court of Human Rights, 21 February 1975, 18 Eur.Ct.H.R. (Ser. A) 1975 
( Golder/United Kingdom ). 
128  See, for instance, European Court of Human Rights, 9 October 1979, 32 EurCtHR (Ser. 
A) 1979 ( Airey/Ireland ), where the Court held, inter alia, that ‘[a]rticle 6 § 1 may 
sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance 
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Furthermore, it also imposes duties on the ECHR Member States to make sure 
for instance that their domestic rules on evidence do not in practice violate the 
equality of arms principle that ensues from Article 6. According to the ECtHR: 
 each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case – 
including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a sub-
stantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. 129 
 It should be noted, however, that the Member States are left with a margin of 
appreciation as to how to achieve these results, which means that not all limita-
tions to access to court or equality of arms are automatically incompatible with 
the Convention. 
 It seems that Article 6 ECHR may potentially provide an important minimum 
guarantee to host country plaintiffs in foreign direct liability cases who fi nd that 
certain features of the systems of civil procedure in the European home countries 
where they bring their claims seriously hamper their right to a fair trial. This 
may be the case for instance where excessively high litigation costs, the unavail-
ability of affordable legal assistance or legal aid, or the evidentiary rules of the 
forum make it practically impossible for them to pursue their claims. These 
factors gain signifi cance in light of the inequality of arms that typically exists 
between the host country plaintiffs in these cases and their corporate opponents 
as regards fi nancial scope, level of organization, and access to relevant 
information. 130 
 Illustrative of the role that Article 6 ECHR may play in this respect is a UK 
defamation case between a multinational corporation and NGO campaigners. 
In this case, the ECtHR held that the state had a responsibility to ensure equal-
ity of arms between the parties to the dispute and that, in light of the disparity 
between the respective levels of legal assistance enjoyed by the parties to this 
particular case, the state’s refusal to grant legal aid to the NGO campaigners 
imposed an unfair restriction on their ability to present an effective defence. 131 
 In the Dutch Shell Nigeria case, Article 6 ECHR was raised by the plaintiffs 
in relation to their limited possibilities for obtaining evidence that was in the 
hands of their corporate opponents under the relatively strict Dutch civil pro-
cedural regime on the production of exhibits. The court refused to accept their 
argument, however, holding that the restrictions of the Dutch regime are in 
proves indispensable for an effective access to court either because legal representation is 
rendered compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of certain Contracting States for 
various types of litigation, or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case’ 
(p. 15). 
129  European Court of Human Rights, 27 October 1993, [1993] ECHR 49 14448/88 
( Dombo Beheer/The Netherlands ), para. 33. 
130  See, in more detail, Enneking 2012, pp. 114–116. 
131  European Court of Human Rights, 15 February 2005, [2005] ECHR 103 ( Steel and 
Morris/United Kingdom ), paras 59–71. 
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principle compatible with Article 6 ECHR and the equality of arms principle, 
except where special circumstances dictate otherwise. According to the court, 
the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of such special circumstances under 
which a deviation from the regular application of the Dutch regime on the 
production of exhibits was warranted. 132 
 2.4.4 Discussion 
 Since they fall outside the material scope of the Rome II Regulation, the issue 
of procedural rules and practical circumstances is mainly determined not by EU 
law but by the national procedural rules and litigation practices that are in place 
in the EU Member State countries where foreign direct liability cases are brought 
before a court. The issue is of crucial importance, however, as it determines 
whether victims will in practice have any chance of successfully pursuing a foreign 
direct liability case before an EU Member State court. 133 
 According to the UNGPs, states are under an obligation to 
 take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mecha-
nisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including 
considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that 
could lead to a denial of access to remedy. 134 
 The UNGPs stress that many of such barriers ‘are the result of, or compounded 
by, the frequent imbalances between the parties to business-related human rights 
claims, such as in their fi nancial resources, access to information and expertise’. 135 
 An example of a legal barrier, according to the UNGPs, is the situation that 
‘claimants face a denial of justice in a host State and cannot access home State 
courts regardless of the merits of the claim’. 136 As regards practical and proce-
dural barriers that may prevent victims of corporate human rights abuse from 
getting access to judicial remedies, the UNGPs give four specifi c examples: 
 1. The costs of bringing claims go beyond being an appropriate deter-
rent to unmeritorious cases and/or cannot be reduced to reasonable 
levels through Government support, “market-based” mechanisms (such 
as litigation insurance and legal fee structures), or other means; 
132  See, for instance, The Hague District Court, 14 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:
2011:BU3535 (oil spill near Oruma), para. 4.16. See also, in more detail, L. F. H. Enneking, 
‘Multinationals and Transparency in Foreign Direct Liability Cases’, 3  The Dovenschmidt 
Quarterly (2013) 134–147. 
133  See, in more detail, Enneking 2012, pp. 136–137, 187–191, 307–309. 
134  Principle 26 UN Guiding Principles,  op. cit . 
135  Commentary Principle 26 UN Guiding Principles,  op. cit . 
136  Ibid . 
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 2. claimants experience diffi culty in securing legal representation, due to 
a lack of resources or of other incentives for lawyers to advise claim-
ants in this area; 
 3. there are inadequate options for aggregating claims or enabling repre-
sentative proceedings (such as class actions and other collective action 
procedures), and this prevents effective remedy for individual claimants; 
 4. State prosecutors lack adequate resources, expertise and support to meet 
the State’s own obligations to investigate individual and business involve-
ment in human rights-related crimes. 137 
 Considering the focus of this book on procedural rules and practical circum-
stances that are likely to pose the main barriers for access of victims of corporate 
human rights (and environmental) abuse to civil law remedies before EU Member 
State courts, the criminal law related fourth example will be left aside here. The 
other three examples of practical and procedural barriers that may prevent victims 
of corporate human rights (and environmental) abuse from getting access to 
judicial remedies, however, all appear to be present to some extent in many of 
the EU Member States. Especially in foreign direct liability cases, where there 
is typically a signifi cant inequality of arms as regards fi nancial scope, level of 
organization and access to relevant information between the plaintiffs (victims 
from non-EU and mostly developing host countries) and their corporate oppo-
nents (large EU-based internationally operating enterprises), this signifi cantly 
affects the feasibility of successfully pursuing these cases before EU Member 
State courts. 
 In many of the EU Member States, signifi cant thresholds exist with respect 
to the costs associated with the pursuit of these often complex cases, often in 
combination with limited (or no) possibilities of entering into contingency fee 
agreements (or similar outcome-related fee arrangements) with legal representa-
tives, and limited (or, for non-nationals, no) availability of legal aid. In addition, 
the options for pursuing collective actions (i.e. group actions or representative 
actions) in this particular context tend to be limited (except perhaps for claims 
dealing with environmental harm), whereas restrictive rules on document dis-
closure tend to make it very diffi cult (if not impossible) for the plaintiffs in 
these cases to furnish the court with the evidence needed to substantiate their 
claims. 
 It should be noted that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
in its 2016 Recommendation on human rights and business has recommended 
with respect to these particular procedural and practical thresholds, that: 
 Member States should consider adopting measures that allow entities such 
as foundations, associations, trade unions and other organisations to bring 
claims on behalf of alleged victims; Member States should consider possible 
137  Ibid . 
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solutions for the collective determination of similar cases in respect of 
business-related human rights abuses; Member States should consider revis-
ing their civil procedures where the applicable rules impede access to infor-
mation in the possession of the defendant or a third party if such information 
is relevant to substantiating victims’ claims of business-related human rights 
abuses, with due regard for confi dentiality considerations. 138 
 All in all, none of the EU Member states features a combination of legal culture, 
procedural rules and practical circumstances that is as conducive to the pursuit 
of foreign direct liability cases as the US civil litigation system. The UK legal 
system at this point seems most conducive for this type of litigation, which (at 
least partly) explains why the far majority of (tort law based) European foreign 
direct liability claims have so far been pursued before English courts. In pro-
cedures before any of the EU Member State courts, the right to a fair trial as 
laid down in Article 6 ECHR may potentially provide an important minimum 
guarantee where excessively high litigation costs, the unavailability of affordable 
legal assistance or legal aid, or the evidentiary rules of the forum make it practi-
cally impossible to pursue foreign direct liability cases. 
 However, not all limitations on the access to court are automatically incom-
patible with the Convention, which means that courts will probably only under 
(very) special circumstances consider restrictive procedural rules or practical 
circumstances to be in violation of Article 6 ECHR. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its 2016 
Recommendation on human rights and business has recommended in this 
respect: 
 When alleged victims of business-related human rights abuses bring civil 
claims related to such abuses against business enterprises, Member States 
should ensure that their legal systems suffi ciently guarantee an equality of 
arms within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In particular, they should provide in their legal systems for 
legal aid schemes regarding claims concerning such abuses. Such legal aid 
should be obtainable in a manner that is practical and effective. 139 
 Still, the existence in most EU Member States of procedural rules and practical 
circumstances that render the pursuit of foreign direct liability cases very diffi cult 
or, in some cases, even impossible is a matter of serious concern when it comes 
to ensuring access to justice in EU Member State courts for victims of corporate 
human rights and environmental abuse by EU-based internationally operating 
138  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on human rights and business, nos. 39, 42, 43. 
139  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on human rights and business, no. 41. 
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business enterprises. It is an issue that needs to be addressed not just at the 
level of the individual Member States but also at the EU level, if the EU is 
serious about realizing EU policies or supporting EU Member States’ policies 
on international corporate social responsibility and business respect for human 
rights. And even though EU competences in the fi eld of civil procedural law 
are inherently limited, EU involvement in this fi eld is not unprecedented, as 
there have been various attempts over the past years to strengthen the enforce-
ment role of the Member States’ systems of civil law in fi elds such as competition 
law and consumer law. 140 
 A relevant outcome is the Commission’s 2013 initiative on collective redress, 
which seeks to promote national redress mechanisms for the enforcement of 
EU law in, among other areas, the fi eld of environmental protection. 141 This 
raises the question of to what extent the EU considers the promotion of inter-
national corporate social responsibility and business respect for human rights 
by EU-based internationally operating business enterprises in non-EU host 
countries an EU matter and a priority at this point in time. If so, the reduction 
of practical and procedural barriers in the EU Member States that may lead to 
a denial of access to justice before EU Member State courts for victims of 
corporate human rights and environmental abuse, regardless of the merits of 
the claims, should be one of its main priorities in the years to come. 
 2.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
 One of the main focal points of the debates in the EU Member States on access 
to judicial remedies for victims of corporate human rights abuses is the con-
temporary trend towards foreign direct liability cases: transnational (civil) liability 
claims against internationally operating business enterprises in relation to harm 
caused to people and the planet in the course of their operations – or those of 
their subsidiaries or supply chain partners – in developing host countries. Over 
the past two decades, the prevalence of this type of litigation before EU Member 
State courts has strongly increased, from a mere handful of cases in the 1990s 
to a total of around 40 cases pursued in various EU Member States up until 
now – and counting. 
 Whether these foreign direct liability cases can play a role in providing victims 
of corporate human rights and environmental abuse with access to judicial 
remedies before EU Member State courts is dependent on a number of factors 
that determine the feasibility of these cases. These include, among others, the 
question of what law EU Member State courts should apply in determining the 
validity of these claims, and the question of whether there are barriers inherent in 
140  See, in more detail, Enneking 2012,  op. cit. pp. 307–309. 
141  Commission recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, 2013/396/EU,  OJEU L 201/60 (26 July 2013). 
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the procedural rules and practical circumstances in the EU member States that 
may prevent these cases from being pursued, regardless of their merits. In foreign 
direct liability cases brought before EU Member State courts, the issue of 
applicable law is largely determined by EU law in the form of the Rome II 
Regulation. Under this Regulation, foreign direct liability claims brought before 
EU Member State courts will in most cases be decided not on the basis of 
home country tort law but on the basis of host country tort law. This is likely 
to be different only where the case pertains to environmental damage (or to 
damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage) and where 
the event giving rise to the damage can be said to have taken place in the home 
country of the corporate defendant. In that case, the victim is presented with 
the option of choosing the applicability of the law of the home country instead 
of that of the host country. 
 Current developments in (prospective) legislation and case law in various EU 
Member States underline the importance of having a broader possibility to apply 
home country tort law in foreign direct liability cases brought before EU Mem-
ber State courts. The solution may lie in an extension of the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation’s special rule on environmental damage to human rights related 
damage as well as, possibly, health and safety related damage. Many of the policy 
rationales prompting the introduction of the special rule on environmental 
damage can be said to also exist – or even more so – with respect to these types 
of damage if they are caused by the operations of EU-based business enterprises. 
Extending the scope of the special rule on environmental damage in this way 
would be crucial to realizing EU (Member States’) policies on international 
corporate social responsibility and business respect for human rights. 
 Apart from the possibilities that may be offered by (an extended version of) 
the Regulation’s special rule on environmental damage, the application and 
enforcement through foreign direct liability cases of any legal norms developed 
in the EU Member States to promote international corporate social responsibility 
and corporate respect for human rights in host countries, remains dependent 
on the applicability of one of the Rome II Regulation’s other exceptions. The 
exceptions as regards overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum 
country and as regards the public policy of the forum country could potentially 
be relevant in this regard. Their role remains limited, however, as these provi-
sions are only to be applied in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, the 
potential role in this context of the provision on rules of safety and conduct is 
also limited, as these rules need only be taken into account by the court as a 
matter of fact and insofar as the court deems appropriate. 
 As concerning the issue of applicable law, it is therefore recommended that: 
 • Future case law by the ECJ and the Member State courts on the applica-
tion in civil liability cases involving people and planet related harm in non-
EU host States as a result of the operations of EU-based internationally 
operating business enterprises, of the Rome II Regulation’s special rule on 
environmental damage, should be closely monitored. 
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 • Future case law by the ECJ and the Member State courts on the applica-
tion in civil liability cases involving people and planet related harm in non-
EU host States as a result of the operations of EU-based internationally 
operating business enterprises, of the Rome II Regulation’s exceptions on 
overriding mandatory provisions and public policy and the provision on 
rules of safety and conduct, should be closely monitored. 
 • Where necessary, action should be taken at the EU level and/or at the level 
of the individual Member States to prevent the application of these provi-
sions from hampering the realization of EU (Member States’) policies on 
international corporate social responsibility and business respect for human 
rights. 
 • The possibility of extending the scope of the Rome II Regulation’s special 
rule on environmental damage to human rights-related damage as well as, 
possibly, health and safety related damage should be seriously considered. 
 • Further research should be conducted into the ways in which such an 
extension could be formulated so as to promote the realization of EU 
(Member States’) policies on international corporate social responsibility 
and business respect for human rights. 
 In foreign direct liability cases brought before EU Member State courts, the 
issue of procedural rules and practical circumstances is determined by the national 
procedural rules and litigation practices that are in place in the countries where 
these cases are brought. According to the UNGPs, states are under an obliga-
tion to consider ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that 
could lead to a denial of access to remedies. This is an important provision as, 
in many of the EU Member States, the pursuit of foreign direct liability cases 
is likely to be very diffi cult due to the costs associated with the pursuit of these 
often complex cases, limited options for pursuing collective actions, and restric-
tive rules on document disclosure. In combination with the fact that these cases 
are characterized by the inequality of arms as regards fi nancial scope, level of 
organization and access to relevant information between the plaintiffs and their 
corporate opponents, this may render the pursuit of these cases impossible in 
practice. 
 This is an issue that needs to be addressed not just at the level of the indi-
vidual Member States but also at the EU level, if the EU is serious about real-
izing EU policies or supporting EU Member States’ policies on international 
corporate social responsibility and business respect for human rights. EU involve-
ment in the fi eld of civil procedural law in order to promote private law enforce-
ment of EU norms is not unprecedented in fi elds such as consumer law and 
competition law. With this in mind, the reduction of practical and procedural 
barriers in the EU Member States that may lead to a denial of access to justice 
before EU Member State courts for victims of corporate human rights and 
environmental abuse, regardless of the merits of the claims, should be one of 
the EU’s main priorities in the years to come. 
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 As concerning the issue of procedural rules and practical circumstances, it is 
therefore recommended that: 
 • Civil liability cases before EU Member State courts involving people and 
planet related harm in non-EU host states as a result of the operations of 
EU-based internationally operating business enterprises, should be closely 
monitored so as to identify any procedural rules or practical circumstances 
that may lead to a denial of justice for victims of corporate human rights 
or environmental abuse, regardless of the merits of the claim. 
 • In doing so, the absence of new or further claims in one or more of the 
Member States, at a time when the prevalence of this type of litigation is 
strongly on the increase, should be interpreted as an indication that pro-
cedural and practical barriers exist in those Member States that render the 
pursuit of such claims impossible altogether. 
 • Where necessary, action should be taken by the individual Member States 
as well as at the EU level to prevent procedural rules and practical circum-
stances, especially those relating to costs, collective redress and access to 
evidence, from resulting in a denial of justice for victims of corporate human 
rights or environmental abuse. 
 3  Non-judicial remedies 
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 3.1 Introduction 
 3.1.1 Context of the research 
 The possibility for those negatively affected by business activities of using effec-
tive remedies through which they can ask for recognition of their grievance and 
claim compensation, is the litmus test for all business and human rights frame-
works. 1 Access to an effective remedy is also a human right itself, enshrined 
in major international human rights treaties. 2 From a legal perspective, litigation 
through the courts is the most formal and legally effective avenue, as its out-
comes are binding on all parties and, if necessary, enforceable. Court rulings 
also contribute to providing legal clarity on how to apply human rights norms 
in the business context and how this corporate responsibility translates into tort 
law. As the chapter on judicial remedies illustrates, however, formal litigation 
1  This chapter was written by Katharina Häusler, Karin Lukas, Julia Planitzer (Ludwig 
Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights), Pablo Paisán Ruiz (Cuatrecasas, Gonçalves, Pereira), 
and Katerina Yiannibas (Globernance Institute of Democratic Governance and Assistant 
Professor of Public and Private International Law at the University of Deusto). The research 
by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights has been co-fi nanced in Austria by 
the Austrian Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMASK), 
and the Chamber of Labour Vienna. The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of any of 
the (co-) funding institutions. The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights would 
like to thank Patrick Harris, Beate Kiewlicz and Niki Koumadoraki for their research and 
editorial assistance. 
2  E.g. Art. 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 13 European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Art. 47 Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
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might be costly, lengthy, diffi cult or even impossible for various reasons. 3 There-
fore, victims’ representatives, researchers, but also companies have increasingly 
been looking into the possibilities of non-judicial remedies in addition or as an 
alternative to judicial remedies. ‘Non-judicial remedies’ is, though, a very broad 
term in itself, encompassing models that are very different in view of their 
organization and possible outcomes. They can take, for example, the form of 
state-based or international arbitration, conciliation or mediation (e.g. the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises with the system of National Contact 
Points or the World Bank Inspection Panel), sector/industry based initiatives 
(e.g. the Fair Wear Foundation), or company-based grievance mechanisms. 4 
What these mechanisms have in common is that they require the willingness of all 
actors involved, notably also the business actor, to engage in – to varying degrees – 
a formalized process. Unlike for court litigation, there exist no formal legal proce-
dures for non-judicial remedies in Europe and the outcome of such procedures can 
be binding on both parties (either an agreement reached through mediation or a 
binding decision by an arbitrator), but does not necessarily have to be. 
 The Framework for Business and Human Rights presented in 2008 by Prof. 
John Ruggie, 5 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
builds on three pillars: the state responsibility to protect against human rights 
abuses by third parties, the responsibility of companies to respect human rights, 
and the need for an effective access to remedies. 6 Ruggie underlined the sig-
nifi cance of effective grievance mechanisms for the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework’ to be functional. Norms or corporate codes of conduct will only 
have a lasting impact if alleged violations of these rules can be investigated and 
3  See chapter 1 on Jurisdictional Issues. For an overview, see also: G. Skinner  et al ., ‘The 
Third Pillar. Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational 
Business’ 2013. Available at: http://www.biicl.org/documents/182_the_third_pillar.pdf, 
accessed 13 March 2015. 
4  For an overview and analysis of various existing mechanisms, see e.g. C. Rees and D. Vermijs, 
‘Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena’, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University, 2008. K. Lukas  et al .,  Corporate Accountability: The 
Role and Impact of Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms , Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016 
[forthcoming]. 
5  Prof. Ruggie was appointed SRSG in July 2005, a year after the ‘Norms on the Responsi-
bilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights’ drafted by the United Nations’ Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights between 1999 and 2003, were rejected by the UN Human Rights Com-
mission. The UN Human Rights Council renewed his mandate in June 2008 for a further 
three years (UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 8/7). 
6  UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
J. Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights’, 
A/HRC/8/5, 2008 (‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’). 
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those who believe that they have been harmed can seek remediation. 7 While he 
stressed the importance of national judicial systems, he dedicated much of his 
further work to developing standards for non-judicial remedies. In 2011, he 
presented the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, which outline 
the respective duties of states and companies and should help them to imple-
ment the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’. 8 Their endorsement by 
the UN Human Rights Council in its Resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011 make 
the Guiding Principles the most authoritative international framework to date 
in the area of business and human rights. 
 Apart from the ‘foundational principle’ that ‘States must take appropriate 
steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate 
means, that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction 
those affected have access to effective remedy’, 9 the Guiding Principles also 
include ‘operational principles’ for non-judicial and non-state-based remedies. 
Based on their responsibility to respect, companies should ‘establish or participate 
in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and communi-
ties who may be adversely impacted.’ 10 However, Ruggie has also highlighted 
other possible forms of non-judicial remedies, such as industry, multi-stakeholder 
and other collaborative initiatives. To fulfi l the minimum standards of an effec-
tive remedy, all forms of non-judicial grievance mechanisms have to follow a 
set of criteria outlined in the Guiding Principles: they must be legitimate, acces-
sible, predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, and a source of 
continuous learning. Company-based, operational-level mechanisms should addi-
tionally be based on engagement and dialogue. 11 These criteria are also used 
for the case studies (see section 3.1.3 Defi nitions and methodology). 
 While the Guiding Principles have established themselves as common refer-
ence points in the business and human rights discussion, the concept and use 
of non-judicial remedies – particularly non-state based ones – is contested in 
academia and civil society. Some authors and civil society organizations have 
argued that the Guiding Principles were an incomplete framework as some 
important issues were not adequately addressed and the framework remains 
vague on effective implementation and access to justice. 12 
 7  Ibid ., para. 82. 
 8  UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
John Ruggie, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31, 2011 (‘Guiding 
Principles’). 
 9  Ibid ., para. 25. 
10  Ibid ., para. 29. 
11  Ibid ., para. 31. 
12  Cf., for example, C. Parker and J. Howe, ‘Ruggie’s Diplomatic Project and Its Missing 
Regulatory Infrastructure’ in R. Mares (ed),  The UN guiding principles on business and 
human rights: Foundations and implementation , Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2012; 
Human Rights Watch, ‘UN Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards. 
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 Operational-level grievance mechanisms – the ‘company-created human rights 
remedy mechanisms’ recommended by Ruggie – are on the rise. However, such 
mechanisms also entail serious risks for rights-holders and also for the right to 
remedy in general. 13 Consequently, mechanisms should be based on a partner-
ship between a company and primary stakeholders, including those potentially 
affected by a company’s activities. 14 As a potential alternative model, an inter-
national NGO is currently developing a community-driven operational grievance 
mechanism, which should be designed primarily by the affected populations 
themselves to meet their needs and expectations. 15 
 3.1.2 Research interest 
 Analyzing and evaluating all forms of non-judicial remedies would go far beyond 
the scope of this work. Building on previous research in this area, we thus focus 
on company-based (operational-level) grievance mechanisms. 16 While there is 
already extensive literature and research on some international or state-based 
non-judicial remedies, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises and its system of National Contact Points or the World Bank Inspection 
Panel, 17 there is still little knowledge about the functioning of company-based 
grievance mechanisms. As the UN Working Group on the issue of human rights 
Global Rules Needed, Not Just Guidance’, statement of 16 June 2011, available at https://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-
standards, accessed 29 March 2016. 
13  It is shown that, for example, potential users of the grievance mechanisms fear retaliation, 
see Access,  ACCESS to Remedy in Context of Business and Human Rights: Improving the 
Effectiveness of Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms , (Expert meeting report, 3–4 April 2014), 
p. 10, available at http://accessfacility.org/sites/default/fi les/Report%20Expert%20Meeting%
20on%20Grievance%20Mechanisms_ACCESS%20Facility_The%20Hague_%203-4%
20April%202014_0.pdf, accessed 3 November 2016. A further example, as described in one 
case, is the inclusion in the grievance mechanism of a provision that required benefi ciaries of 
remedies to sign legal waivers concerning future legal actions: see J. Kaufman and K. McDon-
nell, ‘Community-Driven Operational Grievance Mechanisms’, 1(1)  Business and Human 
Rights Journal (2016) 129. 
14  S. Knuckey and E. Jenkin, ‘Company-created remedy mechanism for serious human rights 
abuses: a promising new frontier for the right to remedy’, 19(6)  The International Journal 
of Human Rights (2015) 801–827. 
15  For details on this project see: http://www.earthrights.org/legal/community-driven-ogms, 
accessed 07 April 2016; J. Kaufman and K. McDonnell, ‘Community-Driven Operational 
Grievance Mechanisms’, 1(1)  Business and Human Rights Journal (2016) 127–132. 
16  On the terminology, see  infra ‘Defi nitions and methodology’. 
17  Cf., for example, K. Lukas, ‘The Inspection Panel of the World Bank. An Effective Extra-
judicial Complaint Mechanism?’ in Jan Wouters  et al ., ‘Improving Delivery in Development: 
The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and Accountability’, 6  The World Bank Legal Review 
(2015) Washington, DC, World Bank; J. W. Ramsing  et al ., ‘Remedy Remains Rare. An 
analysis of 15 years of NCP cases and their contribution to improve access to remedy for 
victims of corporate misconduct’, OECD Watch, 2015, available at http://www.oecdwatch.
org/publications-en/Publication_4201/@@download/fullfi le/Remedy%20Remains%20
Rare.pdf, accessed 20 May 2016. 
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and transnational corporations and other business enterprises noted in its report 
to the UN General Assembly in 2015, ‘[r]esearch in the fi eld of business and 
human rights lacks comprehensive data on the number and nature of complaints 
against companies for their adverse impacts and the effectiveness of the bodies 
tasked with investigating and remediating those impacts’. 18 
 Most companies have only started to develop such mechanisms during the 
last decade – often as part of their work to implement the Guiding Principles, 
or as part of their wider corporate social responsibility or business and human 
rights policy and/or their membership in the UN Global Compact. 19 Further-
more, so far studies have mostly analyzed company-based grievance mechanisms 
of US-based companies, which already have a longer history of use. 20 
 In line with the topic of the overall research project, this chapter analyses griev-
ance mechanisms established by European-based companies (one headquartered in 
the EU and one in Norway). Bearing in mind the limited scope of this research 
project, this work is not able to provide a full picture of the set-up and implementa-
tion of company-based grievance mechanisms in Europe. Rather we would like to 
use the example of two big companies operating in different sectors to illustrate 
the possible potentials and challenges of such mechanisms. By distilling good prac-
tices of and challenges for company-based grievance mechanisms, we aim to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the functioning of these mechanisms among 
European stakeholders. The research outlined below should provide examples and 
support other companies when developing their own grievance mechanisms. We 
would also like to highlight the kind of grievances for which company-based mecha-
nisms can be a useful (often easier and quicker) alternative or supplement to litiga-
tion and where, in our view, formal judicial procedures need to step in. The baseline 
for assessing the appropriateness of company-based grievance mechanisms is the 
understanding that, from a human rights perspective, out-of-court mechanisms 
are clearly inappropriate where violations reach the level of serious crime. In cases 
where national judicial systems entirely fail to provide any access to remedy (e.g. 
due to an ongoing confl ict situation in the country) it can be still refl ected, if 
operational-level grievance mechanisms could nevertheless be used in such cases as 
a fi rst step for ensuring recognition and fi rst remediation for those affected. 
 In comparison to the non-judicial company-based grievance mechanisms, this 
chapter also analyzes international arbitration under the auspices of the 
18  United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.’ (A/70/216, 30 July 
2015), para. 88, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
A/70/216, accessed 22 April 2016. 
19  The ‘Communication on Progress’ participants have to submit annually includes also a 
sub-criterion ‘Operational-level grievance mechanisms for those potentially impacted by 
the company’s activities (BRE 4 + ARE 4)’ in the self-assessment form. (https://www.
unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication_on_progress/GC_Advanced_COP_selfassessment.
pdf, accessed 16 March 2015). 
20  Cf., for example, B. Linder et al.,  The Right to Remedy: Extrajudicial Complaint Mechanisms 
for Resolving Confl icts of Interest between Business Actors and Those Affected by their Operations, 
Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, 2013; C. Rees and D. Vermijs,  op. cit. 
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Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague (PCA) as an example of how 
and under what conditions international arbitration could potentially be adapted 
to provide a remedy for human rights grievances, in addition to non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms. The potential use of international arbitration for promot-
ing access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses has 
gained increasing relevance in recent years. The chapter explores what possibili-
ties international arbitration at the PCA could offer for companies and affected 
individuals and, on the other hand, what issues and challenges the arbitration 
mechanism could present. 
 3.1.3 Defi nitions and methodology 
 This chapter takes a comparative approach to two company-based grievance 
mechanisms and arbitration under the auspices of the PCA. In the literature, there 
exist various defi nitions of non-judicial remedies operating at company level and 
some also distinguish between ‘complaints’ and ‘grievances’. For the purpose of 
the research on the two company-based mechanisms, we use the Guiding Prin-
ciples’ broad defi nition of ‘operational-level grievance mechanism’ as a basis, while 
using ‘operational-level’ and ‘company-based’ interchangeably: 
 Operational-level grievance mechanisms are accessible directly to individuals 
and communities who may be adversely impacted by a business enterprise. 
They are typically administered by enterprises, alone or in collaboration 
with others, including relevant stakeholders. They may also be provided 
through recourse to a mutually acceptable external expert or body. They 
do not require that those bringing a complaint fi rst access other means of 
recourse. They can engage the business enterprise directly in assessing the 
issues and seeking remediation of any harm. 21 
 Our research focused deliberately on a small number of mechanisms to allow 
in-depth research within the limited resources available. The companies whose 
grievance mechanisms are analyzed in the case studies were selected on the 
following basis: 
 • European context: the companies are headquartered in a Member State of 
the EU or the European Free Trade Association. 
 • Relevance of companies: the companies chosen for the case studies are 
multinational enterprises, which are well known in public. They represent 
different industry sectors and have the potential to act as role models within 
their sectors. 
 • Human rights relevance: the selected grievance mechanisms refer to pro-
cedural and material human rights requirements (mentioning, at least 
21  UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles,  op. cit. para. 29. 
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implicitly, international standards and documents) and conform prima facie 
to the minimum criteria for non-judicial remedies. 
 • Length of operation: the selected grievance mechanisms have already been 
working for some years, to allow evaluation of their outcomes. 
 The project builds on desk research of relevant international standards and 
documents, academic literature, company documents, and empirical data and 
information gained through expert interviews. It uses the international human 
rights framework as its legal basis for assessment. The effectiveness of the 
mechanisms – also in terms of human rights compatibility – is assessed based 
on the criteria established by the Guiding Principles. 22 According to these 
criteria, non-judicial mechanisms must be: 23 
 (a) legitimate: enabling trust from the stakeholder groups for whose use they are 
intended, and being accountable for the fair conduct of grievance processes 
including the question whether;  the mechanism, in its work, is suffi ciently inde-
pendent from the management. 
 (b) accessible: being known to all stakeholder groups for whose use they are 
intended, and providing adequate assistance for those who may face par-
ticular barriers to access; 
 (c) predictable: providing a clear and known procedure with an indicative time 
frame for each stage, and clarity on the types of process and outcome avail-
able and means of monitoring implementation; 
 (d) equitable: seeking to ensure that aggrieved parties have reasonable access 
to sources of information, advice and expertise necessary to engage in a 
grievance process on fair, informed and respectful terms; 
 (e) transparent: keeping parties to a grievance informed about its progress, and 
providing suffi cient information about the mechanism’s performance to 
build confi dence in its effectiveness and meet any public interest at stake; 
22  UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles,  op. cit. para. 31. 
  After having tested the effectiveness criteria of the Guiding Principles in four pilot projects 
on company/stakeholder grievance mechanisms, Prof. Ruggie suggested a slightly adapted 
set of criteria: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, John Ruggie, Addendum,  Piloting principles for effective company/
stakeholder grievance mechanisms: A report of lessons learned , A/HRC/17/31/Add.1, 2011. 
23  Based on the Guiding Principles’ criteria, CSR Europe – a business network for corporate 
social responsibility – has developed process requirements for effective company grievance 
mechanisms, which can serve as a useful ‘checklist’ for companies, which are setting up 
new mechanisms: CSR Europe,  Assessing the effectiveness of company grievance mechanisms. 
CSR Europe’s Management of Complaints Assessment (MOC-A) Results , 2013, available at: 
http://www.csreurope.org/sites/default/fi les/Assessing%20the%20effectiveness%20of%20
Company%20Grievance%20Mechanisms%20-%20CSR%20Europe%20(2013)_0.pdf, 
accessed 30 May 2016. 
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 (f) rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes and remedies accord with inter-
nationally recognised human rights; 
 (g) a source of continuous learning: drawing on relevant measures to identify 
lessons for improving the mechanism and preventing future grievances and 
harms. 
 Operational-level mechanisms should also be: 
 (h) based on engagement and dialogue: consulting the stakeholder groups for 
whose use they are intended in their design and performance, and focusing 
on dialogue as the means to address and resolve grievances. 
 Research shows that, in general, ‘there is not a one-size-fi ts-all approach’ 24 for 
grievance mechanisms. However, it is recommended that confl icts be settled as 
far as possible at local level. 25 The effectiveness of the mechanisms can also 
include further – more specifi c – criteria. For example, a previous study analyzed 
the victim’s perspective on case outcomes. It showed that the majority of victims 
would not be satisfi ed with the outcome experienced. An element identifi ed to 
improve the outcome is the integration of a neutral convener or facilitator in 
the process, who is acceptable to all stakeholders and helps to equalize power 
imbalances among stakeholders. 26 Generally, there are – due to various reasons – 
limited data available to assess the effectiveness of company-based grievance 
mechanisms. Non-judicial mechanisms typically do not follow up after an 
agreement on whether the grievance was resolved fairly and what impact the 
agreement had. 27 
 For the case studies, each of the researchers has conducted at least two inter-
views, with company representatives, union representatives, arbitrators, or rep-
resentatives of victims having used the mechanism (at least one with a company 
representative and one with an external stakeholder). In total, the research team 
conducted eight interviews, either personally, via phone or via IP telephony. 28 
 Researchers encountered various diffi culties in accessing information about 
grievance mechanisms and fi nding stakeholders willing to give an interview. The 
identifi ed gap of data concerning the number and nature of grievances against 
companies and related remedial action 29 could be confi rmed in the course of this 
24  Van Genugten  et al .,  Company-community Confl icts: The Effectiveness of Outcomes of Non-
judicial Confl ict Resolution. An Explanatory Report . Report prepared for ACCESS Facility, 
The Hague (2013, copy with authors), p. 56. 
25  Ibid . 
26  Ibid ., pp. 37–39. 
27  Access,  ACCESS to Remedy in Context of Business and Human Rights: Improving the Effective-
ness of Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms , (Expert meeting report, 3–4 April 2014), p. 11. 
28  See the list of interviewees in Annex. For confi dentiality reasons a number of interviews 
have been anonymised. 
29  Cf. the Statement by M. Jungk, UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises at the 70th session of the General 
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research. While many European companies report to have established operational 
level grievance mechanisms, 30 concrete information about their operation is chal-
lenging to access. Therefore, a number of companies, which were initially pre-
selected for possible analysis of their grievance mechanisms, could fi nally not be 
considered for a case study due to a lack of information. 31 
 3.2 Case studies on company-based grievance 
mechanisms 
 3.2.1 Siemens AG (case study by Julia Planitzer) 
 3.2.1.1 General description of the company and its grievance mechanism 
 Siemens consists of Siemens AG, a stock corporation under the federal laws of 
Germany, and a total of about 800 legal entities, including minority investments. 
Siemens’ headquarters is situated in Munich. 32 In 2014, Siemens restructured 
its organization and its operations are grouped into seven sub-groups: Power 
and Gas, Wind Power and Renewables, Energy Management, Building Tech-
nologies, Mobility, Digital Factory, Process Industries, and Drives. In addition, 
there are segments on Healthcare, and Financial Services. 33 As of 30 September 
2015, Siemens had 348,000 employees worldwide; 34 around 60 per cent of all 
employees work in Europe, Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Seventy 
thousand employees work in the Americas. 35 
 Since 2003, Siemens has been a participant to the UN Global Compact and 
describes its commitment to the Compact’s ten principles in, for instance, a 
report dedicated to sustainability. 36 The Communication on Progress 2015 
indicates that Siemens reports on an operational-level grievance mechanism ‘for 
Assembly, Third Committee, Item 72 (b&c), 27 October 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16660&LangID=E, accessed 23 March 
2016. 
30  Cf. the ‘Communications on progress’ in the framework of the Global Compact initiative 
(https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants). 
31  Researchers conducted initial research on fourteen European companies (including the two 
companies fi nally selected). 
32  Siemens,  Annual Report 2014, Financial Report – Combined Management Report , p. 172. 
33  Ibid. , p. 172, 174; Siemens,  Annual Report 2015 ( A. Combined Management Report ), p. 2. 
34  Siemens,  Annual Report 2015 ( A. Combined Management Report ), p. 2. 
35  As of 30 September 2014, see Siemens,  Siemens at a glance – Fiscal 2014 for the time 
period between May 2014 and May 2015, p. 6, http://www.siemens.com/annual/14/en/
download/pdf/Siemens_AR2014_At-a-glance.pdf, accessed 28 October 2015. 
36  Siemens,  Sustainability Information 2015 as addendum to the Siemens Annual Report , 
p. 36, http://www.siemens.com/about/sustainability/pool/en/current-reporting/siemens_
sustainability_information2015.pdf, accessed 09 December 2015. 
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those potentially impacted by the company’s activities’. 37 Additionally, reporting 
follows the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines of the Global Reporting Initia-
tive (GRI) 38 and recommendations of Transparency International. 39 
 The ‘Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines’ cover areas such as Siemens’ core 
values. The section on treatment of business partners and third parties lays out 
Siemens’ principles concerning anti-corruption and working with suppliers. In 
addition, the guidelines comprise regulations concerning the protection of 
information and concerning environment, safety and health. A fundamental 
principle for Siemens AG and its subsidiaries is observing the law and the legal 
system in every country of business. The company does not tolerate discrimina-
tion, which covers internal cooperation as well as cooperation with external 
partners. 40 Suppliers are supposed to share Siemens’ values and therefore should 
‘respect basic human rights of employees’ and ‘comply with laws prohibiting 
child labor’. 41 
 Siemens developed a specifi c code of conduct for suppliers and third party 
intermediaries. Suppliers are expected to respect fundamental employment rights 
as set out in the core treaties of the UN and ILO and the document also refers 
to the OECD Guidelines and the UN Global Compact. Suppliers should ensure 
they pay fair remuneration and minimum wages and safeguard the right of 
workers to form trade unions. Furthermore, the supplier is expected to ensure 
that employees can lodge complaints with superiors without fear of reprisal. 42 
The web-based training for suppliers also stresses by referring to the ILO the 
prohibition of employment of children under fi fteen years old. 43 Suppliers are 
also requested to support the implementation of the code of conduct in their 
own supply chains. 44 Additionally, Siemens advises suppliers to implement human 
rights. This also includes, as pointed out in a toolkit for suppliers on how to 
implement human rights practices in their companies, the establishment of 
grievance mechanisms that allow the fi ling of complaints in a safe and anonymous 
37  UN Global Compact, Communication on Progress 2015, https://www.unglobalcompact.
org/participation/report/cop/create-and-submit/advanced/145241, accessed 18 November 
2015. 
38  See, for an overview, Siemens GRI G4 Index 2015: http://www.siemens.com/about/
sustainability/pool/en/current-reporting/siemens_gri_g4-index-2015_comprehensive-
option.pdf, accessed 09 December 2015. 
39  Siemens,  Sustainability Information 2015 as addendum to the Siemens Annual Report , p. 10. 
40  Siemens (Corporate Compliance Offi ce),  Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines (January 
2009), A.1 and A.2. 
41  Ibid ., B.8. 
42  Siemens,  Sustainability in the Supply Chain – Code of conduct for Suppliers and Third Party 
Intermediaries , Version 3.0, 2015–07, p. 12. 
43  Siemens,  Sustainability in the Supply Chain, Web-based training (Code of Conduct for Siemens 
Suppliers, Child Labor ), https://wbt.siemens.com/static_wbts/wbtesscsup/player.htm, 
accessed 25 May 2016. 
44  Siemens,  Annual Report 2014 , Corporate Governance, B.3.3., p. 139. 
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environment. 45 The toolkit for suppliers recommends establishing adequate 
processes and initiatives and indicates that suppliers that are advanced in terms 
of human rights should implement grievance mechanisms. 46 The code of conduct 
for suppliers should go beyond the fi rst tier of suppliers and should also be 
applied by the suppliers of the suppliers. 47 
 In order to identify potential risks of e.g. human rights abuses or corruption 
among the around 90,000 suppliers of Siemens, it established a risk-based system 
of appropriate processes. This system comprises not only sustainability self-
assessments by suppliers but also risk evaluations conducted by the Siemens’ 
purchasing department, supplier quality audits and sustainability audits conducted 
by external auditors. The procedures of supplier quality audits were amended 
and include sustainability questions; in the fi scal year 2015 Siemens conducted, 
in total, 981 supplier quality audits. Suppliers conducted 3,508 self-assessments 
and, in the fi scal year 2015, Siemens commissioned 50 external audits, mostly 
conducted in Asia and Australia. External audits are the strongest tool among 
the audits to review the performance of suppliers 48 and the number of these 
audits is expected to increase signifi cantly in 2016. 49 In case the audits show 
deviations from the Siemens requirements, suppliers have to implement improve-
ment measures within a reasonable period. These actions are, among others, 
monitored by follow-up audits conducted by external auditors. In 2015, in 
total, 35 measures to ensure the prohibition of child labour had to be imple-
mented by suppliers. Measures concerning the respect for the basic human rights 
of employees were requested by Siemens 357 times. Measures for health and 
safety of employees (388) rank highest. 50 Measures to ensure that no children 
are working in the company mostly concern proper mechanisms to prevent child 
labour by suppliers. Furthermore, companies, for instance, have to show how 
they monitor working time in order to be able to document extra hours cor-
rectly. Suppliers were requested to implement attendance recording systems. 
Cooperation with fi ve suppliers was fi nally stopped since emergency exits were 
not accessible for workers. 51 
 In order to ensure compliance with the Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines 
and its code of conduct for suppliers and third party intermediaries, Siemens 
installed several channels of reporting. Generally, employees can fi le complaints 
45  Cf. Siemens,  Supply Chain Management, Toolkit on Implementing Human Rights , http://
w5.siemens.com/cms/supply-chain-management/en/sustainability/toolkit/implement/
human-rights/pages/home.aspx, accessed 25 May 2016. 
46  Ibid . 
47  Siemens,  Sustainability in the Supply Chain – Code of conduct for Suppliers and Third Party 
Intermediaries , Version 3.0, 2015–07, p. 24. 
48  Siemens,  Sustainability Information 2015 as addendum to the Siemens Annual Report , p. 19. 
49  INT 2, representative of Siemens AG/Supply Chain Management, 03 December 2015. 
50  Siemens,  Sustainability Information 2015 as addendum to the Siemens Annual Report , 
p. 18–19. 
51  INT 2, representative of Siemens AG/Supply Chain Management, 03 December 2015. 
Non-judicial remedies 89
internally with their supervisor, compliance offi cer, or internal works council. In 
addition, internal and external stakeholders can use two secure reporting chan-
nels: the compliance hotline called ‘Tell Us’ and the Siemens’ ombudsperson. 52 
The system of reporting is embedded in Siemens’ compliance system which 
consists of three segments: (1) Prevent: by implementing training and policies; 
(2) Detect: by installing reporting channels; and (3) Respond: by implementing 
consequences for misconduct. 53 
 The hotline ‘Tell Us’ functions via telephone and internet and allows the 
fi ling of reports anonymously. The website clearly indicates that the application 
is not part of the Siemens websites or the Siemens intranet. 54 Users can select 
a country and a language (thirteen languages are available), and telephone and 
website are accessible 24/7. 55 The second channel is an external ombudsperson. 
The ombudsperson is an attorney based in Munich whose contact details are 
published online and in the relevant reports. 56 In the fi scal year 2015, further 
inquiries and investigations were conducted in 568 cases, which were reported 
via the hotline, the ombudsperson, and via notifying the supervisors. These 
reported compliance cases led to 208 disciplinary sanctions, including warnings 
and dismissals. 57 
 In 2012, Siemens, the central works council of Siemens, the German Industrial 
Union of Metal workers (IG Metall) and the IndustriAll Global Union signed 
an International Framework Agreement (IFA). 58 The agreement refers to Sie-
mens’ membership in the UN Global Compact and to its commitment to 
fundamental labour rights defi ned by international conventions. The agreement 
fl eshes out core principles such as prohibition of child labour, freedom of asso-
ciation, and the right to collective bargaining and appropriate remuneration. In 
addition, the role of suppliers is mentioned and that Siemens actively endeavours 
to have these principles incorporated in the policies of its suppliers. 59 Having a 
look at various IFAs, it can be shown that the majority of IFAs’ provisions 
concern the suppliers’ obligation to implement the provisions themselves. 
Formulations concerning the degree to which they are binding vary among 
52  Siemens (Corporate Compliance Offi ce),  Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines (January 
2009), G, p. 24; Siemens,  Sustainability in the Supply Chain – Code of conduct for Suppliers 
and Third Party Intermediaries , Version 3.0, 2015–07, p. 38. 
53  Siemens,  Annual Report 2014 , Corporate Governance, B.3.3., p. 138. 
54  Cf. https://www.bkms-system.net/bkwebanon/report/clientInfo?cin=19siem14, accessed 
09 December 2015. 
55  Siemens, Compliance Hotline Tell Us, http://www.siemens.com/about/sustainability/
en/core-topics/compliance/system/tell-us.htm, accessed 09 December 2015. 
56  Siemens, Ombudsman, http://www.siemens.com/about/sustainability/en/core-topics/
compliance/system/ombudsman.htm, accessed 29 October 2015. 
57  Siemens,  Sustainability Information 2015 as addendum to the Siemens Annual Report , p. 29. 
58  See for the English version of the agreement: http://www.industriall-union.org/sites/
default/fi les/uploads/documents/siemens-gfa-2012-english_fi nal.pdf, accessed 29 October 
2015. 
59  See sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.9 of the IFA. 
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IFAs. 60 The wording used in the IFA of Siemens concerning suppliers can be 
categorized as encouraging the latter to implement the IFA principles, by refer-
ring to the code of conduct for suppliers, but does not create a responsibility 
of Siemens to have the IFA implemented in the whole supply chain. In addition 
to the protection of labour rights, the IFA should support the development of 
structures representing the interests of Siemens employees at national level and 
strengthen networking of these structures at international level. In order to 
reach this goal, regular meetings at regional level are foreseen. 61 
 The central works council negotiating team ( Verhandlungsdelegation ) 
together with the IG Metall are in charge of monitoring and supporting the 
implementation of the agreement. About every two months, the central works 
council negotiating team meets with the IG Metall and the Siemens manage-
ment for relevant matters. 62 However, primarily, IFA should be implemented 
by regional structures of workers’ interest representation. 63 Implementation 
of the IFA is ongoing. The fi rst steps included awareness raising for the IFA 
at regional level by conducting meetings of representatives of employees of 
all Siemens facilities in China, by organizing special training series (e.g. in 
India), and translating the IFA into eleven languages. A further step was the 
establishment of sustainable structures for communication for matters of 
the IFA. 64 
 The IFA refers to ‘internal and local/national complaint and arbitration facili-
ties’ that all employees or representatives should turn to in case of grievances. 
Internal complaint facilities should be used primarily. Possible breaches of the 
agreement can be submitted via the company’s internal communication chan-
nels, such as the ‘Tell Us’ hotline. The central works council negotiating team 
has to deal only with complaints that cannot be solved through the local and 
national complaint and arbitration facilities. The team should ‘prevent external 
legal disputes’. 65 Therefore, the central works council negotiating team can be 
seen as the highest instance for more serious complaints in order to solve com-
plaints internally. 66 
 The IFA or the Siemens Business Conduct Guidelines describe a company-
based grievance mechanism by referring to the ‘Tell Us’ hotline and the external 
ombudsperson. Available material though does not indicate that concerning 
Siemens’ actions or actions of joint ventures, in which Siemens is involved, such 
formal grievance mechanisms are used in relation to alleged human rights abuses 
60  K. Lukas,  Labour Rights and Global Production (2013) Vienna, Graz, NWV, 153. 
61  IG Metall (eds.),  Arbeitnehmervertretung bei Siemens in China, Erfolgreiche Chinesisch-
Deutsche Kooperation (2015) 8. 
62  INT 1, representative of IG Metall, 02 November 2015. 
63  IG Metall (eds.),  Arbeitnehmervertretung bei Siemens in China, Erfolgreiche Chinesisch-
Deutsche Kooperation (2015) 8–9. 
64  Ibid ., p. 9. 
65  See sections 2.10.2, 2.10.4 and 2.10.5 of the International Agreement. 
66  INT 1, representative of IG Metall, 02 November 2015. 
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caused by activities related to Siemens. Siemens is, for example, involved through 
the joint venture Voith Hydro in the construction of the Belo Monte Dam in 
Brazil. As addressed by several NGOs to the management at the Annual Share-
holders’ Meetings in 2015 and 2016, 67 the Belo Monte Dam violates, inter alia, 
indigenous land rights, cultural rights, and the right to life, food, and health. 
The NGOs Gegenstroemung, Amazon Watch, and International Rivers recom-
mended Siemens to conduct an independent audit and implement in the future 
a complaint mechanism ‘accessible to threatened and/or affected local com-
munities in project areas’. 68 Similarly, Siemens is involved in the construction 
of the Agua Zarca Hydroelectric Dam on the Gualcarque River in Honduras 
through the joint venture Voith Hydro. Demonstrations against the project led 
to death threats, violence, and police harassment against the indigenous Lenca 
families in the region. 69 Siemens holds a minority of Voith Hydro (35 per cent) 
and claims that Siemens itself would not be part of the consortium that is in 
charge of this project. 70 After several submissions and initiatives of NGOs 
informing Siemens about the situation in Honduras, 71 Voith Hydro decided to 
67  Siemens,  Shareholder Counterproposals and Election Nominations for the Annual Shareholders’ 
Meeting 2015 of Siemens AG on January 27th 2015, http://www.siemens.com/investor/
pool/en/investor_relations/events/annual_shareholders_meeting/2015/Gegenantraege_
en_20150113.pdf, accessed 02 December 2015; Siemens,  Shareholder Counterproposals and 
Election Nominations for the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting 2016 of Siemens AG on Janu-
ary 26th 2016; see the counterproposal of the Association of Ethical Shareholders, pp. 3–4, 
http://www.siemens.com/investor/pool/de/investor_relations/events/hauptversammlung/
2016/Gegenantraege_de_20160112.pdf, accessed 02 February 2016. 
68  Letter of Gegenstroemung, Amazon Watch and International Rivers addressed to Siemens 
CEO Joe Kaeser, dated 20 January 2015, http://amazonwatch.org/assets/fi les/2015-belo-
monte-siemens-hr-dossier.pdf, accessed 17 May 2017. 
69  Letter of International Rivers, Friends of the Earth International,  Oekunemisches Buero fuer 
Frieden und Gerechtigkeit addressed to Siemens CEO Joe Kaeser, dated 20 January 2015, 
http://amazonwatch.org/assets/fi les/2015-agua-zarca-siemens-hr-dossier.pdf, accessed 
02 December 2015; and speech of Andrea Lammers ( Ökumenisches Büro für Frieden und 
Gerechtigkeit ) at the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting 2016 of Siemens AG on January 26th 
2016, http://www.kritischeaktionaere.de/fi leadmin/Dokumente/Reden_2016/Rede_
Andrea_Lammers_Siemens_HV_2016.pdf, accessed 02 February 2016. In early March 
2016, Berta Cáceres, Honduran human rights defender of the Lenca community and 
central fi gure in the protests against the Agua Zarca dam project, was assassinated in her 
house. The organization International Rivers immediately started an online calling on the 
builders of the dam, including Siemens, to terminate their investment or work concerning 
the dam. See http://org.salsalabs.com/o/2486/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_
KEY=19314, accessed 21 March 2016. 
70  Letter of Siemens AG, dated 09 March 2016, available at http://business-humanrights.
org/sites/default/fi les/documents/Statement%20der%20Siemens%20AG%2009032016.
pdf; and statement of Siemens reacting to the assassination of Berta Cáceres, 09 March 
2016, available at http://business-humanrights.org/en/honduras-second-member-of-
indigenous-group-murdered-within-2-weeks-dutch-development-bank-suspends-
activity#c133990, last accessed 23 March 2016. 
71  Speech of Andrea Lammers ( Ökumenisches Büro für Frieden und Gerechtigkeit ) and of 
Christian Russau ( Dachverband der Kritischen Aktionärinnen und Aktionäre /German 
umbrella association of critical shareholders) at the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting 2016 
92 Katharina Häusler, Karin Lukas and Julia Planitzer
stop working on this project until further notice. Voith’s decision is supported 
by Siemens. 72 Additionally, Siemens receives criticism for its involvement in 
Morocco’s programmes for renewable energy in the Western Sahara. Siemens 
has been commissioned to supply turbines and engineering consulting support 
by the Moroccan fi nancial group Nareva Holding for wind farms in the Western 
Sahara that have a negative impact on the people living in the area, related in 
particular to issues connected to unclear land ownership 73 
 3.2.1.2 Evaluation of the mechanism along the established criteria 
 LEGITIMACY 
 Both communication channels for possible breaches of rules set out in, for 
instance, the International Framework Agreement (IFA) or the code of conduct 
for suppliers, are organized externally. The hotline ‘Tell Us’ is operated by an 
external company and the ombudsperson is an independently organized external 
attorney. The follow-up actions after fi ling reports are clearly internally organized. 
The Siemens’ compliance system deals with the reports starting with an assess-
ment followed by a four stage compliance investigation. 74 
 The IFA, on the other hand, describes a different procedure for reports. 
While also using the ‘Tell Us’ hotline, the central works council negotiating 
team is tasked with handling grave breaches that cannot be resolved by national 
or local mechanisms. The procedure between fi ling a report and the work of 
of Siemens AG on January 26th 2016, http://www.kritischeaktionaere.de/fi leadmin/
Dokumente/Reden_2016/Rede_Andrea_Lammers_Siemens_HV_2016.pdf, accessed 
02 February 2016. 
72  Cf.  Sueddeutsche Zeitung ,  Wasserkraft-Projekt gestoppt , (C. Giesen, 05 May 2016, http://
www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/voith-hydro-wasserkraft-projekt-gestoppt-1.2981466, 
accessed 17 May 2016) and Stuttgarter-Zeitung. de,  Umstrittenes Wasserkraftwerk – Voith 
Hydro legt Honduras-Projekt auf Eis , (T. Magenheim, 05 May 2016, http://www.stuttgarter-
zeitung.de/inhalt.umstrittenes-wasserkraftwerk-voith-hydro-legt-honduras-projekt-auf-eis.
ce60efae-14ca-4e85-8f8f-aed05d5e159c.html, accessed 17 May 2016). 
73  Western Sahara Resource Watch,  Dirty Green March – Morocco’s controversial renewable 
energy projects in occupied Western Sahara , WSRW Report August 2013, pp. 12–13. Also 
the UN Security Council discussed the matter of contracts with foreign companies in 
Western Sahara. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs issued a legal opinion 
on the matter of contracts of the Moroccan authorities with foreign companies for the 
exploration of mineral resources in Western Sahara and held that these contracts are not 
illegal per se. The opinion, however, states, that ‘if further exploration and exploitation 
activities were to proceed in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of Western 
Sahara, they would be in violation of the principles of international law applicable to mineral 
resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories,’ UN Security Council, letter dated 
29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/161 (12 February 2002), 
para. 25. 
74  Siemens,  Annual Report 2014 , Corporate Governance, B.3.5., p. 140  et seq . 
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the special group is not further described in the IFA. However, the central 
works council negotiating team consists of fi ve works council representatives, 75 
which shows a higher degree of independence from the management than the 
regular compliance procedure. 
 In general, the procedure of fi ling complaints as described in the IFA is still 
in its initial phase and establishing a practical process for solving issues between 
employees’ representatives and the management is identifi ed as a future chal-
lenge. 76 Currently, it is not clear whether the central works council negotiating 
team has to deal formally with a complaint, since this team discusses complaints, 
which could not be solved by negotiations between, for example, the works 
council and management fi rst. 77 For all possible channels to fi le complaints, 
the follow-up procedure is not clearly defi ned, or is internally organized without 
explaining to what extent all stakeholders involved can have an infl uence on the 
process itself. In the case of IFA, external monitoring is to a certain extent 
conducted through the involvement of works council representatives. Based on 
the available material and information it is challenging to assess the extent to 
which comprehensive procedural mechanisms that ensure fair conduct of the 
processes are in place. 
 ACCESSIBILITY 
 The possibility of using the hotline is mentioned in various relevant documents, 
which are distributed to the relevant internal and external stakeholders. However, 
documents such as the code of conduct may not reach employees at every level 
worldwide. Although it is mentioned that reporting led to 653 further inquiries 
in 2014, 78 there is no further information given on how many of those were 
initiated by reports via the hotline, besides using other reporting channels 
(ombudsperson or supervisors). 
 The accessibility of the ombudsperson seems to be lower since it is not 
explained when and under which circumstances the ombudsperson should be 
contacted rather than the hotline. It seems that the ombudsperson is intended 
to be installed for grave possible breaches. Clearer guidance and, for example, 
a form for reporting might have an encouraging impact on employees. 
 The IFA also mentions the hotline as a possibility for reporting violations of 
employees’ rights. However, in practice, the role of the hotline concerning 
matters of labour rights violations seems to be rather limited. Rather, informal 
networks and personal contacts help to make the trade union IG Metall aware 
of possible cases of labour rights violations. However, as indicated by a 
75  INT 1, representative of IG Metall, 02 November 2015. 
76  IG Metall (eds.)  Arbeitnehmervertretung bei Siemens in China, Erfolgreiche Chinesisch-
Deutsche Kooperation (2015) 9. 
77  INT 1, representative of IG Metall, 02 November 2015. 
78  Siemens,  Annual Report 2014 , Corporate Governance, B.3.5., p. 140. 
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representative of IG Metall, the trade union is notifi ed about approximately two 
possible cases of violation of workers’ rights per year, but is not being made 
aware of all cases. For example, IG Metall was informed about labour rights 
violations at a Siemens plant in Indonesia concerning obligatory breaks for 
workers and usage of restrooms. 79 The development of regional structures for 
labour rights representation is therefore crucial in order to raise awareness about 
the possibility of complaining within the framework of the IFA. 
 For suppliers, Siemens recommends installation of a company-based grievance 
mechanism, but it is not a mandatory requirement. However, Siemens requires 
suppliers to have a form of labour rights representation. Suppliers should have, 
for instance, a workers’ council to ensure a form of complaints mechanism. In 
case there are no internal grievance mechanisms, the Siemens structures, includ-
ing the hotline, should apply. It is important for Siemens to ensure dissemination 
about these measures; suppliers can implement several measures, such as making 
the hotline better known in the company, having a letterbox for anonymous 
complaints, or by having a designated ombudsperson within the supplier. 80 
 Assessments concerning the predictability, equitability, transparency and rights-
compatibility of the grievance mechanism are challenging to make, since infor-
mation concerning the grievance mechanisms can be found in different 
frameworks of the company, for instance, the supply chain management and 
IFA. A comprehensive structure for grievance mechanisms for human rights 
abuses is required from suppliers and relates to, for example, payment of mini-
mum wages, compliance with maximum working hours, or preventing child 
labour. The IFA itself, for example, does not defi ne the forms of remediation 
or how those could be assessed. Time frames seem to be undetermined and 
information about remedies achieved is limited. 
 DIALOGUE AND ENGAGEMENT, CONTINUOUS LEARNING 
 The possibility to lodge complaints as described in the IFA is based on discus-
sions of the Siemens management on the one side and the works council as 
well as the trade union IG Metall on the other. In order to further enhance 
the process of complaints lodging, regional structures should be developed. 
Regional or country-based interest representatives should raise awareness among 
employees about lodging complaints. Meetings in different countries such as 
China, United States, and South Korea are conducted regularly. For example, 
after a two-year process of negotiations and training, several trade union rep-
resentatives of Siemens plants in China are now able to exchange and interact 
in a national coordination forum. 81 Hence, dialogue plays a central role in the 
complaints mechanism as described in the IFA. Continuous learning plays also 
79  INT 1, representative of IG Metall, 02 November 2015. 
80  INT 2, representative of Siemens AG/Supply Chain Management, 03 December 2015. 
81  INT 1, representative of IG Metall, 02 November 2015. 
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a vital role within the supply chain management. Siemens organizes workshops 
and training for suppliers and offers brochures in order to support the imple-
mentation of the code of conduct. 82 Furthermore, Siemens’ buyers play an 
important role and are regularly in touch with the suppliers concerning their 
efforts in reaching the required standards. 83 For this, it is benefi cial that Siemens 
usually has a subsidiary in the country concerned. 84 Furthermore, sustainability 
forms an integral part within the buyers’ training programme. 85 If a supplier 
does not fulfi l the required standards, the responsible procurement department 
defi nes follow-up actions with the supplier. 86 
 3.2.1.3 Concluding remarks 
 The UN Global Compact reporting tool ‘Communication on Progress’ indicates 
that Siemens uses a grievance mechanism. The existing internal grievance mecha-
nisms, consisting of the hotline and the ombudsperson, are framed under 
compliance 87 and are to a large extent focused on efforts against corruption. 
The International Framework Agreement (IFA) describes a grievance mechanism 
for violation of labour rights, including the use of internal complaint facilities. 
These mechanisms also apply to the supply chain. Reporting channels for com-
plaints are clearly defi ned and also requested from suppliers. In case there is a 
violation taking place at a supplier’s company, procedures exist by which Siemens 
ensures that the supplier fulfi ls Siemens’s requirements. 88 
 The IFA was signed in 2013 and has since been implemented. Nevertheless, 
a procedure for complaints of violations of labour laws still needs to be further 
developed. Although there is a rather informal means of lodging complaints to 
the trade union, this system might require further institutionalization. Part of 
the process – by designating the central works council negotiating team as the 
highest instance for serious violations – is defi ned in the IFA, but seems unused 
thus far for specifi c cases. The works council negotiating team and the trade 
union IG Metall are currently paving the way to realizing the procedure of 
complaints lodging in the future. As a prerequisite, interested unions at regional 
level are needed to represent the rights of Siemens employees and support the 
lodging of complaints. 
82  Siemens,  Sustainability in the Supply Chain – Code of conduct for Suppliers and Third Party 
Intermediaries , Version 3.0, 2015–07, p. 36. 
83  Ibid . 
84  INT 2, representative of Siemens AG/Supply Chain Management, 03 December 2015. 
85  Siemens,  Sustainability Information 2015 as addendum to the Siemens Annual Report , p. 19. 
86  Ibid . 
87  See, for instance, the Siemens GRI G4 Index 2015, showing the ‘Human Rights Grievance 
Mechanisms’ are dealt with as part of the Siemens compliance grievance mechanisms, 
pp. 6–7, http://www.siemens.com/about/sustainability/pool/en/current-reporting/
siemens_gri_g4-index-2015_comprehensive-option.pdf, accessed 09 December 2015. 
88  INT 2, representative of Siemens AG/Supply Chain Management, 03 December 2015. 
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 Additionally, the IFA primarily focuses on abuses of labour rights in its com-
pany and subsidiaries worldwide. That the mechanisms of IFA should also cover 
the situation of workers in suppliers of Siemens is seen as challenging. However, 
workers’ councils of Siemens plants in the country should tackle this issue and 
assess the situation of labour rights in suppliers. 89 Efforts channelled to Siemens’ 
subsidiaries primarily concern the implementation of the IFA. Grievance mecha-
nisms for workers in the supply chain form part of the Siemens’ supply chain 
management. The hotline is mentioned as a possibility for workers of the supply 
chain. In addition, it is seen as benefi cial that Siemens usually has a subsidiary 
in the country and therefore can react quickly in the case of complaints about 
possible violations of standards. The role of Siemens’ local buyers is stressed as 
highly important. In addition to the different audit procedures, Siemens repre-
sentatives can visit – unannounced – suppliers and assess the situation. 90 
 In general, two frameworks for reporting and grievance mechanisms can be 
identifi ed: one framework is embedded in the Siemens’ compliance mechanisms 
and includes the ‘Tell Us’ hotline and the ombudsperson; the second framework 
is the procedure described in the IFA. The fi rst is primarily seen as an instru-
ment of compliance rather than a fully-fl edged grievance mechanism according 
to the UN Guiding Principles. The procedure described in the IFA is indeed 
understood clearly as a grievance mechanism, but still seems to be in an earlier 
stage of its full implementation. For both frameworks, clear procedures and 
time frames for grievance for human rights abuses are available only to a limited 
extent. Both frameworks are also applicable to the supply chain. Grievance 
mechanisms described in different frameworks and the supply chain use the 
same entry channel. Efforts within the Siemens’ supply chain management and 
the implementation of IFA by the workers’ council and trade unions concerning 
this matter might be further harmonized and possible interactions between 
different strands of grievances within Siemens might be further strengthened. 
 3.2.2 Statoil (case study by Pablo Paisán Ruiz) 
 3.2.2.1 General description of the company and its grievance mechanism 
 Statoil ASA (‘Statoil’) is a Norwegian oil company that was founded on 14 June 
1972 by the Norwegian Parliament (in its origins it was a state-owned company) 
and was established with the objective of creating a national player with enough 
resources for competing with foreign oil and gas extraction companies. Statoil 
discovered its fi rst oil and gas deposit in 1976, creating its fi rst offshore extrac-
tion platform ten years later. 
89  INT 1, representative of IG Metall, 02 November 2015. 
90  INT 2, representative of Siemens AG/Supply Chain Management, 03 December 2015. 
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 In the oil and gas sector in general, operational activities can have varied 
social and environmental impacts, 91 and can give rise to grievances 92 because 
of human rights abuses. 
 In 2001, the Norwegian Parliament approved the listing of Statoil’s shares 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange and on the New York Stock Exchange. 93 The 
consequence of Statoil’s shares being listed on an offi cial secondary securities 
market is that Statoil must comply with the legislation applicable to companies 
listed in both countries (Norway and the US). It must also follow ‘mandatory 
disclosure’ or explain why it does not follow the respective corporate governance 
guidelines (under the ‘comply or explain’ principle) since investors expect that 
listed companies not only comply with certain fi nancial standards but also follow 
certain practices aimed at maintaining appropriate standards of corporate respon-
sibility, integrity, and accountability to shareholders. 94 
 The current version of the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Gov-
ernance, which dates from 30 October 2014, establishes that the core concept 
of corporate social responsibility is the company’s responsibility for the manner 
in which its activities affect people, society and the environment, and it typically 
addresses human rights; prevention of corruption; employee’s rights, health and 
safety; the working environment; discrimination, and environmental issues, in 
line with G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015). 95 The latter 
establish that in addition to their commercial objectives, companies are encour-
aged to disclose policies and performance relating to business ethics, the envi-
ronment and, where material to the company, social issues, human rights, and 
other public policy commitments. Such information may be important for certain 
investors and other stakeholders to better evaluate the relationship between 
companies and the communities in which they operate and the steps that com-
panies have taken to implement their objectives. 
91  Statoil, “Sustainability Report 2014”, p. 10. The report states that ‘Statoil acknowledges 
the scientifi c consensus on human-induced climate change and supports the efforts of the 
United Nations and its member states to agree and implement necessary measures to 
prevent dangerous manmade interference with the climate system’. 
92  UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles,  op. cit. para. 25, offering a defi nition of 
grievance in its commentary by explaining that ‘grievance is understood to be a perceived 
injustice evoking an individual’s or a group’s sense of entitlement, which may be based on 
law, contract, explicit or implicit promises, customary practice, or general notions of fair-
ness of aggrieved communities’. 
93  Statoil,  Annual Report 2014 , p. 14, http://www.statoil.com/no/InvestorCentre/Annual
Report/AnnualReport2014/Documents/DownloadCentreFiles/01_KeyDownloads/20-
F_2014.pdf, accessed 29 March 2016. 
94  For an overview see also H. Christiansen and A. Kolderstrova  The Role of Stock Exchanges 
in Corporate Governance (2009). Available at: http://www.oecd.org/fi nance/fi nancial-
markets/43169104.pdf, accessed 17 May 2016. 
95  OECD,  G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance – OECD Report to G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2015), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-
Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf, accessed 29 March 2016. 
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 Corporate governance includes, in particular, initiatives with the objective to 
achieve smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth by encouraging proper interac-
tion between companies, their shareholders and other stakeholders and extending 
the reporting requirements with regard to non-fi nancial parameters establishing 
a more comprehensive risk profi le of the company, enabling more effective 
design of strategies to address those risks. Sustainability implies that the company 
must effectively manage the governance, social, and environmental aspects of its 
activities as well as fi nancial operations. 96 
 As a result of the foregoing, since 2001 Statoil publishes an annual sustain-
ability report separately from the fi nancial statements. In its fi rst sustainability 
report for the fi scal year 2001, Statoil makes an express reference to the respect 
of human rights in developing countries and focuses on observing and promot-
ing fundamental standards for human rights since some of the world’s petroleum 
is found in zones of instability and confl ict. 
 In 2012, Statoil and other oil companies made large offshore gas discoveries 
in Tanzanian territorial waters. A pipeline transporting natural gas from a region 
in Tanzania to Dar es Salaam led to demonstrations, since the people living in 
this region wanted the gas to be kept in the region. The demonstrations are 
seen as being beyond the direct responsibility of Statoil, ‘but shows that Statoil 
can be vulnerable to the expectations of impoverished groups’. 97 As a reaction, 
Statoil acted locally: it avoided seismic shooting at night, so that Statoil did not 
risk colliding with local fi shing boats. Statoil hired local employees. However, 
the Tanzanian authorities showed little effort to resolve these issues by consult-
ing civil society. 98 In the context of the Tanzania’s Liquefi ed National Gas 
(LNG) project, 99 Statoil is one of the partners. The government acquired land 
and the implementation of the project will lead to relocations and compensation 
on land rights. It would seem vital that Statoil should strengthen its role in the 
implementation by using the grievance mechanism established and ensuring 
informed consent by the communities concerned. 100 The most recent Statoil 
sustainability reports of 2014 and 2015 contain a specifi c section on ‘Human 
Rights’, in which the creation of a Human Rights Steering Committee was cited 
as an objective. This committee was established in January 2015 and it comprises 
senior representatives from key business areas and staff functions and is chaired 
 96  International Corporate Governance Network,  ICGN Global Governance Principles 2014 , 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/icgn_global_governance_principles_2014_
en.pdf, accessed 29 March 2016. 
 97  Pål Wilter Skedsmo  et al . (Fridtjof Nansen Institute),  Doing good by doing well? – Statoil 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (2013), p. 27, https://www.fni.no/getfi le.php/132230/Filer/
Publikasjoner/Doing_good_by_doing_well.pdf, accessed 29 March 2016. 
 98  Ibid. , pp. 26–27. 
 99  See for further information on the LNG project, R. Denny,  Accountability through active 
citizenship: improving Petroleum Governance in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania, Baseline 
Survey Report – Tanzania , p. 12. 
100  INT 2, representative of NGO, 7 April 2016. 
Non-judicial remedies 99
by a Statoil chief compliance offi cer. This group advises on policy and imple-
mentation matters and received training on the UN Guiding Principles. It is 
not a grievance mechanism but if there are any severe cases of human rights 
issues or violations, they will be notifi ed to the Human Rights Steering Com-
mittee. 101 In 2015, Statoil developed a stand-alone human rights policy after 
consultation with stakeholders, union representatives and international experts 
on human rights, consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. 102 Statoil’s board of directors approved it on 10 September 
2015. 103 According to this policy, Statoil commits to treating those working for 
the company and those impacted by its operations, fairly and without discrimi-
nation. It also commits to providing appropriate remediation, including, where 
relevant, effective grievance mechanisms in the location where it may have caused 
or contributed to adverse human rights impacts. 
 Due to Statoil’s policy commitment to respect human rights, the company 
strives to conduct its business operations consistently with the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprises, according to its sustainability report. 104 The origin of 
grievance mechanisms at Statoil was an internal labour issue. The use of the 
grievance mechanisms to remedy abuses of human rights related to environmental 
issues, however, did not become widespread until the year 2011. Statoil was 
also confronted with complaints under the OECD Guidelines’ National Contact 
Points procedure in recent years, relating to environmental concerns and the 
consultation of local communities. 105 
101  Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2015, p. 33, http://www.statoil.com/no/InvestorCentre/
AnnualReport/AnnualReport2015/Documents/DownloadCentreFiles/01_KeyDownloads/
2015_Sustainability_report.pdf, accessed 29 March 2016. 
102  Ibid . 
103  Statoil,  Human Rights Policy (Final Version adopted by the Board of Directors on 10 Sep-
tember 2015 , http://www.statoil.com/en/EnvironmentSociety/Sustainability/Downloads/
Human%20Rights%20Policy.pdf, accessed 17 May 2016. 
104  Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2014 , p. 31. As briefl y mentioned above, the OECD Guide-
lines are a set of recommendations of the governments of Member States to companies 
operating in and from their territory with voluntary principles and standards to guide 
companies in their international operations. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights promote the use, value, and power of effective community grievance 
mechanisms. 
105  For instance, a complaint concerning the Corrib gas project in North West County Mayo 
(Ireland) run by a consortium of Shell, Statoil, and Vermilion. Initially, the Irish National 
Contact Point was dealing with this case, but later the Dutch National Contact Point 
was asked to deal with it, since Shell, having its seat in the Netherlands, was also involved. 
Pobal Chill Chomáin (People of Kilcommon) and two supporting non-governmental 
organizations (‘Action from Ireland’ and ‘Sherpa’) fi led on 21 August 2008 a complaint 
concerning the Corrib gas project. There were no options for the resolution of the dispute 
through mediation and the National Contact Points from Ireland and The Netherlands 
issued a statement with remarks and recommendations. According to the statement, 
when an EU company in its exercise of due diligence is faced with concerns of local 
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 Statoil expects its suppliers to respect human rights and apply Statoil’s ethical 
requirements. 106 According to the Statoil Supplier Declaration, 107 Statoil’s sup-
pliers have to ensure that all suppliers’ employees have access to effective griev-
ance mechanisms. 
 Community queries are addressed by regular contact with the communities 
and by compliance with any formal grievance-handling procedures required by 
the regulatory authorities (e.g. concerning labour law). 108 
 For the above-mentioned purposes, Statoil participates (being a founding 
member) in IPIECA. IPIECA is an association of the oil and gas sector estab-
lished in 1974 (after the creation of the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP)), specializing in environmental and social issues. By means of its work-
ing groups managed by members and through its executive management, IPIECA 
combines the knowledge and experience of oil and gas companies and associa-
tions, which represent more than half of the oil production in the world. 
 Although the origins of the IPIECA lie in the search for solutions to the 
challenges of climate change, at the dawn of the twenty-fi rst century, its activity 
extends to community grievance mechanisms and, in January 2015, it approved 
a manual for implementing operational-level grievance mechanisms. 109 
stakeholders over their situation and rights, it has the responsibility to consider, where 
appropriate, going beyond what is legally required when it comes to holding consultations 
with the local community. See http://www.oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_150, accessed 
11 April 2016. 
   In a different case, the Norwegian Climate Network and Concerned Scientists Norway 
fi led on 28 November 2011 a complaint against Statoil alleging that Statoil breached the 
environment chapter of the OECD Guidelines by investing in the oil sands of Alberta 
and thereby contributing to Canada’s violation of international obligations to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the period from 2008 to 2012, not considering 
relevant international agreements when Statoil began its activities in Canada. This com-
plaint was rejected in March 2012 because it did not meet the criteria specifi ed in the 
OECD Procedural Guidelines and it was directed towards national policies rather than 
company policies. In fact, the complaint was fi led against a company but aimed to infl u-
ence law-making policies in Canada and Norway. See on this case http://nettsteder.
regjeringen.no/ansvarlignaringsliv-en/fi les/2013/12/statoil_fi rst.pdf, accessed 11 April 2016; 
http://www.oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_248?set_language=en, accessed 11 April 2016; and 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/StatoilAssessmentandConclusion.pdf, accessed 
11 April 2016. 
106  Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2015 , p. 33. 
107  Statoil,  Supplier Declaration (COM140295_1_ REV. 1), http://www.statoil.com/en/
OurOperations/Procurement/Downloads/Supplier%20Declaration%20Aug2014.pdf, 
accessed 28 May 2016. 
108  Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2014 , p. 31; Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2015 , p. 33. 
109  IPIECA,  Community grievance mechanisms in the oil and gas industry – A manual for 
implementing operational-level grievance mechanisms and designing corporate frameworks 
(2015), p. 6, http://www.ipieca.org/publication/community-grievance-mechanisms-oil-
and-gas-industry-manual-implementing-operational-leve, accessed 29 March 2016. 
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 In 2014, Statoil developed a framework for site-level community grievance 
mechanisms. 110 They are separate from any workforce grievance mechanism 
following the UN Guiding Principles 111 and have been implemented so far for 
the Statoil operations in Brazil, Tanzania, and the US. 112 Furthermore, Statoil 
has contributed to the IPIECA grievance mechanisms guide. 113 
 During the years 2014 and 2015, Statoil received and mediated one grievance 
in Tanzania related to exploration activities. Statoil carried out seven fi eld visits 
when implementing the grievance mechanism. In 2015 no grievance was received 
in Brazil; however, three fi eld visits were carried out to listen to local fi shermen 
and to promote awareness about the grievance mechanism. 114 
 The community grievance mechanism of Statoil is a site-level mechanism, 115 
which encompasses also, for instance, community liaison offi cers. 116 Statoil 
ensures accessibility by providing multiple points of access: through Statoil 
personnel acting locally, through a local telephone number available for com-
plaints in each project, and through the internet. Until 2015, only a few reports 
under the community grievance mechanism were lodged in Tanzania. Cases 
concerned reduced fi sh catch and compensation for nets cut by company ves-
sels. 117 However, how effectively the grievance mechanism will work when the 
intensity of Statoil’s operations increase will need to be assessed in the future. 
Currently, Statoil has not yet started producing in Tanzania. 118 
 Statoil also provides to all individuals free access by phone or the internet to 
Statoil’s Ethics Helpline, which is available in English and local languages in all 
countries where Statoil operates. Through this helpline, any possible breaches 
of the company’s code of conduct or applicable laws and regulations, as well 
as concerns related to Statoil’s health, safety and environment responsibilities, 
and internationally recognized human rights, can be reported. 119 When a claim 
is raised, a report number is assigned and the claimant will be given a personal 
110  Statoil,  Annual Report 2014 , p. 31. 
111  IPIECA,  Community grievance mechanisms in the oil and gas industry – A manual for 
implementing operational-level grievance mechanisms and designing corporate frameworks , 
2015, p. 6, http://www.ipieca.org/publication/community-grievance-mechanisms-oil-
and-gas-industry-manual-implementing-operational-leve, accessed 29 March 2016. 
112  Statoil,  Annual Report 2014 , p. 6; Statoil,  Annual Report 2015 , p. 34. 
113  IPIECA,  Community Grievance Mechanisms toolbox , 2014, http://www.ipieca.org/publication/
community-grievance-mechanism-toolbox, accessed 29 March 2016. 
114  Statoil,  Annual Report 2015 , p. 34. 
115  Statoil,  Annual Report 2014 , p. 31. 
116  R. Denny,  Accountability through active citizenship: improving petroleum governance in 
Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania – Baseline Survey Report , January 2015, p. 19, http://
www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/fi les/NORAD_Tanzania_Baseline_Report_1.pdf, 
accessed 25 March 2016. 
117  Ibid ., p. 19. 
118  Ibid.; and INT 2, representative of NGO, 07 April 2016. 
119  Statoil’s Ethics Helpline, http://www.statoil.com/en/about/ethicsvalues/pages/
etikkhjelpelinjen.aspx, accessed 17 May 2016. 
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identifi cation number (PIN) in order to follow up and check on the status of 
the claim. 
 3.2.2.2 Evaluation of the mechanism along the established criteria 
 LEGITIMACY 
 Statoil’s internal grievance processes have been used for complaints of groups 
of individuals. 120 Additionally, Statoil has also been involved in non-judicial 
proceedings under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 121 
 The grievance mechanism established by Statoil is established internally, 
including all possibilities for having access to the mechanism. However, 
there are multiple points of access, including through Statoil’s local team. 
This is important, since people possibly affected at places where Statoil 
operates might have no access to the internet. When implementing the 
grievance mechanism at the local level in Tanzania (2014–2015), seven field 
visits were carried out by company representatives to hear the concerns of 
communities. 122 
 It is indicated that Statoil is responding quickly to requests from civil society. 
Compared to other oil companies that are working in Tanzania, Statoil seems 
to make greater efforts in terms of engagement with civil society. 123 Although 
cooperation with NGOs exists, further strengthening the inclusion of external 
partners, such as NGOs, as an access point for grievances would be recom-
mended. Issues such as confi dentiality have to be ensured in order to establish 
trust in the procedure. 
 This is also strongly linked to the equitability of the process. An equitable 
grievance mechanism includes the possibility for affected stakeholders to have 
access to information provided by an organization or group that is organized 
externally of the company. 
 ACCESSIBILITY AND PREDICTABILITY 
 All stakeholders, regardless of their location, have access to the Statoil grievance 
mechanism. In 2014, a corporate framework for a site-level grievance mechanism 
was established, setting itself up in Brazil, Tanzania and the US. 124 The mecha-
nism is based on the local context and available in local languages. So far, few 
120  Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2015 , p. 34. 
121  See concerning the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: http://www.oecd.
org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf, accessed 17 May 2016. 
122  Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2015 , p. 34. 
123  INT 2, representative of NGO, 07 April 2016. 
124  Statoil,  Sustainability Report 2014 , p. 31. 
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complaints have been fi led, the reason for which could be the short time of 
existence of the mechanism and the fact that potentially more sensitive onshore 
operations in Tanzania have not fully started yet. However, for the future, it 
will be important to monitor the use of complaint mechanisms, as a lack of 
cases might also be a sign of a lack of awareness of the mechanisms, or a lack 
of trust in the process. 
 Statoil has had complaints from Tanzanian fi shermen due to Statoil’s explora-
tion activities in Tanzania. The grievance mechanism for these complaints has 
been implemented locally by the Statoil team in Tanzania, resolving the com-
plaints by means of economic compensation, which has been considered adequate 
in order to repair the damage caused. 125 Concerning predictability, it is not 
possible to assess the indicative time frame due to the limited number of cases 
dealt with in the grievance mechanism. However, it has been shown that, in 
the context of Tanzania, Statoil generally seems to react swiftly to requests from 
civil society. 126 
 TRANSPARENCY 
 The mechanism is very young. Regarding the cases mediated so far, accessible 
information about the procedures and outcomes is limited. Therefore, it would 
be recommended that further information be provided in the sustainability 
reports on current experiences, which would also improve predictability for 
those considering using the mechanism. Furthermore, the process including 
envisaged time frames should be described in more detail. 
 3.2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
 The oil and gas sector in which Statoil operates potentially affects human rights 
abuses in many fi elds, impacting on employees, local communities, or the envi-
ronment. The companies that operate in this sector are mainly large companies 
whose shares are listed on the stock exchange markets (and, thus, with great 
visibility). The exploration activities are sometimes executed in countries with 
a rather weak human rights record, due to a lack of governance structures and 
weak rule of law. 
 The combination of both factors means that the stakeholders of these com-
panies demand that the companies take a step forward in terms of environ-
mental and social responsibility and, in sum, on human rights issues. The 
awareness of these concerns is shown in the sustainability reports of these 
125  Statoil,  Annual Report 2015 , p. 34. 
126  INT 2, representative of NGO, 07 April 2016. 
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companies, 127 including Statoil. Although reports of these companies show 
increased awareness for human rights matters, it seems that there is still a 
difference between the day-to-day activities with potential impact on human 
rights, and their reports. 
 The grievance mechanism is an excellent tool for approaching both the text 
and the reality and Statoil is taking a determined step forward in applying com-
munity grievance mechanisms for human rights abuses. Nevertheless, we are at 
the ‘beginning of the road’ as the culture on grievance mechanisms for human 
rights abuses is relatively new in large companies. It is clear that effective griev-
ance mechanisms should be part of oil and gas sector companies to address 
human rights issues in their operations. 
 An effective community grievance mechanism in the oil and gas sector is a 
key tool to solve issues in a non-judicial, effective and rapid manner (however, 
it neither replaces nor impedes access to the judicial system). This mechanism 
is a process for receiving, investigating, responding to or mediating complaints 
or grievances from affected communities in a timely, fair and consistent 
manner. 128 
 However, the effectiveness of the grievance mechanisms established in Brazil 
and Tanzania is challenging to assess, since the mechanisms have only been in 
place since 2014. Furthermore, in the context of Tanzania, Statoil’s activities 
are limited at the moment, but will increase in future. It has to be tested in 
the future, when the number of grievances might rise, to see how effectively 
the mechanism works. It is recommended that more information be published 
concerning the procedure of the mechanism, the involvement of civil society 
and local communities, and issues raised in the framework of Statoil’s fi eld 
visits. 
127  According to Repsol’s corporate responsibility report for 2014, it has several channels 
which the stakeholders can use to report or process grievances with respect to any 
aspect  of its operations and as part of its overriding pledge to upholding human rights. 
Repsol has committed, within the realm of its human rights due diligence efforts, to 
establishing effective communication and grievance mechanisms at the operations level, 
see Repsol,  Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2014 , pp. 137, 138, https://www.
unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/cop_2015/200651/original/RSC_Report_
2014_eng.pdf?1445872937, accessed 17 May 2016; and according to BP‘s sustainability 
report for 2014, BP works with IPIECA to develop tools for managing community 
grievances, see BP,  Sustainability Report 2014 , p. 50, http://www.bp.com/content/
dam/bp/pdf/sustainability/group-reports/Sustainability_Report_2014.pdf, accessed 
17 May 2016. 
128  IPIECA,  Community grievance mechanisms in the oil and gas industry – A manual 
for implementing operational-level grievance mechanisms and designing corporate 
frameworks (2015) p. 6, http://www.ipieca.org/publication/community-grievance-
mechanisms-oil-and-gas-industry-manual-implementing-operational-leve, accessed 
29  March 2016. 
Non-judicial remedies 105
 3.3 Case study on the potential of the arbitration 
mechanism: Permanent Court of Arbitration (case study 
by Katerina Yiannibas) 129 
 3.3.1  General description and functioning of the permanent 
Court of Arbitration 
 The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an intergovernmental organiza-
tion established in 1899 at The Hague through the adoption of the Convention 
for the Pacifi c Settlement of International Disputes at the fi rst International 
Peace Conference. The PCA was established by the Contracting States to facili-
tate arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution so as to ensure the pacifi c 
settlement of international differences. 130 While the PCA was initially conceived 
to handle interstate disputes, the PCA has evolved to provide access to an 
international remedy for non-state parties. The PCA’s basic organizational 
structure is outlined in its two founding documents: the aforementioned 1899 
Convention and its revision in 1907. As of May 2016, the PCA has 119 Member 
States that have acceded to one or both of the founding conventions. 131 
 Despite the nomenclature, the PCA is not a typical court; rather, it administers 
and facilitates arbitration, conciliation and fact-fi nding. In terms of organizational 
structure, the PCA comprises a panel of arbitrators named the Members of the 
Court, the Administrative Council, and its Secretariat, the International Bureau. 
The Members of the Court are potential arbitrators that are named by Member 
States for a term of six years, with the possibility of renewal, based on their 
known competency in international law and moral reputation. 132 The Adminis-
trative Council, comprising Member States’ diplomatic representatives accredited 
to the Netherlands and chaired by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
provides general guidance and supervises the PCA’s administration, budget and 
expenditure. 133 The permanent Secretariat of the PCA, known as the Interna-
tional Bureau, is headed by its Secretary-General and is composed of a multi-
national and multilingual legal and administrative staff that administer arbitration, 
129  The author would like to thank Brooks W. Daly (Permanent Court of Arbitration), Lise 
Johnson (Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment) and Denis Bensaude (Bensaude-
Paris) for their invaluable insights as well as Prof. Marta Requejo Isidro (Max Planck 
Institute Luxembourg) and Prof. Nerea Magallon Elosegui (University of Deusto) for 
their constructive review. 
130  Hague Convention for the Pacifi c Settlement of International Disputes 1899, Art. 1. The 
1899 Convention was revised at the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907. 
131  Permanent Court of Arbitration Member States, https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/
member-states/, accessed 11 March 2016. 
132  PCA Members of the Court-Panel of Arbitrators, https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/structure/
members-of-the-court/, accessed 11 March 2016. 
133  PCA Administrative Council, https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/structure/administrative-
council/, accessed 11 March 2016. 
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conciliation and fact-fi nding disputes between any combination of states, private 
parties, state-controlled entities, and intergovernmental organizations. 134 
 The PCA is headquartered in The Hague at the Peace Palace, home also to 
the International Court of Justice – the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. Cases under the auspices of the PCA can be administered at the Peace 
Palace or, alternatively, at any location as agreed by the parties or directed by 
the arbitral tribunal. While the working languages of the PCA are English and 
French, parties may agree to conduct proceedings in any language. 135 
 The PCA provides various arbitration services if so agreed by the parties, 
which could be implemented at a cost. Under Article 6 of the 2010 United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration 
Rules, the Secretary-General of the PCA can designate or act as an appointing 
authority for the selection of arbitrators. In such cases, the Secretary-General 
retains the discretion to appoint the most appropriate candidate as arbitrator 
and is not restricted by the list of arbitrators that make up the Members of the 
Court. The International Bureau can further provide registry services and 
administrative support to the parties and the arbitrators, including fi nancial admin-
istration, logistical and technical support for meetings and hearings, travel 
arrangements, and general secretarial and linguistic support. 136 In practice, 
arbitrator fees are not usually set by the PCA but rather reached by agreement 
between the parties. In 1995, the PCA established the Financial Assistance Fund 
with the objective of helping developing states with the costs of international 
dispute resolution administered by the PCA. The fund consists of voluntary 
fi nancial contributions by states, intergovernmental organizations, national insti-
tutions, as well as natural and legal persons, and is available to qualifying states 
or state controlled entities, with the approval of an external and independent 
Board of Trustees. 137 
 As concerning PCA procedure in the conduct of international arbitration, 
there is no one single set of procedural rules. The PCA has developed a number 
of sets of arbitration rules, 138 based largely on texts of UNCITRAL that parties 
134  PCA Services, https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/, accessed 11 March 2016. 
135  Ibid . 
136  PCA Arbitration Services, https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/, accessed 
11 March 2016. 
137  PCA Financial Assistance Fund for Settlement of International Disputes, Terms of Refer-
ence and Guidelines  (as approved by the Administrative Council on December 11, 1995), 
Arts 4–5. 
138  Rules include: Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Arbitration Rules 2012; PCA Optional 
Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States; PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating 
Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State; PCA Optional Rules for 
Arbitration Involving International Organizations and States; PCA Optional Rules for Arbi-
tration between International Organizations and Private Parties; PCA Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and the Environment; PCA Optional 
Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities. 
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may choose depending on the nature and circumstances of the dispute, although 
the PCA often administrates cases under the conduct of UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules or other ad hoc rules. 139 In 2001, the PCA adopted a set of com-
prehensive environmentally tailored procedural rules: Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Environment and/or Natural Resources. 140 
In addition to the adoption of the environmental rules, the PCA maintains a 
list of specialized arbitrators for environmental disputes as well as scientifi c and 
technical experts for potential appointment as expert witnesses. As part of their 
work in the fi eld of dispute avoidance and settlement concerning environmental 
issues, the PCA and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
convened a working group in 2006. The working group developed a set of 
guidelines; including ‘ways of increasing access to justice on environmental 
matters, inter alia, through public interest lawsuits to apply and implement 
environmental laws, the use of preliminary remedies in environmental disputes, 
and the use of environmental expertise in dispute settlement concerning envi-
ronmental issues.’ 141 A question emerges of whether similar rules and guidelines 
could be adopted by the PCA in the fi eld of business and human rights. 
 Since its inception in 1899, the PCA has managed several hundred cases, 
including cases in which the PCA was asked to provide full administrative sup-
port as well as cases where the PCA was asked to appoint or constitute the 
arbitral tribunal or to decide on the removal of an arbitrator. 142 The large 
majority of the PCA caseload has come about in the last thirty years, in part 
due to the notable increase in bilateral investment treaties in the 1990s as well 
as being the result of a general trend refl ecting a global increase in dispute settle-
ment through arbitration. 143 In 2015, the PCA administered 135 cases, of which 
76 were investor state arbitrations arising under bilateral or multilateral invest-
ment treaties and national investment laws; 44 arbitrations arising under contracts 
involving a state, intergovernmental organization, or other public entity; eight 
interstate arbitrations; one arbitration under the PCA Optional Rules for Arbi-
tration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment; 
and one conciliation between a private party and an intergovernmental organiza-
tion arising under a contract submitted to conciliation in accordance with the 
139  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),  Dispute Settlement , 
Module 1.3: Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2003, p. 11. Available at: http://unctad.
org/es/Docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf, accessed 27 May 2015. 
140  For full text of the PCA Environmental Rules, see https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-
the-Environment-and_or-Natural-Resources.pdf, accessed 11 March 2016. 
141  UNEP/PCA Advisory Group on Dispute Avoidance and Settlement concerning Envi-
ronmental Issues, Working Group Report, 2–3 November 2006, p. 1. 
142  Interview with Brooks W. Daly, 24 June 2015. 
143  Hugo Siblesz, Secretary-General PCA,  What Role for the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Today? Remarks, New York University School of Law, 11 February 2013. 
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UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980). 144 Of these, approximately 10 per cent 
of cases have a human rights component, 145 and approximately 20 per cent of 
cases deal with the activities of EU corporations in non-EU countries. 146 
 3.3.2 Evaluation of the mechanism along the established criteria 
 3.3.2.1 Legitimacy 
 The principal concerns over legitimacy 147 in international arbitration centre 
on the resolution of public law issues through a private adjudication system 148 
and the accountability of arbitrators. 149 Civil society has expressed a certain 
scepticism about arbitration as a confl ict resolution mechanism when the dispute 
involves aspects of public law and policy, including human rights. 150 Whether 
national courts will recognize the arbitrability of human rights issues, i.e. the 
capability of settlement of human rights issues by arbitration, depends largely 
on substantive domestic law on arbitration, which can vary signifi cantly between 
jurisdictions and could result in the non-enforcement of an arbitral award. 151 
 In commercial cases, a noted advantage of international arbitration is the 
fi nality and non-appealable nature of the award. These principles, intended to 
avoid unnecessary delays and to combat the obstruction of process by dilatory 
or recalcitrant parties, have come under scrutiny in cases with a noted public 
interest, particularly in cases with a human rights component. 152 Appellate 
144  PCA Annual Report 2015. Available at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/175/2016/02/PCA-annual-report-2015.pdf, accessed 11 March 2016. 
145  See also J. Levine, ‘The interaction of international investment arbitration and the rights 
of indigenous peoples’ in  Investment Law within International Law , ed. Freya Baetens, 
(2013) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 108. 
146  Interview with Brooks W. Daly, 24 June 2015. 
147  UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Imple-
menting the United Nations ’Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (UN Guiding 
Principles 2011), 2011, para. 31a. Legitimacy is defi ned as ‘enabling trust from the 
stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended, and being accountable for the fair 
conduct of grievance processes’. 
148  See D. Behn, ‘Legitimacy, Evolution and Growth in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Empirically evaluating the State-of-the-Art’, 46(2)  Georgetown Journal of International 
Law (2015) 367. 
149  Interview with Denis Bensaude, 03 March 2016. 
150  Interview with Lise Johnson, 03 March 2016. There are also extensive debates about this 
question in academia; see e.g. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, and Francesco 
Francioni (eds).  Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (2009) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
151  See C. Pamboukis, ‘On Arbitrability: The Arbitrator as a Problem Solver’ in  Arbitrability: 
International & Comparative Perspectives , (eds. Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brek-
oulakis) (2009) Wolters Kluwer: The Netherlands. 
152  See  AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). (As concerning the principle of 
fi nality in regards to collective consumer redress, the court reasoned: ‘We fi nd it hard to 
believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review, and 
even harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force 
such a decision.’) 
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review was originally contemplated at the 1899 founding convention of the 
PCA at The Hague, but was not made part of the default arbitration mecha-
nism. This does however leave it open to the parties to agree to appellate 
review. So far, no cases submitted to the PCA have made this part of the pro-
cedural regime. There are no rules, however, that would exclude appellate 
review. 153 
 There are further concerns relating to the accountability of arbitrators. There 
is no international qualifi cation for arbitrators. Moreover, the parties appoint 
the arbitrators, an element of the arbitration mechanism that raises concerns of 
impartiality and independence. Specifi cally, the concern relates to the confl ict 
of interest inherent in counsel acting as arbitrator in other cases. 154 The selection 
of arbitrators by the parties does, however, provide an opportunity to select an 
adjudicator with a high level of expertise and specialization in international 
human rights. 155 The work to identify those most qualifi ed and with an estab-
lished reputation for impartiality is work that could be done by the PCA, as it 
has previously done in cases relating to the environment and/or natural resources 
and outer space. The PCA Member States have twice adopted procedural rules 
that have been targeted at specifi c sectors: PCA Optional Rules for Arbitration 
of Disputes Relating to the Environment and/or Natural Resources; PCA 
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities. 
In both cases the Member States decided that the subject matter had a strong 
public interest. Should PCA Member States decide that it is appropriate, they 
could in turn give a mandate to the PCA to prepare procedural rules arising in 
disputes relating to corporate related human rights abuses, as well as to develop 
a specialized panel of arbitrators and experts. 156 This would provide a reference 
for parties to choose arbitrators among this group of identifi ed experts in inter-
national human rights law. The accountability of arbitrators also relates closely 
to the issues of costs and transparency; both will be discussed in the sections 
below. 
153  In 2013, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (ICDR) adopted Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules. 
154  See M. Solanes and A. Jouravlev, Revisiting Privatization, Foreign Investment, International 
Arbitration and Water, Santiago: CEPAL, 2007. 
155  Interview with Brooks W. Daly, 24 June 2015. 
156  PCA,  PCA Responds to Queries on Arbitral Legitimacy , available at: http://archive.pca-
cpa.org/shownews67ec.html?ac=view&pag_id=1261&nws_id=414, accessed 11 March 
2016. In response to a 2014 inquiry on arbitral legitimacy by the International Congress 
and Convention Association, the PCA responded that it was the institution’s role to foster 
legitimacy and to put forward a number of concrete practices to this end; including 
reducing the geographic concentration of arbitral practice in The Hague and expanding 
the appointment and the training of non-European arbitrators from diverse national 
backgrounds. The PCA opened an offi ce in Mauritius in 2010, pursuant to the PCA-
Mauritius host country agreement, so as to develop arbitral infrastructure and engage the 
regional arbitration community by participating in educational outreach and training 
programmes throughout Africa. 
110 Katharina Häusler, Karin Lukas and Julia Planitzer
 3.3.2.2 Accessibility and predictability 
 As concerning accessibility, 157 international arbitration conducted under the 
auspices of the PCA presents both certain challenges and potential as relating 
to costs and party consent to arbitral jurisdiction, as well as some noted advan-
tages, as relating to fl exibility of location, language, and procedure. In its ori-
gins, the PCA was designed to resolve disputes between states. Through its 
evolution, the PCA now provides services to various combinations of states, 
state entities, intergovernmental organizations, and private parties. In principle, 
the PCA stands to provide a neutral forum for the international adjudication of 
corporate related human rights abuses without the exhaustion of domestic judicial 
remedies on the part of the victims. However, non-state actors that access arbi-
tration are typically investors and not other persons or non-commercial actors. 158 
Access to international arbitration under the auspices of the PCA would require 
agreement between the parties, the company and victims, to consent to arbitral 
jurisdiction ad hoc. International instruments (e.g. direct treaty language in 
international investment agreements) or specialized PCA rules in the area of 
business and human rights would need to be adopted so as to facilitate access 
to international arbitration between companies and victims. Currently, the evi-
dence shows that the mechanism is mostly used by large or extra-large multina-
tional enterprises. 159 This is in part due to the costs related to arbitration. 
 Prospects for easy access to arbitration administered under the auspices of 
the PCA and low cost do exist. There are currently methods available to parties 
for reducing both time and costs, including constituting arbitral tribunals with 
fewer members; limiting the number of pages of written pleadings; establishing 
time limits; and limiting the number of days of hearing. In cases relating to 
corporate related human rights abuses, the arbitration mechanism would have 
to have regard for the limited resources of victims and enact concrete measures 
accordingly. Counsel and arbitrator services should be provided pro bono or 
for a reduced fee. There have been cases where arbitrators and conciliators have 
been willing to waive all fees. 160 The willingness of international jurists to do 
pro bono work in cases should not be underestimated. Moreover, the PCA 
Financial Assistance Fund, which is currently only available for states, could be 
adapted. This would require a decision by the PCA Member States to change 
the terms of that fund or to create a new fund with fi nancing that could be 
open to any party, when the substantive claim relates to human rights. 
157  UN Guiding Principles 2011,  supra, para. 31b. Accessibility is defi ned as ‘being known 
to all stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended, and providing adequate assis-
tance for those who may face particular barriers to access’. 
158  Interview with Lise Johnson, 03 March 2016. 
159  D. Behn, ‘Legitimacy, Evolution and Growth in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Empiri-
cally evaluating the State-of-the-Art’, 46(2)  Georgetown Journal of International Law 
(2015) 386. 
160  Interview with Brooks W. Daly, 24 June 2015. 
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 A great advantage of arbitration conducted under the auspices of the PCA 
is that it is fl exible and procedures can be best adapted to the case at hand, 
notably in regards to the location of the proceedings, site visits, language(s), 
and applicable law. While procedural fl exibility may detract from predictability 161 
of the procedure and the outcome, fl exibility can offset barriers traditional to 
litigation. For instance, in the case where the arbitration is held abroad, there 
is no need to hire local counsel. As concerning the seat of the arbitration, while 
the PCA is located in The Hague, arbitration proceedings can be held anywhere 
in the world the parties agree to. As concerning evidence, for example, eviden-
tiary matters are discretionary to the arbitral tribunal and procedures can be 
best adapted to the case at hand. There are mass claims procedures explored 
by working groups at the PCA where lowered standards of proof, burden shift-
ing, and evidentiary sampling were cited as methods to add effi ciency and lower 
cost in special cases. 162 As concerning applicable law, the adoption of a special-
ized set of arbitral procedural rules in disputes relating to corporate related 
human rights abuses could include an applicable law clause, or at the least a 
model applicable law clause, providing for the direct application of international 
human rights instruments. 
 3.3.2.3 Transparency and a source of continuous learning 
 Transparency 163 in international arbitration is fundamental so as to offset concerns 
surrounding legitimacy of the mechanism and arbitrator accountability. Inter-
national arbitration in general has been criticized for its confi dentiality, but 
arbitration is not by nature confi dential: it follows the agreement of the parties. 
Parties can agree to have fully transparent proceedings, as evidenced in the  Abyei 
Arbitration conducted at the PCA in The Hague between the Government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. 164 
 In 2015, the PCA was the fi rst to apply the UNCITRAL Transparency 
Rules in  Iberdrola, S.A. and Iberdrola Energia. S.A.U. v Bolivia (PCA Case 
No. 2015–05). The PCA participated in the negotiation of the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014) 
161  UN Guiding Principles 2011,  supra, para. 31c. Predictability is defi ned as ‘providing a 
clear and known procedure with an indicative time frame for each stage, and clarity on 
the types of process and outcome available and means of monitoring implementation.’ 
162  See generally H. M. Holtzmann and E. Kristjánsdóttir,  International Mass Claims Processes: 
Legal and Practical Perspectives (2007) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
163  UN Guiding Principles 2011,  supra, para. 31e. Transparency is defi ned as ‘keeping parties 
to a grievance informed about its progress, and providing suffi cient information about 
the mechanism’s performance to build confi dence in its effectiveness and meet any public 
interest at stake’. 
164  PCA Archives, The Government of Sudan/The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (Abyei Arbitration). Available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/
Court%20Documents/PCA/Abyei_Final_Award_EN.pdf, http://legal.un.org/riaa/
cases/vol_XXX/145-416.pdf, accessed 11 March 2016. 
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(UNCITRAL Transparency Rules) and the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention), 
which was adopted on 10 December 2014 and opened for signature on 
17 March 2015, so as to make possible the application of the UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules to the existing around 3,000 investment agreements signed 
before 1 April 2014. The UNICTRAL Transparency Rules and the Mauritius 
Convention provide the legal basis to open arbitral hearings to the public, to 
allow interested parties to make submissions to the tribunal, and to make arbi-
tration documents publicly available (the notice of arbitration, the response to 
the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defence, any 
further written statements or written submissions by a disputing party, a table 
listing all exhibits to those documents, if it had been prepared for the proceed-
ings, any written submissions by the non-disputing treaty party/parties and by 
third parties, transcripts of hearings, where available, and orders, decisions and 
awards of the arbitral tribunal). 165 As concerning continuous learning, 166 trans-
parency in international arbitration under the auspices of the PCA is essential 
so that arbitral jurisprudence can be studied and awards can be scrutinized. 
 3.3.2.4 Rights-compatibility 
 As concerning rights-compatibility, 167 some of the more prominent arbitration 
rules in regards to applicable law, including the PCA rules, maintain that arbitral 
tribunals can apply broad legal standards. 168 Rules of law designated by the 
parties could provide for the direct application of human rights instruments, 
although these could run into confl ict with mandatory rules in specifi c jurisdic-
tions that could jeopardize the recognition and enforcement of the eventual 
award. So as to ensure that outcomes and remedies accord with internationally 
recognized human rights, a long-term goal of the EU could entail the inclusion 
of express treaty language providing for the direct application of international 
human rights instruments into investment agreements. 
 So as to ensure that outcomes and remedies accord with internationally rec-
ognized human rights, the adoption of a specialized set of arbitral procedural 
rules in disputes relating to corporate related human rights abuses could include 
oversight of the implementation of the award. This could entail a reporting 
requirement on award compliance from the parties to the PCA. 
165  See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014). 
Available at: https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/
Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf, accessed 11 March 2016. 
166  UN Guiding Principles 2011,  supra, para. 31g. A source of continuous learning is defi ned 
as ‘drawing on relevant measures to identify lessons for improving the mechanism and 
preventing future grievances and harms.’ 
167  UN Guiding Principles 2011,  supra, para. 31f. Rights-compatibility is defi ned as ‘ensuring 
that outcomes and remedies accord with internationally recognized human rights.’ 
168  PCA Arbitration Rules 2012, Art. 35; ICSID Convention Article 42(1). 
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 3.3.3 Concluding remarks 
 International arbitration under the auspices of the PCA could be adapted so 
as to provide uncomplicated access to remedy for victims of corporate related 
human rights abuses. In its essence, arbitration is a fl exible and neutral mecha-
nism for the resolution of cross-border disputes. Currently, the arbitration 
mechanism under the auspices of the PCA offers certain advantages: notably, 
the fl exibility of procedure in terms of location, language, time limits, eviden-
tiary considerations, as well as the choice, number, and specialization of adju-
dicators. As the mechanism currently stands, access for victims of corporate 
related human rights abuses depends on the consent of both the victims and 
the company. In this regard, it is recommended that the PCA develop special-
ized arbitration rules for disputes relating to business and human rights, as it 
has previously done for disputes relating to natural resources and/or the 
environment and outer space. Such an instrument could formalize and there-
fore promote some of the aspects important to provide remedy to victims of 
corporate related human rights abuses; these include fi nancial assistance for 
costs relating to the arbitration and counsel, transparency,  amicus curiae par-
ticipation, collective redress, and oversight of the implementation of the award. 
Furthermore, the PCA could develop a specialized list of arbitrators and experts 
in the area of business and human rights, as it has previously done for disputes 
relating to natural resources and/or the environment and outer space. As 
relating to costs, the PCA should consider adapting the Financial Assistance 
Fund so that funds are made available to non-state parties. There are important 
steps that should be taken that go beyond the PCA, namely, the inclusion by 
states of express treaty language for the direct application of international 
human rights instruments and the establishment of arbitral jurisdiction for 
victims of corporate related human rights abuses in international investment 
agreements. 
 3.4 Conclusions and recommendations 
 Even though many European companies have established some sort of grievance 
procedures as part of their CSR policies in recent years, the present research 
shows that fully fl edged grievance mechanisms are not yet well developed in 
Europe. While researchers struggled to even identify company-based grievance 
mechanisms that preliminarily fulfi lled basic quality criteria, detailed research on 
the two grievance mechanisms revealed that several aspects of the procedures 
are not yet well-defi ned, or accessible information is limited. Currently, therefore, 
both company mechanisms qualify as a set of grievance procedures rather than 
as fully fl edged operational-level grievance mechanisms. The mechanisms are 
rooted in rather more general corporate social responsibility or compliance 
standards, emphasizing, for example, anti-corruption policies within companies 
or community relations. Moreover, some mechanisms have not been widely 
used to date, making it diffi cult to evaluate their performance with regard to 
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procedures, outcomes, and effi ciency in bringing business-related human rights 
abuses to the companies’ attention. 
 Both company-based grievance mechanisms use various entry channels for 
fi ling complaints, in particular hotlines as well as designated local contact persons 
(e.g. community liaison offi cers). In addition, one company-based grievance 
mechanism also provides the possibility to fi le more formal written complaints, 
for instance those addressed to an ombudsman. This makes the grievance 
mechanisms easily accessible for aggrieved persons and might provide an advan-
tage compared to formal judicial procedures, the requirements of which are 
often diffi cult to understand for people without a legal education, and access 
criteria are challenging to fulfi l without legal support. However, the researchers 
could not establish if persons who might be negatively affected by a company’s 
activity received suffi cient information about the grievance mechanisms to allow 
use of them when needed. Framing the entry channels for fi ling complaints in 
the general compliance policy of a company can contribute to a lessened aware-
ness that these channels could also be used in the case of negative human rights 
impacts. Without the possibility of conducting onsite visits in the framework of 
this study, it is therefore impossible to say if the necessary information fi ltered 
down to each worker or community member, thus effectively ensuring acces-
sibility in practice. Furthermore, it is challenging to assess the extent to which 
communities and civil society were consulted in the development of the griev-
ance mechanisms, and how they are involved in the implementation of these 
mechanisms. 
 Regarding the conduct of grievance procedures, both companies use ‘mixed 
systems’, where grievances can be lodged both internally (e.g. through a super-
visor or local contact person) and externally (e.g. ombudsperson or external 
hotline). While internal procedures are arguably even more easily accessible than 
external procedures, they bear a number of risks, notably a lack of commitment 
by supervisors to proceed with the complaint and possible reprisals against the 
complainant. Additionally, such mixed systems might hamper trust of the persons 
affected in the independence and confi dentiality of the process. In fact, concern-
ing the two companies analyzed, further research would be needed in order to 
assess how confi dentiality is ensured in practice if complaints are fi led with a 
company representative such as a supervisor or a contact person for local com-
munities. The same applies to the instruction and training such representatives 
receive in relation to this matter. 
 A close connection between the internal and external systems, or even a 
perceived proximity of the external process to the company, can lead to an 
increase of distrust even with regard to the external, and thus technically inde-
pendent, system. An additional risk of applying internal and external systems 
may be that different stakeholders within the company or related to the com-
pany, such as trade unions, workers’ councils or compliance offi cers, are in 
charge of implementing the different channels, but that there is little exchange 
among these different stakeholders. While different procedures could potentially 
also be useful to target different groups of victims, improved exchange would 
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allow a better assessment as to whether the mechanisms established are fully 
fl edged. 
 In addition, information about the exact responsibilities for each step in the 
complaints proceedings is limited and, with regard to the cases already dealt 
with, there is little transparency about the proceedings and outcomes, including 
clear procedures for providing compensation to those who have been negatively 
affected. This makes it diffi cult to predict outcomes and thus persons affected 
or their counsellors might fi nd it diffi cult to assess whether they should use one 
of the company mechanisms or rather try another judicial or non-judicial 
remedy. 
 The case studies found that internal grievance mechanisms are mostly used 
for labour law violations and smaller scale confl icts with local communities. In 
these cases, some of the procedures can be considered as well-suited for provid-
ing relatively quick solutions to less serious human right abuses (e.g. payment 
for extra hours, obligatory working breaks, unintentional damage to property), 
ideally without requiring much paperwork on the part of the claimants. How-
ever, concerning more complex cases or (potentially) serious violations of human 
rights, the mechanisms seem too limited. The grievance mechanisms are mostly 
perceived as tools for labour law violations within the company, its subsidiaries, 
and – to a certain extent – its suppliers. Only to a limited extent are the mecha-
nisms also seen as mechanisms for addressing negative human rights implications 
caused by actions of the company. 
 So far, both companies analyzed in this study are committed to further 
developing their grievance mechanisms; however, procedures for continuous 
learning still need to be improved. This concerns both internal review mecha-
nisms and continuous engagement with external stakeholders such as unions or 
community-based organizations. As, for instance, shown in the case of Siemens, 
the IFA describes a channel of grievance mechanism that is based on coopera-
tion with the trade union, which is strongly involved in order to increase aware-
ness of the IFA and further institutionalize the lodging of complaints. 
 Since the proliferation of international arbitration, the default arbitration 
mechanism has been contemplated by and large for the resolution of cross-
border commercial disputes where the primary interests are effi ciency and fi nality. 
There is evidence that human rights issues have emerged in both commercial 
and investor-state disputes. Accordingly, if arbitration is to be used in such cases, 
the mechanism must be adapted as the outcomes inherently impact the public 
interest, making the correctness of the award and transparency of the proceed-
ings essential. The advantage of international arbitration is that it can provide 
direct access in a neutral forum for holding companies accountable where 
national jurisdictions are unavailable or diffi cult to access. International arbitra-
tion is, per se, an external mechanism and if proper procedures are in place, 
independence towards both parties can be ensured and the outcomes are binding 
on both parties. However, in contrast to company-based grievance mechanisms, 
which usually do not involve any direct costs for claimants, international arbitra-
tion is costly and a framework to lower the fi nancial burden for victims would 
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be necessary. As concerning international arbitration conducted under the aus-
pices of the PCA, the arbitration mechanism would need to establish procedures 
that contemplate the particular interests involved in cases where the substantive 
claims involve human rights; in particular, a set of procedural rules that ensure 
transparency, review of the award, specialized arbitrators (and their account-
ability), and fi nancial assistance. 
 Based on the conclusions, a number of recommendations can be made. 
 The existence of the Guiding Principles is assessed as an important success 
factor for non-judicial grievance mechanisms, given that they created awareness. 169 
However, the analysis within this research shows that further guidance would 
be necessary in order to assess for which type of adverse human rights impacts 
company-based grievance mechanisms are suitable in order to reach a fair reme-
diation. For example, more informal local mechanisms could be useful for 
monitoring the implementation of agreements, whereas more formalized mecha-
nisms might prove conducive to solutions concerning claims of land rights. 170 
It is recommended that further discussion take place within the framework of 
the UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corpo-
rations and other business enterprises on company-based grievance mechanisms, 
and for which adverse human rights impacts the most suitable remedies for the 
persons impacted can be achieved. 
 Additionally, it is recommended that more information be gathered on the 
follow up of company-based grievance mechanisms in order to be able to assess 
whether the mechanism leads to fair remediation. The UN Working Group 
would need to elaborate in more detail as to which criteria are conducive for 
an effective, rights-based company-based mechanism, also covering the monitor-
ing of implementation of agreements. 
 It is recommended that the UN Global Compact’s disclosure procedures 
(Communications on Progress) include further effectiveness criteria and identify 
in more detail the necessary requirements to be fulfi lled concerning operational-
level grievance mechanisms in order to ensure that companies implement a 
fully-fl edged operational-level grievance mechanism. At the level of the EU, 
Member States could also refl ect about clear guidance for company-based 
grievance mechanisms, e.g. in the EU or National Action Plans on Business 
and Human Rights, taking into account research on best practices and 
shortcomings. 
 Regarding the level of the individual company mechanisms, general recom-
mendations are limited as this study has only analyzed two grievance mechanisms 
169  Access,  ACCESS to Remedy in Context of Business and Human Rights: Improving the 
Effectiveness of Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms , (Expert meeting report, 3–4 April 
2014), p. 12. 
170  In this sense see B. Ganson,  Access to Remedy Through Consensual Processes – Working 
Paper (ACCESS)  available at http://accessfacility.org/sites/default/fi les/Working%20
Paper%20-%20Access%20to%20remedy%20through%20consensual%20processes.pdf, 
accessed 3 November 2016, p. 8. 
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and the conclusions are drawn exclusively on this experience. Bearing this caveat 
in mind, it is recommended that companies involve civil society – in particular 
local communities or workers – in the design and implementation of grievance 
mechanisms. Furthermore, it is advisable to institutionalize exchange on pro-
cedures between involved stakeholders, in the case that companies apply a mixed 
system, involving external and internal channels of lodging complaints. At the 
same time, confi dentiality of individual complaints handled by external stake-
holders has to be ensured in order to be able to establish and maintain trust 
in the procedure. 
 Entry channels for fi ling complaints should to a certain extent be separated 
from the compliance framework in order to strengthen awareness that these 
mechanisms can also be used for negative human rights impacts. By contrast, 
independently operated telephone hotlines or online complaints forms, which 
are available in local languages, can be seen as a positive example of an easy 
entry point for raising minor issues that can be solved outside courts. 
 In relation to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it is recommended that 
EU Member States give a mandate to the PCA to adopt a set of arbitration 
rules in disputes relating to corporate related human rights abuses. Such rules 
should provide for transparency,  amicus curiae participation, collective redress, 
specialized arbitrators, fi nancial assistance, and oversight of the implementation 
of the award. 
 Furthermore, EU Member States should give a mandate to the PCA to adapt 
the Financial Assistance Fund to provide fi nancial assistance to non-state parties 
when the subject matter of the dispute involves corporate related human rights 
abuses. 
 Case study – Siemens AG 
 Interview 1: Interview with a representative of ‘IG Metall’, German Industrial 
Union of Metal workers on 2 November 2015 per telephone (referred to as 
‘INT 1, representative of ‘IG Metall’, 2 November 2015’). 
 Interview 2: Interview with a representative of Siemens AG, Supply Chain 
Management, on 3 December 2015 per telephone (referred to as ‘INT 2, 
representative of Siemens AG/Supply Chain Management, 3 December 2015’). 
 Interview 3: Interview with a representative of a non-governmental organiza-
tion, on 2 February 2016 per telephone. 
 Case study – Statoil 
 Interview 1: Interview with a representative of Statoil, on 13 January 2016. As 
the person interviewed objected to it, the information gathered through this 
interview could not be used for the fi nal case study. 
 Interview 2: Interview with a representative of a local non-governmental orga-
nization, on 7 April 2016, per telephone (referred to as ‘INT 2, representative 
of NGO, 7 April 2016’). 
 Case study – Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 Interview 1: Interview with Brooks W. Daly, Deputy Secretary-General, Principle 
Legal Counsellor, Permanent Court of Arbitration, on 24 June 2015. 
 Interview 2: Interview with Denis Bensaude, Arbitrator (chairperson, sole arbitra-
tor and co-arbitrator) in over fi fty cases, under the ICC, LCIA, CCIG, OHADA, 
CMAP and UNCITRAL rules, as well as in ad hoc arbitrations conducted under 
the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, on 3 March 2016. 
 Interview 3: Interview with Lise Johnson, Head of Investment Law and Policy at 
the Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment. Previously submitted an  amicus 
brief in a case administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration involving a 
human rights component; in particular, dealing with the rights of people not party 
to an investor-state arbitration (in this case, indigenous people), on 3 March 2016. 
 Annex: list of interview partners 
 4  Corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights vis-à-vis 
legal duty of care 
 Cees van Dam and Filip Gregor with contribution 
from Sandrine Brachotte and Paige Morrow 
 4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter deals with the intersection of corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights and tort law in the context of complex corporate structures and 
business relationships. More specifi cally, it considers the relationship between 
a company’s duty of care, on the one hand, and the same company’s respon-
sibility to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts linked to 
its operations, products or services by its business relationships, such as those 
concerning subsidiary companies (as a headquarters, parent, or controlling 
company), contractors, and other business partners. In this regard, this chapter 
proposes three types of legal reform: a disclosure obligation for a company as 
regards the control it exercises over its business partners (Scenario I), a rebut-
table presumption of control a company exercises over its business partners 
(Scenario II), and a statutory duty for a company to conduct human rights 
due diligence (Scenario III). 1 
 The analysis builds on the answers to two consecutive surveys solicited from 
distinguished legal experts from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK. Altogether, the authors received twenty opinions from 
1  This chapter was written by Cees van Dam, Professor of International Business and Human 
Rights at the Rotterdam School of Management (Erasmus University), and Visiting Professor 
at King’s College London, and Filip Gregor, Head of Responsible Companies Section at 
Frank Bold, a purpose driven law fi rm, with the contribution from Sandrine Brachotte, Legal 
Consultant at Frank Bold, and Paige Morrow, Head of Brussels Operations at Frank Bold. 
The authors would like to thank the following individuals who provided inputs through the 
consultation: Daniel Augenstein (Germany), Anne Scheltema Beduin (Netherlands), Stéphane 
Brabant (France), David Chivers, QC (UK), Sandra Cossart (France), Liesbeth Enneking 
(Netherlands), Ingrid Gubbay (UK), Patrick Harty (UK), Nicola Jägers (Netherlands), 
Rasmus Kløcker Larse (Sweden), Yvon Martinet (France), Robert McCorquodale (UK), Sarah 
McGrath (United States), Krishnendu Mukherjee (UK), Lucas Roorda (Netherlands), Urs 
Rybi (Switzerland), Channa Samkalden (Netherlands), John Sherman (US), Christopher 
Schuller (Germany), Gwynne Skinne (US). 
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experts, whose names are listed in the acknowledgements. The aim of these 
surveys and of this work was threefold: 
 1. Clarify obstacles connected to tort law that undermine the realization of 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights. 
 2. Identify the most feasible and effective reforms to overcome these obstacles 
and improve access to remedy for victims of human rights abuse. 
 3. Consider the scope and other characteristics of such reforms, taking into 
account the principles of tort law, precedents, and legitimate interests of 
corporate actors. 
 The authors have examined eight different scenarios for reforms and a number 
of associated questions, including role and defi nition of control in the context of 
corporate groups and business relationships, connection between the defi nition of 
human rights violations and the tort concept of harm, the effect of corporate 
statutory duties on the position of victims, and the causation between meeting 
or failing standards of care and harm suffered. Three of these reform scenarios 
are presented alongside assessment of several options concerning their scope. 
 These scenarios consider the situation of a legal action launched before the court 
of an EU member state by victims of corporate human rights abuses against an EU 
company that holds control over another company that has caused or contributed 
to the abuse in a non-EU state. The legal basis of such action in tort law is that 
the defendant-company breached its duty of care by causing, contributing or not 
preventing a human rights abuse in the operations of another company or other 
entity over which it exercised control with respect to the harmful activities. 
 This does not consider the cases where the liability of the parent company 
is based on piercing the corporate veil, under corporate law. The conditions for 
piercing the corporate veil differ in different countries, but in general they 
include situations where the subsidiary had no free will, was set up for fraudulent 
purposes, or established to avoid an existing obligation. 
 This chapter proposes three options for legal reform, which would also be 
complementary to one another if all are adopted: 
 • Scenario I: facilitating victims’ access to evidence of the defendant-company’s 
control over its business partner, e.g. subsidiary or contractor that has 
committed the alleged human rights violation. 
 • Scenario II: in terms of burden of proof, presuming the existence of such 
control when certain conditions are met that show control prima facie. 
 • Scenario III: introducing a company’s statutory duty to identify, prevent, and 
take action to cease human rights abuses by its business partners, analogous 
to the human rights due diligence outlined in the UN Guiding Principles. 
 Before discussing each of these scenarios in detail in separate sections, this 
chapter briefl y sets out their legal context. 
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 4.2 Legal context 
 4.2.1 Implementing the UN Guiding Principles 
 The EU law on jurisdiction in civil matters 2 allows victims of corporate human 
rights abuse to bring a tort claim against a company domiciled in the EU, 
including when the harm that provides basis for the claim occurred outside of 
the EU. Often, this is the only option for victims of corporate human rights 
abuses committed in non-EU states to get access to remedy, due to the cor-
ruption or lack of capacity of judiciary in their countries, or because the company 
responsible for the harm has limited assets located in these countries. 
 The UN Guiding Principle 26 outlines the duty of a state to ensure the 
effectiveness of their judicial mechanisms and remove barriers that could lead to 
a denial of access to remedy. 3 The commentary to this principle states: ‘Legal 
barriers that can prevent legitimate cases involving business-related human rights 
abuse from being addressed can arise where, for example: The way in which 
legal responsibility is attributed among members of a corporate group under 
domestic criminal and civil laws facilitates the avoidance of appropriate account-
ability; [or] Where claimants face a denial of justice in a host State [where the 
harmful event has occurred] and cannot access home State courts [where 
the company-defendant is domiciled] regardless of the merits of the claim.’ 4 
 The possibility for victims of human rights abuses to start civil proceedings 
against the company that is controlling, or greatly infl uencing, the company 
which has caused the harm is in line with the scope of the corporate responsi-
bility to respect human rights, and the human rights due diligence process 
relating thereto, described in the UN Guiding Principles. This twin concept 
consists of two elements that require business enterprises to: 
 (a) avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through 
their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur; 
 (b) seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services by their business relation-
ships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts. 
 These elements bear similarity to the duty of care concept in tort law, which 
requires a person that is found liable of having acted with negligence thereby 
2  EU Regulation No. 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast),  OJ L 351/1 , 
20 December 2012, Art. 2. 
3  Guiding Principle 26 states as follows: ‘States should take appropriate steps to ensure the 
effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights 
abuses, including considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that 
could lead to a denial of access to remedy.’ 
4  UN Doc. A/ HRC /17/31, 21 March 2011, Commentary on Guiding Principle 26. 
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causing harm to another, to compensate the victim of such harm. 5 A breach 
of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights can, therefore, amount 
to a breach of the duty of care. 
 The question of under which conditions a company can be held liable for 
acts of other legally separate persons such as subsidiaries, 6 contractors, and 
other business partners violating human rights, has only rarely been subject 
of court decisions in the Member States of the EU. 7 Therefore, the answer 
to this question is subject to debate. One of the obstacles for victims is to 
prove that the company exercised control over the relevant activities of the 
(legal) person(s) causing the harmful situation, which depends on the circum-
stances of the case. If the company exercises control it is usually only liable 
if it can be considered to have breached the duty of care towards the third 
parties suffering harm as a result of the situation. Although the exact require-
ments will differ across jurisdictions, a pivotal consideration for this breach of 
the duty will be whether, considering the likeliness and magnitude of the 
potential harm suffered by the victims of a human rights violation, the com-
pany should have taken measures to prevent the harm from occurring or to 
mitigate its consequences. 
 In practice, one of the major problems for victims to access remedy is that 
they are usually not in a position to prove the existence of such control. Indeed, 
in many situations the victims lack evidence to prove their case, because much 
of the relevant information on the control relationship in corporate structures 
and other relationships is not within their reach. 
 4.2.2 Following the general legal trend 
 The three scenarios that are outlined in this chapter correspond with the general 
tendency in law to improve transparency and accountability in the operations 
of business enterprises. In Europe, there have been several attempts to embed 
the corporate duty to prevent human rights impacts by business partners (i.e. 
by their subsidiaries and contractors), both in company law and civil law. First, 
in 2014 the EU adopted the non-fi nancial reporting directive, which will require 
large corporations to report on how they address risks of human rights impacts 
linked to their operations, including by products, services, and business 
5  For further details, see A. Sanders, ‘The impact of the ‘Ruggie framework’ and the United 
Nations guiding principles on business and human rights on transnational human rights liti-
gation’. In  The business and human rights landscape: moving forward, looking back, K. E. 
Bravo & J. Martin (eds.) (2015) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 288–315. 
6  In this chapter the term ‘subsidiary’ includes all legal entities that are part of the group, 
including subsubsidiaries. 
7  See, for example, the English cases of  Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA Civ 525 and  Thompson v 
The Renwick Group plc (2014) EWCA Civ 635. 
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relationships. 8 The EU institutions discuss further steps in the area of confl ict 
minerals 9 and garment supply chains. 10 
 Second, in the UK, the Modern Slavery Act (2015) requires businesses to 
publish an annual statement that confi rms the steps taken to ensure that slavery 
and human traffi cking are not taking place in the business (or in any supply 
chain). 11 
 Third, the French Parliament is discussing a reform of the Commercial Code 
recognizing a duty of vigilance of parent companies with content and scope 
analogous to the concepts outlined in the UN Guiding Principles. 12 
 Fourth, in Switzerland a coalition of 77 organizations launched a popular 
initiative that aims to put to a public vote in referendum a proposal for legal 
reform that would oblige companies to carry out due diligence and introduce 
their liability for human rights abuses and environmental violations caused abroad 
by companies under their control. 13 
 In March 2016, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
a recommendation 14 providing that Member States should take measures that: 
(a) encourage or, where appropriate, require, that business enterprises carry our 
human rights due diligence throughout their operations; (b) encourage and, 
where appropriate, require such businesses to provide information on their efforts 
 8  EU Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as 
regards disclosure of non-fi nancial and diversity information by certain large undertakings 
and groups,  OJ L 330/1 , 15 November 2014. 
 9  See C. Barbière, EU institutions still divided over confl ict minerals (5 February 2016). 
Retrieved from EurActive website: http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/
news/eu-institutions-still-divided-over-confl ict-minerals/, accessed 30 May 2016. 
10  On 25 April 2016, the European Commission hosted the fi rst High-level Conference on 
responsible supply chain management in the garment sector, to promote successful existing 
initiatives, including from Member States and industry, and provide a platform for continu-
ing the dialogue at EU level (see European Commission, High-level Conference on 
Responsible Management of the Supply Chain in the Garment Sector (n.d.). Retrieved 
from https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/high-level-conference-responsible-
management-supply-chain-garment-sector_en, accessed 30 May 2016). 
11  Modern Slavery Act 2015 (cl. 30). 
12  See additional and up-to-date information on the offi cial French website of legal informa-
tion: http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/panorama/texte-discussion/proposition-loi-
relative-au-devoir-vigilance-societes-meres-entreprises-donneuses-ordre.html, accessed 
30 May 2016. The latest draft of the bill, as approved by the French National Assembly 
on 23 March 2016 is available at: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0708.asp, 
accessed 30 May 2016. 
13  See E. Umlas, Human rights due diligence: Swiss civil society pushes the envelope (n.d.). 
Retrieved from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, http://business-human-
rights.org/en/human-rights-due-diligence-swiss-civil-society-pushes-the-envelope, accessed 
30 May 2016; see also the offi cial website: http://www.konzern-initiative.ch/ accessed 30 May 
2016. 
14  Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers), Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 on 
human rights and business, 2 March 2016. 
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on corporate responsibility to respect human rights; 15 and (c) ensure that human 
rights abuses caused by business enterprises give rise to civil liability, and examine 
the possibility of creating civil causes of action against business enterprises that 
cause human rights abuses as a consequence of a failure to carry out adequate 
due diligence processes to prevent or mitigate risks to human rights. 16 
 In November 2014, the Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights launched an initiative ‘to make domestic legal responses fairer and more 
effective for victims of business-related human rights abuses, particularly in the 
most severe cases.’ The initiative, called the ‘Accountability and Remedy Project’ 
(ARP), ‘aims to deliver credible and concrete recommendations and guidance 
to States to enable more effective implementation of the Access to Remedy pillar 
of the UN Guiding Principles.’ On 10 May 2016, the High Commissioner 
published the ARP fi nal report, which will be discussed at the 32nd session of 
the UN Human Rights Council in June 2016. 17 This report includes guidance 
to UN Member States that ‘The principles for assessing corporate liability under 
domestic private law regimes are properly aligned with the responsibility of 
companies to exercise human rights due diligence across their operations.’ 18 
 Finally, there are multiple examples in law recognizing the liability of com-
panies for the acts of other entities, such as their subsidiaries, business partners, 
or agents. These examples can be found in environmental law, 19 labour law, 20 
and criminal law. 21 The conditions for liability differ depending on the nature 
15  Ibid. , paras 20 and 21. 
16  Ibid. , para. 32 and Explanatory Memoradum, para. 54. 
17  UN Doc. A/HRC/32/19, 10 May 2016. 
18  Ibid. , Policy Objective no. 14. 
19  See, for example, U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act – ‘CERCLA’ (42 U.S.C. § 9601–9675) and Canadian Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C. 
1996, c. 482. In  United States v Bestfoods , No. 97–454 (1998) the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that parent companies can be directly liable under CERCLA § 107(a) 
if they are directly involved in the subsidiary’s management of hazardous substances. 
20  The Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of 
illegally staying third-country nationals  ( OJ L 168, 30 June 2009) provides that both an 
employer who employed illegally staying third-country nationals and a contractor to whom 
the employer was subcontractor, should be liable for fi nancial sanctions and back payments. 
In the UK, the Pensions Act 2004 (cl. 35) provides that, if the pension fund established 
by the service company that employs employees of the group of companies goes into defi cit, 
the other group companies cannot insulate themselves from that defi cit and can be made 
to contribute to the fund to meet the liabilities to the employees. 
21  In the UK, s. 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 (cl. 23), recognizes a criminal offence of the failure 
of commercial organizations to prevent bribery on their behalf. Bribery may be carried 
out by an employee, an agent, a subsidiary, or another third party, as found in s. 8. In 
France, on 25 September 2012, the Cour de cassation in Paris found the company Total 
liable for a criminal offence as regards the tanker Erika oil spill in 1999. Erika was operated 
by a subcontractor of Total’s subsidiary. The court has made clear that criminal liability 
could be found liable beyond legal separation made between two companies when de facto 
they work as a single one, so that such separation can be considered as a ‘legal fi ction’. 
(Cass (crim.), judgement no. 3439, 25 September 2015). 
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and the purpose of the regulation. In some instances, the liability of the com-
pany is absolute, such as, for example, in competition law. In other cases, liability 
is built on principles similar to the human rights due diligence concept, that is, 
that the company may discharge its liability if it took all reasonable steps to 
prevent the violation. 
 4.3 Scenarios 
 4.3.1 Scenario I: access to evidence on control 
 4.3.1.1 Background 
 The exact conditions under which a company is liable for not having prevented 
a human rights violation by its business partner (e.g. a subsidiary or a contrac-
tor) have not yet been fl eshed out comprehensively in the case law and they 
are subject to debate. Generally speaking, however, liability of the company 
will require the victim to prove that the company breached a duty of care 
that it owed to him, and that his damage was caused by this breach. One of 
the conditions for the breach of a company’s duty of care, when this company 
did not cause the harm itself, is that the company exercised suffi cient control 
over the business partner causing the harm, and that the company did not 
use this control in such a way as to prevent the business partner from violat-
ing human rights, while if ‘acting like a reasonably acting company put in the 
same conditions’, 22 the company would have done so. A pivotal consideration 
for this will be whether, considering the likeliness and magnitude of the 
potential harm to third parties by violating human rights, the company should 
have taken measures to prevent the harm from occurring or to mitigate its 
consequences. 
 Control can be of a formal character (such as in parent-subsidiaries relation-
ships) or mainly factual (such as in supply chain situations). It may also imply 
that the company one way or another had the power to infl uence the conduct 
of its business partner. The case law does not yet provide a clear defi nition as 
to what amounts to suffi cient control. The courts have to assess this on a case-
by-case basis and the assessment may differ per jurisdiction. The usual default 
position is that it is for the victim to provide the court with satisfactory evidence 
that the company exercised suffi cient control over its business partner to infl u-
ence its conduct. This illustrates the importance of victims gaining access to the 
relevant information. 
 Although much evidence of a company’s business relationships may be col-
lected and obtained by claimants from publicly available sources, this is usually 
22  The ‘reasonable company’ is defi ned based on several criteria that depend, notably, on the 
size and sector of the company. 
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a very time-consuming and costly affair. Moreover, claimants can simply not 
access evidence that is in the realm of the company. The latter is particularly 
problematic with respect to evidence that a company controlled or infl uenced 
the actions which caused or contributed to the harm, but which were carried 
out by a third party, such as a company’s subsidiary or a contractor. 
 One of the main reasons why victims of human rights abuses often cannot 
get access to relevant information to demonstrate the liability of a company is 
that the national rules on disclosure of evidence that are in force in the forum 
country often do not allow for this. 
 In this respect, common law and civil law systems differ considerably. 
Roughly speaking, common law systems of civil procedure contain general 
rules on disclosure of evidence 23 whereas civil law systems of civil procedure 
do not. 24 In England and Wales, there is a general duty to disclose evidence 
relevant to the case under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). In practice, this 
means that before the trial ‘a party discloses a document by stating that the 
document exists or has existed’ and ‘a party to whom a document has been 
disclosed has a right to inspect that document’ and obtain a copy. ‘Docu-
ment’ has a very broad meaning and includes anything in which information 
of any description is recorded, covering any form of electronic document, 
on any media device. The only limitations are the overriding principle of 
proportionality of the disclosure requests, which should be limited by either 
date, persons, place or categories, and the fact that privileged documents are 
limited to inspection only. 
 In civil law systems, of civil procedure this option is not available. It is usually 
for the claimant to request the court to order the defendant to disclose specifi c 
documents. The burden of adequately specifying the documents and to justify 
a legitimate interest in inspection of those documents is on the claimant. The 
courts are generally very reluctant to allow such a request and to order the 
defendant to disclose one or more of the specifi ed documents. 25 This means 
that companies have no incentive to be transparent about their involvement 
23  In this chapter the English term ‘disclosure’ will be used. In the US this phenomenon is 
known as ‘discovery’. The rules differ in detail but not in principle. 
24  In some jurisdictions like the Netherlands, the courts may require a defendant to provide 
information enabling the claimant to substantiate his claim. See Hoge Raad 20 November 
1987,  Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988/500 (Timmer/Deutman) and Hoge Raad 18 Feb-
ruary 1994,  Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1994/368 (Schepers/De Bruijn). So far, such a 
rule has, however, not been applied in cases against parent companies with respect to their 
control over subsidiaries. In the Netherlands, legislative reform with respect to disclosure 
is also considered, but no specifi c action has yet been taken. 
25  An example of a small breakthrough is Court of Appeal The Hague,  Milieudefensie a.o./
Shell , 18 December 2015. See Liesbeth F. H. Enneking, ‘Multinationals and Transparency 
in Foreign Direct Liability Cases. The Prospects for Obtaining Evidence under the Dutch 
Civil Procedural Regime on the Production of Exhibits,’ 3  Dovenschmidt Quarterly (2013) 
134–147. 
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because this might give a clue to claimants as to which documents they would 
like to request. For the claimants, this is an unfortunate position as it involves 
the risk of requesting the wrong documents or not all the relevant 
documents. 
 4.3.1.2 Description of Scenario I 
 Civil law jurisdictions introduce a specifi c disclosure obligation in a civil court 
procedure with respect to the control a parent company exercises over its sub-
sidiaries and contractors. This would oblige a company-defendant to disclose 
all details of the control it exercises over its subsidiaries and contractors, and 
its general involvement in the management of its subsidiaries and contractors 
as well as its control and involvement in the specifi c case connected to the claim, 
inasmuch as this information is relevant for assessing the company-defendant’s 
duty of care. The aim of this scenario is to limit the current discretion of the 
courts and to extend the basis for claimants to access information, albeit on a 
limited aspect of the liability question as a whole. 
 Effective disclosure is also key to brokering any possible early dispute resolu-
tion where appropriate (as often happens in common law jurisdictions by pre-trial 
out of court settlements). Thus it contributes to the limitation of time and costs 
of the proceedings. 
 This reform does not concern common law jurisdictions because they already 
provide for extensive pre-trial disclosure obligations. 
 4.3.1.3 Feasibility 
 For the scenario to be feasible a number of issues need to be addressed, 
particularly with respect to the question as to which information is legally 
required. 
 In this regard, the concept of control needs to be clarifi ed and developed. 
Defi ning such control could be done in legislation. The legislation could provide 
guidelines with respect to control and leave it to the court that hears the case to 
apply these guidelines, specify the disclosure obligation, and tailor it to the 
circumstances of the case. This would allow the court to keep the disclosure 
obligation up to date. In fact, circumstances under which a parent company 
may be held liable might change over time and so may the information on 
control that is relevant to assess the duty of care. 
 The issues regarding confi dentiality and competitiveness can be dealt with in 
line with provisions in common law jurisdictions that contain strong safeguards 
in this respect. 
 This scenario may be implemented as a procedural rule or as a substantive 
rule. Implementing it as a procedural rule would imply amending the national 
codes of procedure, which might be challenging for Member States of the EU. 
Implementing it as a substantive rule would mean that according to the Rome II 
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Regulation on applicable law, 26 the court must in principle apply the law of 
the place where the harm occurred. There are several exceptions provided in 
the Regulation, but it is disputed whether they would fi t this scenario. 27 This 
issue needs to be clarifi ed by drafting the reform as an overriding mandatory 
provision in the sense of Article 16, which would allow the court to apply it 
as a mandatory provision of the law of the forum country, which will usually 
be the country where the parent company is based, instead of the law of the 
country where the harm occurred. 
 4.3.1.4 Effectiveness 
 In order for the information made available to be effective, the document subject 
to disclosure in court should not be limited to general and formal documents 
but should include emails and reports of meetings, etc. Again, this can be 
brought in line with existing disclosure obligations in common law jurisdictions 
like England. 
 4.3.2 Scenario II: rebuttable presumption of control 
 4.3.2.1 Background 
 The background for Scenario II is the same as in Scenario I. That is, in current 
tort law, the victim-claimant has the burden of proof with respect to the control 
exercised by the company-defendant over its subsidiary, or another business 
partner, which caused the harm. The problem as regards access to remedy is 
the lack of information for claimants in this respect. 
 4.3.2.2 Description of Scenario II 
 This scenario requires a court to accept prima facie evidence 28 that a company 
exercises control over its subsidiaries or other business partners, and then shifts 
the burden of proof to the company to prove that it did not exercise such 
control (the shift only concerns control, not the duty of care and the breach 
of duty). The court could use prima facie control defi nitions from, for example, 
accounting law, thus assuming control: (i) if the company controls the majority 
26  EU Regulation No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II),  OJ L-199/40 . 
27  A provision of domestic provision can be applied instead of a provision of the normally 
applicable law if the latter provision is manifestly incompatible with the public policy ( ordre 
public ) of the forum (Art. 26). Domestic mandatory provisions shall always be applied in 
addition the normally applicable law (Art. 16). 
28  Prima facie evidence means evidence that upon initial examination appears to support a 
case. 
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of shareholders’ voting rights; (ii) if the company has appointed or has the right 
to appoint the majority of the subsidiary’s management; or (iii) if the company 
has the power to exercise or exercises dominant infl uence on its subsidiary. 29 If 
the company would not meet such a threshold, the court would not accept 
the existence of control prima facie, so the victims would have to demonstrate the 
existence of such control under ordinary principles of law (i.e. as usual). 
 This scenario is limited to claims concerning the control a company exercises 
as regards its potential duty of care in tort. It does not apply to other types of 
disputes, such as breach of contract. 
 The disclosure obligation described in Scenario I allows the claimant to obtain 
information in order to prove that the parent exercised control over the sub-
sidiary or another business partner in the specifi c case, while this Scenario II 
goes a small step further by, under certain conditions, assuming a rebuttable 
presumption of control. In both scenarios the requirements for liability (duty 
of care, the breach of that duty, causation and damage) will still need to be 
established. However, both scenarios will be of considerable help for claimants 
in having access to remedy for the abuse of their human rights. 
 4.3.2.3 Feasibility 
 The scenario, if implemented as a reform of substantive law, would not be 
applied in cases for which it would be designed. The reason for this is that, 
according to the Rome II Regulation on applicable law, 30 the court must in 
principle apply the law of the place where the harm occurred. There are several 
exceptions provided in the Regulation, but it is disputed whether they would 
fi t this scenario. 31 This issue needs to be clarifi ed by drafting the reform as an 
overriding mandatory provision in the sense of Article 16, which would allow 
the court to apply it as a mandatory provision of the law of the forum country, 
which will usually be the country where the parent company is based, instead 
of the law of the country where the harm occurred. 
 The scenario represents a gradual rather than a departure in principle from 
existing law. Courts may already be able to partially alleviate the burden of 
proof placed on claimants where the facts speak for themselves (known as ‘ res 
ipsa loquitur ’). They should be encouraged to do so also for the questions of 
29  In accounting law meeting these criteria means that the accounts of this company need to 
be included in the accounts of the group (See Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 
on the annual fi nancial statements, consolidated fi nancial statements and related reports of 
certain types of undertakings,  OJ L 182 , 29 June 2013, pp. 19–76). 
30  EU Regulation No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II),  OJ L-199/40 . 
31  A provision of domestic provision can be applied instead of a provision of the normally 
applicable law if the latter provision is manifestly incompatible with the public policy ( ordre 
public ) of the forum (Art. 26). Domestic mandatory provisions shall always be applied in 
addition the normally applicable law (Art. 16). 
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a parent company’s control of its business partners, although the full imple-
mentation of this scenario requires a statutory reform. 
 The rebuttable presumption is a less radical approach than the option of a 
full reversal of the burden of proof of control, because it still requires claimants 
to present prima facie evidence. It does not radically change the legal situation 
of the defendant companies, in that it would not result in automatic liability 
for the conduct of their subsidiaries, or cause any obviously onerous issues with 
respect to competitiveness and confi dentiality. 
 4.3.2.4 Effectiveness 
 Just like Scenario I, Scenario II requires a clear defi nition of the concept of the 
control, which should be fl exible so that the courts can adapt its specifi c contents 
to the evolution of business behaviour and practices. 
 The proposal can be effective in helping claimants to address a failure of a 
company to adequately supervise its subsidiaries. However, it does not address 
other evidential gaps, for example regarding diffi culties with respect to the 
scientifi c, technical and legal connection between the victims’ injuries and com-
pany’s conduct, which would need to be addressed by a more far-reaching 
reform of evidence disclosure. 
 4.3.3 Scenario III: statutory duty for a company to conduct 
human rights due diligence 
 4.3.3.1 Background 
 In most legal systems, it is diffi cult for victims of corporate human rights abuses 
to establish that a company owed them a duty of care not only to prevent its 
subsidiaries, 32 but also its suppliers and other business partners, from commit-
ting human rights abuses against them and/or to mitigate the consequences of 
any such abuses that have already occurred. There is very little case law clarifying 
this point and, if it does, such duties are only accepted, if at all, under strict 
and narrow conditions. 
 4.3.3.2 Description of Scenario III 
 This scenario proposes making human rights due diligence (HRDD) compulsory 
by creating statutory duties to identify, prevent, mitigate and cease human rights 
abuses for which the company conducting the HRDD is directly or indirectly 
responsible, that is, those caused by its business partners, over which the com-
pany can exercise control, and by providing remedies (damages, injunctions) in 
32  See with respect to parents and subsidiaries, the English cases of  Chandler v Cape [2012] 
EWCA Civ 525 and  Thompson v The Renwick Group plc (2014) EWCA Civ 635. 
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the case that one or more of these duties should be breached. The HRDD of 
the UN Guiding Principles still goes considerably further than this scenario, as 
it is not limited to situations of legal or factual control. 
 The statutory duty to conduct HRDD implies a duty of care owed by the 
company to victims of human rights abuse that corresponds with the extent of 
the HRDD. Liability of the company would depend on the question of whether 
it effectively carried out the HRDD, and whether there was a suffi cient causal 
connection between the harm suffered by the victims and the lack of HRDD 
by the company. 
 Conducting HRDD is not an absolute standard but depends on the circumstances 
of the case. 33 In this respect, the statutory standard will be comparable with the 
general tort law standard of ‘acting as a reasonable person’. It would mean that if 
the company did not meet the HRDD requirements, it can be considered not to 
have acted as a ‘reasonable person’ or a ‘reasonable company’ put in the same 
conditions and would therefore be liable subject to certain additional conditions. 34 
This ‘reasonable company’ is based on several criteria, such as the magnitude of 
the risk of a human rights violation, the burden for the company (in terms of time 
and costs) to take precautionary measures, as well as the size and sector of the 
company. Generally accepted industry standards would further inform the assess-
ment of the reasonableness of an action taken to discharge the duty. 
 If the company has breached its duty by not properly carrying out HRDD, 
it will be liable for the damage that occurred as a consequence of this breach. 
This will, for example, be the case if carrying out HRDD would have enabled 
the company to identify the human rights risk that threatened the victim and 
to take measures to prevent the human rights violation or to limit the conse-
quences of such violation. 
 If these requirements are met, the company is obliged to pay compensation 
for the damage suffered by the claimants. 
 This statutory duty may not only be enforced by victims of human rights 
abuses in the framework of tort law but at the same time also by public law 
measures. As regards the latter, one may think of enforcement by a public body 
(regulator) that is entitled to fi ne a company that breaches such duties or order 
the company to refrain from certain conduct or to do something, for example, 
providing an effective remedy for a human rights violation in which the company 
was involved. 35 This way of public enforcement could be akin to rules applying 
in competition law, consumer protection law, and fi nancial services law. 
33  Compare UN Guiding Principle 17B: ‘Human rights due diligence [. . .] will vary in 
complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the risk of severe human rights impacts, 
and the nature and context of its operations’. 
34  See section entitled ‘Description of Scenario III – comparison with existing tort law’. 
35  For example, in the UK, regulators have the statutory power to order a company to pay 
compensation to individuals or companies that have been negatively affected by the breach 
of statutory regulatory duties with respect to market behaviour (See Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (cl. 8), s. 212). 
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 DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO III – VARIATIONS 
 Some variations of this scenario are conceivable. First, the company’s liability 
might initially be limited to subsidiaries over which it exercises control, for 
example, as provided for in the defi nition in accounting law as suggested in 
Scenario II. Later, the scope can be extended to other business partners over 
whom the company exercises suffi cient control (such as companies in the supply 
chain, for example, direct contractors that are not also the company’s subsidiar-
ies). For these latter cases, it needs to be established how much control is needed 
to create a legal duty and, in conjunction with this, what such a duty would 
entail. The content of this duty can be partially clarifi ed by the emerging stan-
dards for value chain responsibility, such as the OECD general 36 and sector-wise 
due diligence standards, 37 and government supported multi-stakeholder initiatives 
such as the Dutch Garment Covenant. 38 
 Second, the company’s liability might initially be limited to certain specifi c 
human rights risks. This may link to certain human rights or to a certain level 
of breach such as ‘serious human rights abuses’. Alternatively, it may link to 
internationally recognized standards, for example, with respect to environmental 
harm. Limiting the scope of the statutory duty in this way would also help to 
provide a private right of action in common law jurisdictions. 39 
 Third, the burden of proof with respect to the breach of this statutory duty 
is, in principle, on the claimant. This burden may be alleviated with respect to 
information that is in the realm of the company in line with Scenario I and 
with respect to the legal control in line with Scenario II. It is, however, also 
conceivable to reverse the burden of proof of the breach of the duty altogether, 
or for the causation between the failure to conduct HRDD and the damage. 
This would mean that it is for the company to prove that it carried out due 
diligence/acted as would a reasonable company. Such a scenario would 
strengthen the position of victims of human rights abuses even further than by 
36  See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises available at: http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne, accessed 30 May 2016. As of May 2016, OECD develops detailed due 
diligence guidance for responsible business conduct. 
37  See, for example, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Miner-
als from Confl ict-Affected and High-Risk Areas available at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/
mne/mining.htm, accessed 30 May 2016; OECD-FAO Guidance for Responsible Agri-
cultural Supply Chains available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/
rbc-agriculture-supply-chains.htm, accessed 30 May 2016; and the Draft OECD Due Dili-
gence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector 
available at: https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Draft-for-Consultation-Due-Diligence-Guidance-
Responsible-Supply-Chains-Garment-Footwear-Sector.pdf, accessed 30 May 2016. 
38  The full document is available in Dutch on the webpage: http://www.ser.nl/~/media/
fi les/internet/publicaties/overige/2010_2019/2016/convenant-duurzame-kleding-textiel.
ashx, accessed 30 May 2016. The English translation is available at: http://eu-roadmap.
nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/agreement-sustainable-garment-textile.pdf, accessed 
30 May 2016. 
39  See section entitled: ‘Description of Scenario III – Comparison with existing tort law’. 
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introducing a statutory HRDD duty and it would lower their threshold for 
access to justice. Still, in such a variation, the victim would need to prove the 
basic facts, such as that he suffered harm because of a human rights violation 
by a subordinate company. It may then be up to the company–defendant to 
prove that it did not breach its duty, for example, because it did not have suf-
fi cient control over the violating company, or because it could not reasonably 
prevent the violation from happening. 
 Fourth, the legal duty could initially be limited to large companies. 
 DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO III – RELATIONSHIP WITH UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 The proposal brings the company’s duty of care to business relationships in line 
with the scope of the HRDD in the UN Guiding Principles, which require 
companies to address risks of human rights abuses which may be directly linked 
to its operations, products, and services by its business relationships alongside 
those that the company may cause or contribute to. However, Scenario III is 
limited to situations of legal and factual control, whereas the HRDD of the 
UN Guiding Principles is not. 
 The traditional focus of due diligence is on identifying risks. This is under-
standable from the perspective of the traditional aim of carrying out due dili-
gence: to identify (hidden) risks in the books of a company that is about to be 
taken over or becomes part of a merger. However, HRDD has a broader focus. 
It is not only aimed at identifying human rights risks but also at  preventing and 
 mitigating them. This implicitly includes  ceasing the risk from continuing to 
exist. If a human rights violation occurs, the question is therefore whether the 
company’s HRDD could and should have avoided it, ceased it, or limited its 
consequences. 
 DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO III – COMPARISON WITH EXISTING TORT LAW 
 This scenario would establish a statutory duty for a company to carry out 
HRDD. Apart from this new step, the conditions under which the company 
would be liable are the same as under traditional tort law. 
 First, the statutory duty must have been breached, which means that it has 
to be established that the company did not effectively carry out HRDD. 
 Second, it needs to be established that the claimants have suffered damage 
and that this damage was caused or contributed to by the company’s breach of 
duty of carrying out HRDD. The burden of proof for the breach of the duty, 
causation and damage remains, in principle, on the claimants. Claimants may, 
therefore, still need help from Scenarios I and II, which partially alleviate this 
burden with respect to the question of control. 
 Third, under English law, the new statute must either include an express 
provision for civil liability or it must be clear from the context of the statute 
that it allows a person damaged by the breach to bring an action for breach of 
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statutory duty. In fact, in common law, a breach of statutory duty does not, by 
itself, give rise to any private law cause of action. 40 For example, the statutory 
duties owed by company directors to the company exist for the benefi t of its 
members, and not for the benefi t of third parties. 41 As a result, a person suf-
fering a human rights abuse because of a breach of a statutory duty will not 
necessarily be eligible to launch a legal action for damages. Conversely, in civil 
law jurisdictions, the breach of a statutory duty does, in principle, give someone 
who suffers damage because of this breach a right to compensation against the 
company. However, the scope of this statutory duty may imply that it does not 
protect certain victims, or not against certain types of harm. This may follow 
from the context in which the statute was adopted by parliament or from the 
wording of the statutory duty. 
 DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO III – COMPARISON WITH EXISTING LEGAL PROPOSALS 
 i) The Swiss responsible business initiative  In Switzerland a coalition of 
seventy-seven organizations launched the Swiss Responsible Business Initiative 
(RBI), which is a popular initiative that aims to put to a public vote in ref-
erendum a proposal for legal reform that would oblige companies to carry 
out due diligence and introduce their liability for human rights abuses and 
environmental violations caused abroad by companies under their control. 42 
A popular initiative succeeds if the initiators manage to collect 100,000 sig-
natures from Swiss citizens across eighteen months. As of April 2016, twelve 
months after the launch of the initiative, the initiative collected 140,000 
signatures. Just before the launch of the initiative, the Swiss parliament fi rst 
accepted but then narrowly voted down a motion calling for mandatory 
HRDD. 43 
 RBI aims to embed the key principles of the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles into Swiss law. To this 
end, it presents a constitutional proposal that has four elements: 
 • Duty to respect: companies have to respect internationally recognized human 
rights and international environmental standards, and must ensure that these 
40  See M. A. Jones  et al . (eds.)  Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (2014) London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
9–06. 
41  Companies Act 2006 (cl. 46), s. 172. 
42  English translation of the initiative is available on the offi cial website: http://konzern-
initiative.ch/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/150421_sccj_factsheet_5_-_responsible_business_
initiative.pdf, accessed 30 May 2016. 
43  See further information in the complication from OECD Insights Blog prepared for OECD 
Week 2015:  How international investment is shaping the global economy , OECD 2015, 8, 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/2015-international-investment-blog-compilation.
pdf, accessed 30 May 2016. 
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standards are respected also by companies under their control. Control is 
to be determined according to the factual circumstances and may also result 
through the exercise of power in a business relationship. 
 • Mandatory due diligence: companies are required to carry out due diligence. 
In line with the UN Guiding Principles, this duty applies to controlled 
companies as well to all business relationships. 
 • Civil liability: companies are liable for damage caused by companies under 
their control. They can discharge this liability if they can prove that they 
took all due care in line with the HRDD requirement, or that the damage 
would have occurred even if all due care had been taken. 
 • Overriding mandatory provision: the aforementioned provisions will apply 
irrespective of the law applicable under private international law. 
 The main difference of RBI from Scenario III is that the company’s civil liability 
is not derived from the duty to conduct due diligence, which has a broader 
scope in RBI. Instead, the company is strictly, vicariously liable for the conduct 
of controlled entities. This type of liability, which is analogous to liability of 
employers, parents, or pet owners, provides the company with effective defence 
of demonstrating due diligence, which is not diffi cult if the company actually 
conducted due diligence. 
 This approach relieves victims of the burden of proving that the company 
did not exercise due care, evidence of which may not be publicly available. 
However, they still need to prove damage, illegality, causation between the 
damage and conduct of the controlled company, and control of the company-
defendant over the company causing the damage. 
 ii) The French duty of vigilance legislative bill  The French Parliament is 
discussing a reform of the Commercial Code recognizing a duty of vigilance of 
parent companies with content and scope analogous to the concepts outlined in 
the UN Guiding Principles. 
 The draft bill, in a version approved by the National Assembly on 23 March 
2016, 44 requires large companies 45 to elaborate, effectively implement, and 
disclose a plan of vigilance. The plan should include appropriate measures to 
identify and prevent risks of infringements to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, risks of serious injuries or environmental harms or health risks, as 
well as passive or active corruption, resulting directly or indirectly from 
44  The draft bill is available at: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0708.asp, accessed 
on 30 May 2016. See up to date information on the legislative development on the offi cial 
French website of legal information: http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/panorama/
texte-discussion/proposition-loi-relative-au-devoir-vigilance-societes-meres-entreprises-
donneuses-ordre.html, accessed 30 May 2016. 
45  Those employing more than 5,000 persons in France or above 10,000 employees in France 
and abroad. 
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company’s activities and activities of companies it controls and of its subcontrac-
tors and suppliers, with whom the company has an established business rela-
tionship. 46 Details on the content of the plan of vigilance and its implementation 
are subject to a State Council’s decree of application. Every person that has a 
justifi able interest can require the competent jurisdiction to order a company, 
subject to penalty, to establish the plan of vigilance, ensure its publication and 
account for its effective implementation. The bill further provides that non-
compliance with this duty gives rise to civil responsibility under French civil 
code Articles 1382 and 1383, that is, for the damage caused to another by act, 
imprudence, or negligence. 
 The duty of vigilance outlined in the bill is similar to Scenario III with 
several variations. First, it is limited to very large companies. Second, the 
earlier version of the draft included a rebuttable presumption that linked 
any damage to a lack or defect of the company’s vigilance plan. The current 
draft leaves the burden of proof on the victim to prove the tort. Third, the 
specifi cation of control of business partners relies on the defi nition of an 
established relationship provided in the legislation. Similarly, the standard 
of vigilance should be defi ned in an implementing decree. These defi nitions 
may increase legal certainty at the expense, however, of the court’s discretion 
to consider factual control and evolving social expectations concerning the 
standards of care. 
 iii) The German civil society proposal  A report commissioned by a 
coalition of NGOs in Germany sets out in detail the case for a duty of care for 
companies under German law. It proposes the introduction of a statutory duty 
of care for companies to make a human rights risk analysis, take appropriate 
preventive measures, and monitor their effectiveness. If a human rights 
risk has materialized, the company should take measures to attenuate the 
consequences. In the interest of the (potential) victims, the company must 
properly document the measures it takes. The statutory duty is both of a public 
law and a private law nature. First, in the case of a breach of this duty, a public 
authority can impose a fi ne on the company. Second, the breach of this duty 
constitutes the company’s liability in tort and entitles the victims of human 
rights violation to compensation for the damage suffered as a consequence of 
this violation. 47 
46  These relationships are defi ned under French law as stable, regular relationships, with or 
without contract, with a certain volume of business, creating a reasonable expectation that 
such relation will last. See Code de Commerce, Art L. 442–6-I-5 and the decision of the 
Cour de Cassation (commercial chamber) of 18 December 2007. 
47  R. Klinger  et al., Verankerung menschenrechtlicher Sorgfaltspfl ichten von Unternehmen im 
deutschen Recht, Berlin, Amnesty International  et al. , 2016. Available at: https://german-
watch.org/de/11970, accessed 30 May 2016. 
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 iv) The United Kingdom Bribery Act  The United Kingdom Bribery Act 48 
takes a different approach by imposing due diligence as a defence against 
criminal liability. Section 7(1) of the Bribery Act makes clear that the company’s 
responsibility extends to persons ‘associated with the company’ if they bribe 
another person with intention to obtain or retain business or an advantage in 
the conduct of business for the company. A person associated with the company 
is defi ned in section 8 as a person who performs services for or on behalf of the 
company, for example, as employees, agents, and subsidiaries. 
 On the other hand, the Bribery Act requires a company only to have proce-
dures in place designed to prevent such persons from committing bribery (sec-
tion 7(2)). HRDD goes further by focusing on the factual measures taken by 
the company to prevent, mitigate or cease human rights abuses in which the 
company is involved and to provide a remedy to victims in case no suffi cient 
and adequate measures were taken. 
 4.3.3.3 Feasibility 
 Like Scenario II, this scenario faces the applicable law problem: according to 
the EU Rome II Regulation, 49 the court must apply the law of the place where 
the harm occurred. Also here, exceptions may be applicable, but it is not beyond 
dispute whether they fi t this scenario. This issue needs to be clarifi ed by drafting 
the reform as an overriding mandatory provision in the sense of Article 16 (see 
above under Scenario II), which would allow the court to apply the law of the 
forum country, which will usually be the country where the company-defendant 
is based. 
 Apart from this obstacle of private international law, this scenario follows the 
general tendency in the discourse on business and human rights. It expands the 
boundaries of tort law by requiring companies to look beyond their current 
legal borders. This seems to be a big step but in practice a large number of 
companies have already pledged to adhere to the UN Guiding Principles and 
to implement human rights due diligence. The duty also corresponds with the 
increasing level of self-regulation in different areas and industries. This implies 
that many companies follow the principles of corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights, as expressed in the UN Guiding Principles. 
 A statutory obligation to conduct due diligence is not necessarily disadvanta-
geous for companies, as there is an increasing need for a level playing fi eld and 
legal certainty. A company that actually manages its risks properly will carry out 
due diligence to detect risks in order to minimize any negative impact for the 
company. In this sense, carrying out due diligence is primarily a risk manage-
ment tool and not a legal obligation. At the same time, this model encourages 
48  Bribery Act 2010 (cl. 23) 
49  EU Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II),  OJ L-199/40 . 
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companies to work closely with and to monitor subsidiaries and other business 
partners to prevent their involvement in human rights abuses, and, where the 
abuses occur, to mitigate them and provide a remedy at the operational level. 
Responsibly acting companies that invest means, time, and money in properly 
carrying out due diligence may be unjustifi ably disadvantaged in comparison 
with companies that do not make these efforts. A statutory duty to carry out 
HRDD could, therefore, also make a signifi cant contribution towards a level 
playing fi eld on the EU internal market. 
 Conclusion 
 Juan José Álvarez Rubio and Katerina Yiannibas 
 The challenge as stated above is to adapt to the globalized economy with scru-
pulous respect for human rights. A new and emerging globalized reality has 
resulted in an age of radical transformation of our frames of reference. States 
do not have the capacity to unilaterally address all the problems of this complex 
world and cannot solve all the needs of its inhabitants. Further multilateral and 
multilevel governance is required. 
 On 25 March 1957 the European Economic Community was established 
at the initiative of the six founding states. Beyond an economic project, it 
was conceived as a project of peace and freedom at the end of World War II, 
which had ravaged the European continent. After more than half a century 
of multilateral cooperation, the utopic dream of peace on the continent has 
materialized. From its post-war inception, European integration has been 
based on the protection and promotion of human rights and respect for the 
rule of law. These must continue to be the basis for any action of the Euro-
pean Union. The recent economic and fi nancial crisis has fatigued and even 
undermined the engine of European solidarity. It is increasingly tempting 
(and dangerous for our collective future) to think of every man for himself, 
to return to protectionism, autarchy. More than ever, the values and principles 
upon which the EU was built should be considered carefully and upheld 
respectfully. 
 The EU defends the universality and indivisibility of human rights through 
close and active cooperation with third states, international, and regional orga-
nizations, as well as associations and groups at all levels of society. Human rights 
are at the centre of EU relations with other states and regions. With its human 
rights policy, the EU promotes the rights of women, children, minorities and 
displaced persons, opposes the death penalty, torture, human traffi cking, and 
discrimination, and defends civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. 
The values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights are enshrined in the EU treaties. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU is a clear and fi rm declaration of the rights of 
EU citizens and establishes that fundamental rights are binding on EU institu-
tions and on Member State governments when they are implementing EU 
legislation. 
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 In particular, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
reaffi rms the EU commitment to respect human rights internationally and 
enshrines the right to an effective remedy and judicial protection. The task 
before the European legislator is to promote and ensure effective and effi cient 
access to justice, to further develop a justice system of social protection. This 
book identifi es some solutions to the complex legal and practical challenges 
associated with access to remedy in order to assist the efforts of the EU and 
EU Member States to implement the UN Guiding Principles. To this end, the 
following recommendations are advanced: 
 a) As concerning the jurisdictional issues for access to judicial remedies 
 • When deciding on their jurisdiction in private litigation for human rights 
abuses by multinational companies, state courts of EU Member States must 
have due regard to their human rights obligations to ensure effective civil 
remedies under the European Convention on Human Rights and interna-
tional human rights law. 
 • EU Member States should consider allowing their domestic courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction over civil claims concerning business-related human rights 
abuses against subsidiaries, wherever they are based, of companies domiciled 
within their jurisdiction if such claims are closely connected with civil claims 
against the latter companies. 
 • EU Member States’ courts should reverse the foreseeability test applied in 
the ECJ’s  Painer case for joining actions on different legal bases, in cases 
where parents and subsidiaries are joined together. This would put the 
burden on the defendant company to prove that it was unforeseeable that 
the parent may be held jointly liable with the subsidiary, rather than the 
plaintiffs having to argue that it was foreseeable. 
 • Where companies are not domiciled within their jurisdiction, EU Member 
States should consider, or not retreat from, the possibility of allowing their 
domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil claims concerning business-
related human rights abuses against such a business enterprise, if no other 
effective forum guaranteeing a fair trial is available ( forum necessitatis ), and 
there is a suffi ciently close connection to the Member State concerned. 
 • EU Member States should consider introducing a rebuttable presumption 
of control in determining a subsidiary’s central administration; a wholly 
owned or majority-owned subsidiary is presumed to have its central admin-
istration with the parent company, unless the parent can prove that the 
subsidiary makes relevant business decisions independently from the parent 
and has no ties with the parent’s place of incorporation. 
 b) As concerning the issue of applicable law 
 • Future case law by the ECJ and the Member State courts on the applica-
tion of the Rome II Regulation’s special rule on environmental damage in 
Conclusion 141
civil liability cases involving people and planet-related harm in non-EU host 
states as a result of the operations of EU-based internationally operating 
business enterprises should be closely monitored. 
 • Future case law by the ECJ and the Member State courts on the applica-
tion of the Rome II Regulation’s exceptions on overriding mandatory 
provisions and public policy and the provision on rules of safety and conduct 
in civil liability cases involving people and planet-related harm in non-EU 
host states as a result of the operations of EU-based internationally operat-
ing business enterprises should be closely monitored. 
 • Where necessary, action should be taken at the EU level and/or at the level 
of the individual Member States to prevent the application of these provisions 
from hampering the realization of EU (Member States’) policies on interna-
tional corporate social responsibility and business respect for human rights. 
 • The possibility of extending the scope of the Rome II Regulation’s special 
rule on environmental damage to human rights related damage as well as, 
possibly, health and safety related damage should be seriously considered. 
 • Further research should be conducted into the ways in which such an 
extension could be formulated so as to promote the realization of EU 
(Member States’) policies on international corporate social responsibility 
and business respect for human rights. 
 c) As concerning the issue of procedural rules and practical circumstances 
 • Civil liability cases before EU Member State courts involving people and 
planet-related harm in non-EU host states as a result of the operations of 
EU-based internationally operating business enterprises, should be closely 
monitored so as to identify any procedural rules or practical circumstances 
that may lead to a denial of justice for victims of corporate human rights 
or environmental abuse, regardless of the merits of the claim. 
 • In doing so, the absence of new or further claims in one or more of the 
Member States, at a time when the prevalence of this type of litigation is 
strongly on the increase, will be interpreted as an indication that procedural 
and practical barriers exist in those Member States that render the pursuit 
of such claims impossible altogether. 
 • Where necessary, action should be taken by the individual Member States 
as well as at the EU-level to prevent procedural rules and practical circum-
stances, especially those relating to costs, collective redress and access to 
evidence, from resulting in a denial of justice for victims of corporate human 
rights or environmental abuse. 
 d) As concerning non-judicial remedies 
 • Further research is needed (e.g. by academia, civil society) 
 • Concerning the experience of individuals and communities that have 
utilised company-based grievance mechanisms. Based on this, develop 
for which types of adverse human rights impacts company-based 
142 Juan José Álvarez Rubio and Katerina Yiannibas
grievance mechanisms are suitable and how they can supplement judicial 
proceedings. 
 • Concerning the effectiveness and follow-up of company-based grievance 
mechanisms in order to be able to assess whether the mechanisms lead 
to fair remediation. 
 • Further guidance from the UN system is needed 
 • To develop more specifi c guidance for the implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles in order to ensure effective and rights-based mecha-
nisms, including monitoring of the implementation of company-based 
grievance mechanisms. 
 • To further develop the UN Global Compact’s disclosure procedures 
(Communications on Progress) strengthening the implementation of 
fully-fl edged operational-level grievance mechanisms. 
 • Action by the EU and its Member States is needed 
 • To provide clear guidance for company-based grievance mechanisms 
e.g. in the EU or National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights, 
taking into account research on ‘good practices’ and shortcomings. 
 • EU Member States should give a mandate to the PCA to adopt a set 
of arbitration rules in disputes relating to corporate related human 
rights abuses. Such rules should provide for transparency,  amicus curiae 
participation, collective redress, site visits, specialized arbitrators, fi nan-
cial assistance, and oversight of the implementation of the award. 
 • EU Member States should give a mandate to the PCA to adapt the 
Financial Assistance Fund to provide fi nancial assistance to non-state 
parties when the subject matter of the dispute involves corporate related 
human rights abuses. 
 • Further development at the company level is needed 
 • To establish independent entry channels for fi ling complaints that are 
dealt with by (ideally, external) stakeholders who strive to achieve 
equitable solutions for all parties. 
 • To strengthen trust in the procedures by ensuring confi dentiality of 
individual complaints handled by external stakeholders. 
 • To provide more information to (potential) victims of corporate related 
human rights abuse so that they have adequate knowledge about channels 
available to obtain redress and can choose the best option according to their 
specifi c situations. Ensure that the information is delivered in a culturally 
and linguistically appropriate way and takes into account fear of reprisals. 
 As concerning corporate responsibility vis-à-vis a legal duty of care, three com-
plimentary options for legal reform are proposed: 
 • Scenario I: facilitating victims’ access to evidence of the defendant-
company’s control over its business partner, e.g. subsidiary or contractor, 
that has committed the alleged human rights abuses. 
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 • Scenario II: in terms of burden of proof, presuming the existence of such 
control when certain conditions are met that show control, prima facie. 
 • Scenario III: introducing a company’s statutory duty to identify, prevent 
and take action to cease human rights abuses by its business partners, 
analogous to the human rights due diligence outlined in the UN Guiding 
Principles. 
 The EU has an opportunity to lead by example, to adopt legal instruments that 
demonstrate that it is possible to promote international trade and the protection 
of human rights both within and outside the EU. Law is a tool for achieving 
this objective strategically. The technical dimension of legal reform is the work 
of research and, in this case, the result of an academic alliance of legal scholars 
and practitioners with the support of the European Commission. At the dawn 
of the twenty-fi rst century, Europe faces one of the most important challenges 
in its history: to build a new model of political coexistence, a new form of 
democracy that, beyond the mere juxtaposition of current political systems, is 
capable of global leadership in social justice and sustainable development. Europe 
must respond to the challenges of the twenty-fi rst century courageously and 
innovatively. In these uncertain times, the EU is in a unique position to promote 
a model for social and political organization based not on interest but, above 
all, on values. 
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